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Individuals vary in the degree to which they perceive, endure and respond to different situational 
demands, such as stressful social situations. Personality theories aim to capture such individual 
differences in the experience of affect. Personality characteristics are also related to the likelihood 
of the development of anxiety disorders. In the context of social interactions, the extreme fear of 
the scrutiny of others has been differentiated for 40 years from other specific fears or agoraphobia 
and recognized as Social Anxiety Disorder (Diagnostic & Statistical Manual for mental disorders 
-dsm-iv-, American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Stein & Stein, 2008). This thesis presents re-
search that investigates the neurobiology of sad, and personality factors that are associated with 
its development.
1.1 Social Anxiety Disorder
Social anxiety disorder (sad) is characterized by a persistent fear of one or more performance 
situations with exposure to unfamiliar people (dsm-iv, American Psychiatric Association, 1994). 
A person with sad fears that he or she will act in a way that will be humiliating or embarrassing, 
and exposure to the feared situations almost invariably provokes anxiety, which can take the form 
of panic attacks (Stein & Stein, 2008). Social situations are either avoided or endured with intense 
anxiety or distress (Stein & Stein, 2008). The diagnosis of sad requires that the condition interferes 
substantially with the person’s normal routine (Stein & Stein, 2008). The lifetime prevalence rates 
vary between 5-12 percent depending on the inclusion criteria (Stein & Stein, 2008). Social anxiety 
can be treated relatively well, with both pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy (Fedoroff & Taylor, 
2001; Stein & Stein, 2008). When both are directly compared, pharmacological treatment seems to 
have a stronger immediate result, but the effects of behavioral treatment last longer (Gelernter et 
al., 1991; Heimberg et al., 1998; Stein & Stein, 2008). Nonetheless, a considerable number of patients 
do not respond adequately to treatment (Gaston, Abbott, Rapee, & Neary, 2006; Hofmann, 2007). 
For example, it has been estimated that about 40-50 percent of the patients do not show clini-
cal improvement after cognitive behavioral treatment (Eskildsen, Hougaard, & Rosenberg, 2010). 
Therefore new treatment is continuously being developed (Hofmann, 2010). 
Much is still unknown about the pathogenesis of sad and the factors that influence its de-
velopment, course and treatment response (Kimbrel, 2008). Different perspectives or approaches 
(cultural, developmental, cognitive, neurobiological, genetic) are possible in studying sad (or any 
psychiatric disorder), all of which can offer valuable insights (Henningsen & Kirmayer, 2000). 
While research into new treatments is obviously vital for improving treatment responses, insight 
into the more fundamental mechanisms of a disorder is crucial, besides gaining basic theoretical 
knowledge (e.g. Bishop, 2008; Casey et al., 2011; Perlis, 2011). For example, theoretical insight into 
the mechanisms of sad, showing the importance of attention biases and performance feedback, 
has helped to improve standard cognitive behavioral therapy (Rapee, Gaston, & Abbott, 2009). In 
addition, insight into brain mechanisms underlying psychopathology is essential for the under-
standing of psychiatric disorders (Bullmore, Fletcher, & Jones, 2009), although much progress still 
has to be made (Kapur, Phillips, & Insel, 2012). 
1.2 Models of personality and social anxiety
The structure of personality and its biological basis have been topic of research for several decades 
(Cloninger, 1986; Davidson & Irwin, 1999; Eysenck, 1967; Gray, 1978; McCrae & Costa, 1991; Zelen-
ski & Larsen, 1999). Many trait theories commonly emphasize broad and theoretically orthogo-
nal predispositions, which are further organized hierarchically into subcomponents (Bouchard & 
Loehlin, 2001; Naragon-Gainey & Watson, 2011; Watson, Clark, & Harkness, 1994). Trait theories 
often include at least one trait linked to “susceptibility” for positive and one for negative affect (Ze-
lenski & Larsen, 1999). For example, Eysenck’s classical approach contains the extraversion/neu-
roticism dimension, Gray distinguished Behavioral Activation System (bas)/Behavioral Inhibi-
tion System (bis), while Cloninger included Novelty Seeking/Harm Avoidance (Zelenski & Larsen, 
1999). These traits are thought to reflect dimensions in an affect-circumplex: a two-dimensional 
space that describes emotional experience as coordinates within this space (Russell, 1980). Debate 
exists on exactly how these traits are oriented; for example, the bis/bas axes from Gray’s theory are 
thought to be a 45 degree rotation from the Neuroticism/Extraversion dimensions from Eysenck 
(Zelenski & Larsen, 1999). The empirical basis for these theoretical rotations has been questioned 
however (Smits & Boeck, 2006), and a factor analysis has indeed shown that when questionnaire 
data of different trait theories are combined into one analysis, two traits adequately describe the 
experience of positive and negative affect across individuals (Zelenski & Larsen, 1999). The divi-
sion of personality into positive affect and negative affect traits will be operationalized here as the 
neuroticism/extraversion distinction. While neuroticism and extraversion are also part of the “big 
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five trait theories” (McCrae & Costa, 1991) and in some models form subcomponents of higher-
order traits (DeYoung et al., 2010; Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005), here, they will be regarded as 
the two main personality traits directly related to the experience of affect (McCrae & Costa, 1991). 
In that sense, the distinction between neuroticism and extraversion also seems a useful starting 
point in linking personality to psychopathology (but see for example Ormel, Rosmalen, & Farmer 
(2004), for a critical discussion of the relevance of neuroticism).
Neuroticism is characterized by a temperamental sensitivity to painful or negative stimuli, 
and experiencing negative affect more frequently and/or intensely. Extraversion is a temperamen-
tal sensitivity to pleasurable stimuli (rewards) and experiencing positive affect, pride and self-
confidence more frequently and/or intensely (Winter & Kuiper, 1997). Research on extraversion 
and neuroticism has shown that in the development of sad, neuroticism is a vulnerability marker, 
and extraversion a protective factor (Bienvenu, Hettema, Neale, Prescott, & Kendler, 2007; Clark, 
Watson, & Mineka, 1994; Naragon-Gainey & Watson, 2011; Spinhoven et al., 2011). Neuroticism is 
thought to be an unspecific risk factor (i.e. it is related to many psychiatric disorders), while ex-
traversion is perhaps more specifically related to depression and sad (Naragon-Gainey & Watson, 
2011). In addition, the study by Naragon-Gainey & Watson (2011) describes a more detailed link 
between neuroticism/extraversion and hierarchically lower subcomponents (see figure 1.1). For 
neuroticism, the most relevant subcomponents in relation to sad are evaluation sensitivity and 
social concerns, while for extraversion, sociability and dominance are most strongly related to sad 
(Naragon-Gainey & Watson, 2011). In line with these findings, a recent model of sad puts great 
emphasis on the basic personality predisposition in the development, course and treatment of sad 
(Kimbrel, 2008). Although the Kimbrel model relies on Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (Gray’s 
bis/bas axes), the relation of the bis/bas axes with sad is very similar to the Neuroticism/Extraver-
sion findings just discussed, in that bis is regarded as a predisposing factor and bas as a protective 
one for the development of sad. 
However, the factors that influence the development of sad clearly go beyond basic personality 
traits, and include other elements such as genetic makeup and several environmental causes. It is 
of interest that personality factors have a considerable genetic component (Bouchard & Loehlin, 
2001) and it has been found that the heritability of social anxiety can be explained by the heritabil-
ity of personality traits (Bienvenu et al., 2007). Many different “routes” are possible in the develop-
ment of sad (principle of multifinality) and similar predisposing factors may lead to very different 
outcomes (principle of equifinality; Kimbrel, 2008). Personality traits constitute so-called distal 
factors in the development of sad, where for example attention and interpretation biases (which 
form the basis of many cognitive models of sad) are thought of as proximal factors (Kimbrel, 
2008). Several cognitive models have been proposed for sad (Clark & McManus, 2002; Heinrichs 
& Hofmann, 2001; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997) and they all describe broadly similar concepts (Hoff-
man, 2010), including low perceived emotional control, post-event rumination, avoidance and the 
use of safety behaviors.
The distal and proximal factors interact in a complex manner, for example in the relation be-
tween personality, life experience, and social support. It is well-known that childhood traumatic 
experience increases the risk of anxiety disorders and heightened responsiveness of the stress sys-
tem (Elzinga, Spinhoven, Berretty, de Jong, & Roelofs, 2010; Heim & Nemeroff, 2001; Kaufman, 
Plotsky, Nemeroff, & Charney, 2000; Spinhoven et al., 2010), but adequate caregiving moderates 
this trauma-stress/anxiety link (Heim & Nemeroff, 2001). Moreover, attachment security decreases 
the relation between behavioral inhibition and stress reactivity (Nachmias, Gunnar, Mangelsdorf, 
Parritz, & Buss, 1996). On the other hand, maternal overprotection combined with high behavio-
ral inhibition are risk factors for developing social anxiety (Lewis-Morrarty et al., 2012). Another 
study showed that experiencing uncontrollable events increases the relation between behavioral 
inhibition and anxiety (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998). Moderate (non-traumatic) stressful situations 
might be habituating (decreasing responsiveness over time) to one individual, but sensitizing (in-
creasing responsiveness over time) to another, depending on such factors as social support, per-
sonality traits and gender. For example, one study showed that high social support was associated 
with habituation of cardiovascular responses to repeated stress exposure in woman, but not in 
men (Hughes, 2007). In addition, a recent study emphasizes the relation between sociability fac-
tors and neuroticism in the developmental trajectories of pediatric social anxiety (Miers, Blöte, de 
Rooij, Bokhorst, & Westenberg, 2012). Insight into the neurobiology of important processes in the 
development of sad and the relation to individual differences in personality may help to explain 
the mechanisms by which social anxiety can develop. Two of these processes, emotion regulation 
and motivational reward/punishment balance, and their underlying neurobiological mechanisms, 
are crucial in anxiety disorders (Degnan & Fox, 2007) and will be the topic of the current thesis. 
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1.3 Neurobiological Circuits
In the broadest sense, the psychological processes that are studied in the current thesis are part 
of the “mental trilogy”: cognition, emotion and motivation (LeDoux, 2002). The brain-basis for 
interaction between cognition and emotion/motivation is the communication of cortical and 
subcortical brain regions. Basic research has elucidated these cortical-subcortical neurobiological 
pathways in certain detail, and they can be described as circuits of brain regions. Here, the focus 
will be on two of these circuits: the emotion circuit (centered around the amygdala) and the motiva-
tion circuit (centered around the ventral striatum), see figure 1.2. These circuitries have been linked 
to resilience to adverse and stressful events and the development of affective disorders (Feder, Nes-
tler, & Charney, 2009).
Social Anxiety
Neuroticism Extraversion
Self 
-Criticism  
Evaluation 
 Sensitivity 
Anxiety  
Sensitivity  
AS Social  
Concerns Sociability   
Dominance 
Positive  
Emotions 
  
Curiosity 
VS
AMY
PAG  
THAL
HYP
  
VTA
mPFC
LC
Emotion Circuit 
Motivation Circuit 
Figure 1.1  Schematic representation of social anxiety’s associations with (hierarchically-arranged) personality traits
Dashed lines with arrows indicate low specificity to social anxiety (i.e., the trait is more strongly related to several other disorders); solid 
orange lines with arrows indicate moderate specificity (i.e., the trait is related equally to one or two other disorders); thick solid black lines 
with arrows indicate strong specificity (i.e., the trait is more strongly related to social anxiety than to other disorders). All associations of social 
anxiety with neuroticism and its lower-order factors are in the positive direction; all associations of social anxiety with extraversion and its 
lower-order factors are negative. as = anxiety sensitivity. This figure is reproduced with permission from (Naragon-Gainey & Watson, 2011). 
Figure 1.2  A schematic model of brain regions involved in emotion and motivation 
A schematic overview of regions involved in emotion and motivation, divided into two broad circuits (based on Feder, 2009). The 
emotion circuit: salient sensory information is relayed from the sensory cortex (not shown) and the thalamus to the amygdala. 
The amygdala is particularly important for emotion processing (learning and memory), typically studied in relation to threat or fear 
processing (and for example the freezing responses, for which the connections with the periaqueductal grey are important), but 
it is also involved in other emotions. Moreover, the amygdala is connected to regions involved in the autonomic (locus coeruleus, 
release of norepinephrine) and hormonal (hypothalamus, release of Corticotrophin-Releasing Hormone) responses to stress. The 
motivation circuit: The ventral striatum receives dopaminergic input from the ventral tegmental area, in response to impeding or 
obtained incentives. At several brain structures, both circuitries are influenced by (medial) prefrontal regions, which can exert 
top-down control. While these two circuits are partly separable, anatomically and functionally they also overlap, especially at 
the connection between the amygdala and ventral striatum. Note that this is a highly simplified model; many other connections 
exist which are not shown, and in addition many of the presented regions consist of several subregions, characterized by specific 
patterns of connectivity and functioning. Amy, amygdala; Hyp, Hypothalamus; lc, locus coeruleus; mpfc, medial prefrontal cortex; 
Thal, Thalamus; vs, ventral striatum; vta, ventral tegmental area; pag, periaqueductal grey.
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1.3.1 The amygdala and the emotion circuit 
The amygdala is a core region involved in emotion processing (LeDoux, 1998; 2000). Although 
originally, the function of the amygdala was mainly related to the emotion of fear, due to its evi-
dent importance in fear conditioning (LeDoux, 2000), currently its role is perceived much broader. 
The amygdala is critical in detecting salient information in the surroundings, and it is linked to 
the processing of salient or ambiguous stimuli (Davis & Whalen, 2001; Whalen, 2007). In humans, 
there is an abundance of evidence for the importance of the amygdala in face processing (Costa-
freda, Brammer, David, & Fu, 2008), although perhaps more generally, to several facial expressions 
than to any expression (e.g. fear or anger) specifically (Costafreda et al., 2008; Fitzgerald, Angstadt, 
Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006). Anatomically, several subnuclei in the amygdala can be distin-
guished, which have distinct patterns of connections (Price, 2003). The basolateral Amygdala (bla) 
receives sensory input from many cortical sources and from the thalamus (Price, 2003). The central 
nucleus of the amygdala (cea) projects to numerous cortical and subcortical regions. Important 
connections include the link to the (ventral) periaquaductal grey (pag), which is essential for freeze 
responses to threat (Fanselow, 1994). Other essential connections include the hypothalamus (Price, 
2003), involved in the release of the stress hormone Corticotrophin Releasing Hormone (crh), 
and the locus coeruleus (lc), a brain stem nucleus, important for noradrenaline release during 
stress (Valentino & Van Bockstaele, 2008). Through its connections with the Hypothalamus and 
lc, the amygdala plays an integrated role in both the endocrine and autonomic nervous system 
reactions in response to stress (Arnsten, 2009; Joëls & Baram, 2009; Ulrich-Lai & Herman, 2009). 
However, the exact role of the amygdala in prolonged states of social stress is still topic of debate. 
For example, it is unclear whether and how the amygdala is controlled during stress, and amygdala 
activation as well as amygdala deactivation during social stress have been found (Pruessner et al., 
2008; Wager et al., 2009). 
1.3.2 The ventral striatum and the motivation circuit
The motivation circuit is a well-described set of brain regions in the brainstem, striatum and 
medial prefrontal cortex (mpfc) that rely strongly on mesolimbic dopaminergic activity (Haber 
& Knutson, 2010). The ventral tegmental area (vta) is the main brainstem source of dopamine 
and is connected to regions of the ventral striatum. The ventral striatum includes the nucleus 
accumbens, and ventral parts of the putamen and caudate nucleus. Functionally, the ventral and 
dorsal striatum are argued to be best distinguished by their connectivity to the medial Orbito-
frontal Cortex/Anterior Cingulate Cortex and dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex respectively (Haber 
& Knutson, 2010). Despite the extensive amount of research, considerable debate is still going on 
about the type of functions related to the motivation circuit (Salamone, 2009). Dopamine serves 
to promote complex functions such as reinforcement learning (Cools, Nakamura, & Daw, 2011; 
Salamone, 2009; Schultz, 2004) and the anticipation of a reward is also strongly related to dopa-
minergic functioning in this circuit. Hence, the set of regions is often referred to as the reward 
circuit (Knutson & Greer, 2008). However, an accumulating amount of studies have now shown 
that the selective focus on rewards is incomplete. A number of recent reports has shown that dif-
ferent dopamine neurons are involved in motivational valence (da neurons that are responsive 
only to impeding rewards) and motivational salience (da neurons which respond to both impeding 
reward and punishment, as far as they can actively be avoided; Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & 
Hikosaka, 2010; Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 2009). These findings complement previous notions of 
the importance of including aversive motivation in the role of the striatum (Salamone, 1994; 2009). 
Studies in humans have further underscored this broader view of striatal (dopaminergic) activity. 
For example, the striatum was shown to be involved in fear conditioning and avoidance learning 
(Delgado, Li, Schiller, & Phelps, 2008a). 
1.3.3 The prefrontal cortex and emotion regulation
The prefrontal cortex (pfc) is involved in many higher-order cognitive functions (working mem-
ory, executive control, task-switching generally referred to as cognitive control; Miller & Cohen, 
2001). In addition, in the domain of emotions, the pfc is crucial for modifying emotion responses 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005). A recent meta-analysis has identified a very broad set of prefrontal, as 
well as parietal regions involved in emotion regulatory processes (Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 
2011). While some regions are related to specific types of emotion regulation, the ventromedial pfc 
is involved in various kinds of emotion regulation (fear conditioning, placebo control, cognitive 
regulation of emotion). The prefrontal cortex has many connections to regions part of the emo-
tion and motivation circuits and can hence exert a regulatory role over various processes in these 
regions. For example, the amygdala has major cortical connections, and the connections with the 
ventromedial pfc (vmpfc) are crucial for the inhibition of the amygdala during fear extinction 
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(Quirk & Mueller, 2007). However, the amygdala is also more widely connected to other cortical 
areas such as the dorsomedial pfc (dmpfc) and Posterior Cingulate Cortex (Stein et al., 2007). 
Research in humans has shown similarities between cortical regulation of the amygdala during 
fear extinction and instructed emotion regulation (Delgado, Nearing, LeDoux, & Phelps, 2008b; 
Hartley & Phelps, 2009; Quirk & Beer, 2006). This observation may suggest that the human capac-
ity to voluntarily regulate emotional responses is mediated by phylogenetically older fear circuits. 
It is generally hypothesized that reduction of this prefrontal emotion regulatory capacity may form 
the basis of various anxiety disorders (Bishop, 2007; Hartley & Phelps, 2009; Kim et al., 2011). 
1.3.4 Integration of neural emotion and motivation circuitries
Emotional and motivational functions have been closely linked in various scientific perspectives 
(e.g. theoretical, neuro-anatomical). In several emotion theories, reward and punishment process-
ing are central components, while decision-making (“motivation”) theories highlight the role of 
emotional value (Damasio, Grabowski, Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994; Knutson & Greer, 
2008; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Rolls, 1990). For instance, in accordance with the 
concept of loss aversion, people are generally more sensitive to the possibility of losing objects or 
money than they are to the possibility of gaining those objects or amounts of money (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1984; Tom, Fox, Trepel, & Poldrack, 2007). Another example is the somatic marker 
hypothesis, which states that during complex risky decisions, somatic markers (physiological emo-
tional states) guide the motivational decision-making process (Damasio, 1996). 
Similarly, research data from different levels and domains of brain research suggest that the emo-
tion and motivation circuitries are closely linked. For example, it has been shown that the amygdala 
plays an important role in reward processing (Baxter & Murray, 2002). Moreover, acute stress leads to 
an increase in dopamine (Arnsten, 2009; Kienast et al., 2008; Mizrahi, 2010; Pruessner, Champagne, 
Meaney, & Dagher, 2004), stress induction disrupts pfc function during reward anticipation (Osse-
waarde et al., 2011), while cortisol administration increases risk taking (Putman, Antypa, Crysovergi, 
& van der Does, 2010). While acute stress may increase dopamine and reward sensitivity, prolonged 
stress may reduce reward sensitivity (Ossewaarde et al., 2011). Indeed, several affective disorders, such 
as depression, have been associated with reduced reward sensitivity (Feder et al., 2009). 
On the neurotransmitter level, complex interactions (both opposing and complementary) be-
tween the serotonergic and dopaminergic systems (Boureau & Dayan, 2011; Cools et al., 2011) and 
the noradrenergic and dopaminergic systems (Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005) have been highlighted. 
On the brain system level, one study showed that the emotion and motivation circuitries are differ-
entially involved in cognitive emotion generation and regulation, which involved lpfc-amygdala 
and lpfc-Nacc pathways respectively (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). The 
interactions between different subsystems of the neural motivation and emotion circuitries are 
complex therefore, and much remains to be learned. Because of their proposed common impor-
tance in stress resilience (Feder et al., 2009), the functioning of these neural circuitries seems es-
sential to understanding the neurobiology of anxiety disorders. 
1.3.5 Neuroimaging research in sad
Initial functionl Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fmri; see box 1) studies focused on amygdala re-
sponses to negative (angry/fearful) faces, and amygdala hyperactivation has been shown in sad (Et-
kin & Wager, 2007). Exaggerated amygdala responses were also found during speaking in public (Till-
fors, Furmark, Marteinsdottir, & Fredrikson, 2002; Tillfors et al., 2001), a prototypical example of the 
situation sad patients fear most. Recent studies have begun aiming at other more specific symptom-
relevant aspects of sad, like self-relevant praise or critique (Blair et al., 2008), social norm processing 
(Blair et al., 2010), peer evaluation (Guyer et al., 2008), and the reappraisal of negative self-beliefs 
(Goldin, Manber-Ball, Werner, Heimberg, & Gross, 2009). The ventral striatum and the motivation 
circuit have also been implicated in sad. For example, several studies have shown alterations in do-
paminergic activity in sad. However, both increases and decreases were found (Freitas-Ferrari et al., 
2010; van der Wee et al., 2008). One fmri study has linked differences in striatal activity to implicit 
learning processes (Sareen et al., 2007) and other research in (pediatric) social anxiety have shown 
a general increase in striatal activity both for reward and punishment avoidance (Guyer et al., 2012; 
2006). Much remains unknown about how social anxiety is linked to connectivity and activity within 
(and between) these neural emotion and motivation circuitries.
1.4 Aim and outline of the thesis
The aim of the current thesis is to investigate neurobiological mechanisms in social anxiety. The 
focus is on two broad sets of interconnected regions, the neural emotion and motivation circuit-
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ries, and their relation to state and trait aspects of sad. The first subgoal is to address the neu-
ral structural and functional correlates of the affect-related personality traits of extraversion and 
neuroticism. The second sub goal is to study symptom-relevant processes in social anxiety: the 
motivational balance to obtain a social reward or avoid a social punishment, and the processing of 
stress-inducing social evaluative threat. In addition, we investigate how differences between sad 
and controls in brain connectivity during social stress processing are already present in healthy 
controls depending on variation in personality traits. Lastly, the link between the neural mecha-
nism of motivational preference (reward and punishment sensitivity) and social stress processing 
will be explored. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will address individual differences in neuroticism and extraversion in healthy 
controls. These studies are part of the Netherlands Study on Depression and Anxiety (nesda; 
Penninx et al., 2008). While there is some evidence for a modulatory role of neuroticism on task-
induced brain activity, much remains unknown about how neuroticism is linked to brain connec-
tivity, especially the crucial coupling of the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex. 
In Chapter 2, this relation between neuroticism and functional connectivity of the amygdala and 
cortical regions during the processing of negative facial expressions is investigated. 
Chapter 3 will test whether individual differences in neuroticism as well as in extraversion are 
related to brain volume in regions of the emotion and motivation circuitries. 
Cognitive theories conceptually link sad to heightened punishment sensitivity; however, current 
neurobiological findings have not shown evidence of this. Chapter 4 examines social reward and 
punishment anticipation in sad. The hypothesis to be tested is that in sad, the striatum is more 
sensitive (stronger active) when a social punishment can be avoided than when a social reward can 
be obtained. Severe stress during the anticipation of speaking in public is a core symptom of sad. 
Connectivity between the amygdala and cortical regions is thought to be important for emotion 
regulation, a function that is compromised in sad. However, it is unknown whether and how corti-
cal–amygdala connectivity is affected during stress-inducing social evaluative threat. 
Chapter 5 studies cortical-amygdala connectivity in sad during a resting-state (“task-free”) condi-
tion and when anticipating speaking in public. It is hypothesized that cortical-amygdala connec-
tivity is related to cortical cognitive control of the amygdala, and that this regulation is diminished 
in sad during the anticipation of speaking in public. Also, the question will be addressed of wheth-
er this cortical-amygdala connectivity is a mediator in the relation between anxiety symptoms and 
perceived stress. 
Chapter 6 investigates the relation of cortical-amygdala connectivity with neuroticism and ex-
traversion. The same method and data of chapter 5 will be used, but now focusing on the healthy 
control participants. It will be tested whether neuroticism and extraversion modulate cortical-
amygdala connectivity, and whether this relation is dependent on the task-phase (speech anticipa-
tion or baseline measurements). 
Chapter 7 discusses some problematic (statistical) issues in fmri research on clinical populations 
and other between-subject effects research. It will be argued that the combination of extremely 
low statistical power, high flexibility in data analyses, and the lack of direct, quantitative replica-
tion studies, impairs the interpretation of most published findings of fmri research on clinical 
populations.
Chapter 8 summarizes and discusses the empirical findings. The results of the chapters on person-
ality traits (chapters 2, 3 and 6) and sad (chapters 4 and 5) will be discussed in more detail. In ad-
dition, the results of chapters 4 and 5 will be linked, to test whether reward/punishment sensitivity 
is predictive of social stress processing. Lastly, limitations and considerations for future research 
will be discussed. 
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Box 1. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fmri) is a powerful tool to non-invasively obtain 
whole brain coverage of an approximation of neural activity. fmri is an extremely complex 
technique, which allows reconstruction of images from magnetic resonance properties of 
nuclei (see Logothetis, 2008 for an overview). The signal often measured with fmri is the 
Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (bold) signal. bold-fmri relies on the magnetic proper-
ties of oxygenated blood in the brain. An increase in brain activity will change various 
physiological parameters of the blood, thereby influencing the magnetic properties. This 
change in magnetic properties affects the measured signal, which can be quantified and 
reconstructed to its original location. The bold signal thus forms an indirect measure of 
brain activity. The bold signal is relatively slow (the signals peaks 4-8 seconds after the 
onset of neural activity) and hence has a poor temporal resolution. However, the spatial 
resolution is relatively good (in order of millimeters). 
The basic approach of many fmri studies is to have participants perform a task while 
lying in the scanner. This task usually consists of at least two conditions that can be com-
pared against each other (for example viewing emotional and neutral faces). The difference 
in signals between the two conditions can then be interpreted as brain activity related to 
one condition over another (i.e. the emotional expression of a face). It is widely acknowl-
edged, however, that brain functioning is not just captured by local activity within a region, 
but also by connectivity between different regions. Many analytic techniques have been, 
and continue to be, developed to capture brain connectivity (Smith, 2012). In addition to 
studying brain functioning related to external demands (a computerized tasks that has to 
be performed), much research is also devoted to studying the brain “at rest”, the so-called 
“default mode” of brain functioning (Raichle et al., 2001). Brain processes at rest give valu-
able information about ongoing mental functioning intrinsically generated (Raichle, 2010). 
Chapter 2
Neuroticism modulates 
amygdala – prefrontal 
connectivity in response to 
negative facial expressions.
Henk Cremers  |  Ramona Demenescu  |  André Aleman  |  Remco Renken
Marie-José van Tol  |  Nic J.A van der Wee  |  Dick J. Veltman   |  Karin Roelofs
NeuroImage, 2010, 49(1), 963–970. 
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2.1 Abstract
Objective: Neuroticism is associated with the experience of negative affect and the development of 
affective disorders. While evidence exists for a modulatory role of neuroticism on task induced 
brain activity, it is unknown how neuroticism affects brain connectivity, especially the crucial 
coupling between the amygdala and the prefrontal cortex. Here we investigate this relation 
between functional connectivity and personality in response to negative facial expressions. 
Methods: Sixty healthy control participants, from the Netherland Study on Depression and Anxi-
ety (nesda), were scanned during an emotional faces gender decision task. Activity and func-
tional amygdala connectivity (psycho-physiological interaction; ppi) related to faces of nega-
tive emotional valence (angry, fearful and sad) was compared to neutral facial expressions, 
while neuroticism scores were entered as a regressor.
Results: Activity for fearful compared to neutral faces in the dorsomedial prefrontal (dmpfc) cor-
tex was positively correlated with neuroticism scores. ppi analyses revealed that right amyg-
dala–dmpfc connectivity for angry and fearful compared to neutral faces was positively cor-
related with neuroticism scores. In contrast, left amygdala – anterior cingulate cortex (acc) 
connectivity for angry, fearful and sad compared to neutral faces was negatively related to 
neuroticism levels. 
Conclusions: dmpfc activity has frequently been associated with self-referential processing in 
social cognitive tasks. Our results therefore suggest that high neurotic participants display 
stronger self-referential processing in response to negative emotional faces. Secondly, in line 
with previous reports on acc function, the negative correlation between amygdala – acc con-
nectivity and neuroticism scores might indicate that those high in neuroticism display dimin-
ished control function of the acc over the amygdala. These connectivity patterns might be 
associated with vulnerability to developing affective disorders such as depression and anxiety. 
2.2 Introduction 
Neuroticism is a widely recognized trait in various theoretical approaches to human personality 
(Smits & Boeck, 2006; Zelenski & Larsen, 1999). Characteristics of this trait include a tendency to 
worry and to be anxious (Canli et al., 2001), and to the experience of negative affect (Larsen & Ket-
elaar, 1991; Robinson, Ode, Moeller, & Goetz, 2007a; Zelenski & Larsen, 1999). Neuroticism is also 
associated with affective disorders such as social anxiety disorder (sad) and depression (Bienvenu 
et al., 2001; Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994). 
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fmri) studies have provided substantial evidence for 
the modulatory role of individual differences in neuroticism on neural activity related to emotion 
processing (Canli, 2004; Hamann, 2004). Regions where activity is associated with neuroticism (and 
related personality traits) include the amygdala (Haas, Omura, Constable, & Canli, 2007; Reuter et al., 
2004; Stein, Simmons, Feinstein, & Paulus, 2007b), the anterior cingulate cortex (acc) (Eisenberger, 
Lieberman, & Satpute, 2005; Reuter et al., 2004) and the medial prefrontal cortex (Britton, Ho, Tay-
lor, & Liberzon, 2007; Haas et al., 2007; Rubino et al., 2007). However, these regions are functionally 
coupled, and connectivity between amygdala and prefrontal regions is crucial for the integration 
between emotion and cognition (Pessoa, 2008; Stein et al., 2007a). To gain a better understanding of 
the neural basis of individual differences in emotion processing related to neuroticism, a focus on 
functional connectivity between limbic and prefrontal regions is therefore required.
Neuroticism is associated with alterations in cognitive-emotional functions such as affect regula-
tion (Tamir, 2005) self-consciousness (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) and self-regulation (Robinson, 
Ode, Wilkowski, & Amodio, 2007b). Thus, dysfunctional interactions between the amygdala and re-
gions related to these functions, such as ventrolateral pfc (vlpfc), dorsolateral pfc (dlpfc) and acc 
(cognitive control of emotion; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Pessoa, 2008), and dorsomedial prefrontal 
cortex -dmpfc- ( self-regulation and self-referential processing; Amodio & Frith, 2006; Northoff & 
Bermpohl, 2004) are likely to be specifically associated with individual differences in neuroticism. 
Only recently, fmri studies have started to investigate personality-associated differences in 
functional connectivity during emotion processing. Whereas some of these studies focused on 
traits related to positive affect (Haas, Omura, Amin, Constable, & Canli, 2006; Passamonti et al., 
2008), one study reported trait anxiety differences in amygdala-acc coupling (Kienast et al., 2008). 
A mood induction study during Positron Emission Tomography (pet) showed that neuroticism 
is associated with changes in subgenual cingulate coupling with prefrontal regions during mood 
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 2
24
C
H
A
P
TER
 2
25
induction, possibly reflecting a susceptibility marker for depression (Keightley et al., 2003). Despite 
these initial findings, to the best of our knowledge, no study has systematically addressed the ques-
tion on how individual differences in neuroticism are associated with amygdala – prefrontal cortex 
connectivity for various negative emotional facial expressions.
To investigate the modulatory role of neuroticism on amygdala – prefrontal cortex con-
nectivity during emotion processing, we applied a standardized face-processing paradigm with 
different negative emotional facial expressions (angry, fearful and sad) in a large subject sample. 
This sample represented the healthy control subjects as part of the Netherlands Study on De-
pression and Anxiety (nesda; Penninx et al., 2008). We hypothesize that activity in the medial 
pfc, acc and the amygdala is associated with neuroticism scores when processing negative as 
compared to neutral facial expressions. We also hypothesize that connectivity, between the amyg-
dala on one hand and the lateral and medial prefrontal regions and the acc on the other, vary 
with individual differences in neuroticism. 
2.3 Methods
Participants 
Sixty healthy participants were selected from the general population (mean age = 39.9, range 21-
56, 37 females). Participants were recruited as healthy control participants in a large multi-center 
cohort study, the Netherlands Study of Depression and Anxiety (nesda). Participants were tested 
at the Amsterdam Medical Center (amc), Leiden University Medical Center (lumc) and University 
Medical Center Groningen (umcg). The exclusion criteria for these healthy participants were (1) a 
lifetime diagnosis of dsm axis i and/or axis ii disorders, psychotic disorder or dementia, (2) current 
alcohol or substance abuse, (3) a history of seizure or head injury, (4) current use of beta-blockers 
medication, (5) hypertension (high blood pressure) 180/130 mm Hg, (6) more than 5 cigarettes 
smoked per day, (7) older than 57 years and (8) mri incompatible implants or tattoos. During the 
preliminary analysis, 4 participants were excluded because of head movement artifacts. Written 
informed consent from each participant was obtained prior to the scanning session. The study was 
approved by the Ethical Review Boards of each participating center. 
Personality scores
To asses personality traits, all participants completed the neo Five Factor Inventory (Costa & Mc-
Crea, 1992). This questionnaire consists of 60 items and measures five different personality traits: 
neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness and conscientiousness. Of these traits, neu-
roticism and extraversion are most closely related to emotion processing and alterations in neural 
activity (Canli, 2004). Examples of the neuroticism questions include ‘I often feel less then other 
people’, ‘I often feel nervous and tense’. 
Experimental design
Color photographs of faces depicting angry, fearful, sad, happy, and neutral facial expressions were pre-
sented together with scrambled faces in an event-related design. Photographs were selected from the 
Karolinska Directed Emotional Faces System (Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 1998) representing standard-
ized facial expressions of emotions presented by amateur actors. Twenty-four faces were selected for each 
of the five facial expressions, comprising of 12 female and 12 male faces, and 80 scrambled faces. A total 
number of 200 photographs were presented pseudorandomly, such that there were maximally two faces 
presented before the presentation of a scrambled face, and there were no repetitions of the same emo-
tional expressions. Each photograph was presented on the screen for 2.5 s, with an inter-stimulus interval 
(black screen) varied between 0.5 and 1.5 s (jitter). The total duration of the task was 747 s. The experi-
mental paradigm was presented using E-prime software (Psychological Software Tools, Pittsburgh, pa, 
usa). Images were projected onto a translucent screen at the end of the scanner bed, visible via a mirror 
above the participant’s head. Participants were instructed to indicate the gender by pressing one of two 
buttons of two magnet-compatible button boxes with the index finger of the left or right hand. During 
the presentation of scrambled faces, participants had to press left or right buttons in conformity with 
the instructions present on the screen, indicating either left or right by an arrow. Responses and reaction 
times were recorded. 
Image acquisition 
Images were acquired on a Philips Intera 3T mr-scanner. A sense-8 (umcg and lumc) and a sense-6 
(amc) channel head coil was used for radio frequency transmission and reception. For each subject a 
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series of echo planar imaging (epi) -sensitive to the blood oxygenation level dependent effect- volumes 
were obtained, entailing a T2*-weighted gradient echo sequence (repetition time [tr] = 2300 ms, echo 
time [te] = 28.0 ms at umcg and te = 30.0 ms at amc and lumc, flip angle 90 using axial whole-brain ac-
quisition, with an interleaved slice acquisition order. The interslice gap was 0 mm and the plane thickness 
was 3 mm. The matrix sizes were: 64x64 voxels at umcg and 96 x 96 voxels at amc and lumc. The epis 
were acquired at 39 slices at umcg and 35 slices at amc and lumc. The in-plane resolution was 3 x 3 mm 
at umcg and 2.29x2.29 mm at amc and lumc. The axial images were acquired parallel to the anterior-
posterior commissure plane. Functional data comprising 310 volumes were obtained per subject. A T1-
weighted anatomical mri was also acquired for each subject (tr = 9 ms, te = 3.5 ms, matrix size 256x256).
Analysis
Preprocessing
Functional data were preprocessed and analyzed using the statistical parametric mapping software 
package (spm5, http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk) implemented in Matlab 7.2 (The MathWorks Inc., 
http://www.mathworks.com).
The epi volumes were reoriented in respect to the anterior commissure selected on the first 
volume. Time series were corrected for differences in slice acquisition times. The reference slice 
was 39 at umcg and 2 at amc and lumc. After spatial realignment to the first image, a mean epi 
was created. The movement parameters for each participant were inspected. If a participant moved 
more than 3 mm in any direction (anterior-posterior, right-left, inferior-superior) the data were 
excluded from further analysis. The anatomy scan was coregistered to the mean epi image. Subse-
quently, T1, and with it epi images, were spatially normalized to a standard stereotaxic space (Mon-
treal Neurological Institute). During normalization, data were resampled into a 3 x 3 x 3 mm grid 
with 7th degree B-spline interpolation. The functional data were smoothed with a 3D isotropic 
Gaussian kernel of 8 mm full-width at half-maximum.
Imaging analysis 
Low-frequency noise was removed by applying a high-pass filter (cut-off of 128 s) to the fmri time-
series at each voxel. Significant hemodynamic changes for each condition were calculated using 
the general linear model (Friston et al., 2004) with respect to the event-related response convolved 
with canonical hemodynamic response function. To identify activity in regions related to face pro-
cessing, we computed a t-contrast of all faces combined to the baseline, and tested this contrast at 
p < 0.05 family wise error (fwe) corrected for multiple comparisons. To the test the hypotheses 
between the relation of neuroticism and negative affect, the analyses were subsequently restricted 
to the negative emotional facial expressions. T-contrasts for “angry > neutral”, “fearful > neutral”, 
“sad > neutral” were calculated for each subject. Results of these weighted contrast (contrast im-
ages) were then entered in a second level random effect model. For each negative emotional facial 
expression (compared to neutral), neuroticism, extraversion, age and gender were entered as re-
gressors. A one-sample t-test was applied to test the positive and negative effect of the neuroticism 
scores regressor. Effectively, this analysis corresponds to detecting semi-partial correlations be-
tween brain activity and neuroticism, when correcting for extraversion, age and gender. Since the 
amygdala, the acc and the dmpfc all shown to have neuroticism dependent variation in activity 
when processing emotional stimuli, they were defined as regions of interest (roi). The amygdala 
and acc volumes were based on the wfu pickatlas (Maldjian et al., 2003). The dmpfc was defined 
as a 10mm sphere around the peak voxel coordinates reported in a study on phobic pronenesss in 
relation to the processing of negative emotional faces (Rubino et al., 2007). We applied an initial 
significance threshold of p<0.005 (uncorrected) and a spatial extent of five voxels (k ≥ 5), restricted 
to our a priori regions of interested (roi): the amygdala, the acc and the dmpfc. Furthermore we 
report activation outside our rois at p<.001, k≥10 voxels uncorrected for multiple comparisons. 
Activations are reported in standard Montreal Neurological Institute (mni) space.
Functional connectivity analysis: psycho-physiological Interaction (ppi)
Psycho-physiological Interaction (ppi) analyses were used to assess how activity in a brain region of inter-
est covaries with a source region in response to the experimental condition (Friston et al., 1997). Within 
each condition (negative emotional faces compared to neutral faces), we separately examined functional 
connectivity from the left and right amygdala as a source region. To identify the amygdala activation for 
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each participant we examined the contrast of all faces compared to the baseline at p<.05 uncorrected. 
The deconvolved time series from a 5 mm radius sphere around the individually defined peak activated 
voxel within the amygdala (defined by the wfu pickatlas mask) (Maldjian et al., 2003) was extracted (44 
participants). The ppi was calculated as the element by element product of the left and the right amyg-
dala time series (the first eigenvariate from all voxels’ time serie) and a vector coding for the effect of task 
(“anger > neutral”, “fear > neutral”, and “sad > neutral”). This product was subsequently re-convolved 
with the hemodynamic response function (hrf). This interaction term was then entered as a regressor in 
a first level model together with the time series of the amygdala and the vector coding for the task effect. 
The models were estimated and contrasts generated to test the effects of positive and negative ppis. This 
analysis identified regions that display stronger functional connectivity with the amygdala for an emo-
tional compared to a neutral facial expression, and neutral compared to emotional respectively. 
The contrast images for the ppi effects were then entered in a second level analysis. In a similar 
manner as the conventional analysis, neuroticism, extraversion, age and gender were entered as re-
gressors. Subsequently, the positive and negative effect of neuroticisms were tested, which identified 
brain regions that showed connectivity with the amygdala correlating positively or negatively with 
neuroticism scores, respectively. We applied an initial uncorrected threshold of p<.005, k ≥ 5, re-
stricted to our a priori regions of interest, the acc, the dmpfc, dlpfc and vmpfc, and report family 
wise error (fwe) small volume corrections (svc) of p<.05 where applicable. The acc mask was based 
on the wfu pickatlas, while the dmpfc, dlpfc and vmpfc (lateral orbitofrontal cortex) masks were 
defined as a 15 mm sphere around the peak coordinates reported in a study on amygdala connectivity 
based on a large fmri data set on processing angry and fearful faces (Stein et al., 2007a). Furthermore 
we report activation outside our rois at p<.001, k ≥ 10 voxels uncorrected for multiple comparisons. 
2.4 Results
Behavioral results 
For the entire group, reaction times for the different emotional faces were: angry mean rt = 825 ms, sd 
= 158, fear rt = 879, sd = 166, sad rt = 874, sd = 163 and neutral rt = 888 sd = 155. There was a main 
effect of emotion on reaction time, driven by a faster rt for angry compared to neutral faces t(55)=-7.6, 
p<0.05. Accuracy overall was high: for angry 98.3%, fear 98.5%, sad 96.1% and neutral 95.4%. There 
were no significant correlations between neuroticism (or extraversion) and the differences scores of 
each negative compared to neutral facial expression or for accuracy, for each correlation p>0.05. 
Personality scores 
The sample scores for neuroticism were mean 24.3 (range: 13-36), sd = 5.3. For extraversion these 
scores were mean 44.4 (range: 27-56), sd = 6.6. There was a significant negative correlation be-
tween neuroticism and extraversion, r = -0.49, p < 0.05. Since individual differences in extraversion 
also influence emotion processing, we aimed to exclude any possible effect by adding extraversion 
as a regressor in our model (see Passamonti et al., 2008). 
fmri results
Main effects of emotional faces versus baseline
We compared all emotional faces together against the scrambled faces baseline to assess activity 
related to face processing. Main effect of the face processing were found in the bilateral fusiform 
gyrus (left; -42/-54 /-24, Z=6.1 k=25; right, 39 / -45 /-24, Z=7.26, k=110 ), bilateral amygdala (left; 
-18 / -6 / -15, Z=6.95, k=126, ; right 21 /-6 /-15, z-=7.13, k=82), and the right inferior frontal gyrus 
(51/27/21, Z=6.37, k=174). All activations were p<.05, whole brain fwe corrected.
Brain activity for emotional versus neutral faces and relation with neuroticism 
In order to identify activity in brain regions that varied as a function of neuroticism scores, we 
tested the effect of neuroticism in a regression model. This resulted in the identification of activity 
in brain regions that was positively or negatively correlated with neuroticism in response to emo-
tional facial expressions compared to neutral facial expressions. Table 1.1 shows activations clusters 
and peak coordinates. As one can see, of our a priori regions of interest, only the right dmpfc 
showed an effect of neuroticism. We found a positive relation between activity in this region for 
fearful compared to neutral emotional faces and neuroticism scores. The main effects of each con-
trast (regardless of individual differences) are presented in table S2.1
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Functional connectivity : ppi analysis 
In order to investigate how neuroticism is associated with functional connectivity of the amyg-
dala and the prefrontal cortex, we tested the effect of neuroticism as a regressor in a model of 
connectivity with the left and right amygdala (separately) as source regions. This analysis resulted 
in the identification of brain regions showing connectivity with the amygdala that was either 
positively or negatively correlated with neuroticism scores when viewing emotional compared to 
neutral facial expressions.
Table 2.2 shows the modulatory effect of neuroticism on the connectivity of the left amyg-
dala. For angry and fearful faces, connectivity of the left amygdala and right acc was negatively 
associated with neuroticism scores. For sad compared to neutral faces, a similar relation between 
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Figure 2.2 
Brain regions displaying association between neuroticism and functional connectivity with the right amygdala for emotional 
compared to neutral faces. (a) right dorsomedial prefrontal cortex for angry compared to neutral facial expressions. (b) right 
dorsomedial prefrontal cortex for fearful compared to neutral facial expressions.
Figure 2.1 
Brain regions displaying association between neuroticism and functional connectivity with the left amygdala for emotional compared to 
neutral faces. (a) right anterior cingulate cortex for angry compared to neutral facial expressions. (b) right anterior cingulate cortex for 
fearful compared to neutral facial expressions (c) right dorsal anterior cingulate cortex for sad compared to neutral facial expressions.
neuroticism and amygdala connectivity (with a more dorsal part of the acc) was observed. Both 
these findings indicate that the higher the neuroticism scores, the lower the functional coupling 
for negative emotional compared to neutral facial expressions between the left amygdala and the 
acc. These effects are shown in Figure 2.1. For display purposes the partial correlation scores for 
neuroticism (the residual, corrected for extraversion, age and gender) were linear transformed 
(mean added and and scaled standard deviation) to approximate the original neuroticism scores. 
Table 2.3 displays the positive and negative correlations between neuroticism and regions 
functionally coupled with the right amygdala for each of the negative emotional compared to 
neutral emotional facial expressions. A positive correlation was found between the amygdala 
connectivity with the right dorsomedial prefrontal (dmpfc) cortex for both angry and fearful 
compared to neutral facial expressions. This indicates that the higher the neuroticism scores, the 
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Contrast Region Side Voxels Z values P values
       mni coordinates
x y z
angry > neutral 
fear > neutral 
Positive dmpfc R 10 2.95 0.002 6 57 33
Calcarine gyrus L 17 3.71 <0.001 -3 -93 6
sad > neutral 
Positive 
Posterior 
Cingulate gyrus
R 10 3.65 <0.001 6 -48 30
Contrast Region Side Voxels Z values P values
      mni coordinates
x y z
angry > neutral 
Positve 
Parahypocampal 
gyrus
R 12 4.39 <0.001 30 -39 -6
Negative acc R 7 2.96 0.002 12 36 12
fear > neutral 
Negative acc R 15 3.26 0.001 9 30 15
sad > neutral 
Negative Dorsal acc* R 41 4.08 <0.001 12 12 30
Contrast Region Side Voxels Z values P values
      mni coordinates
x y z
angry > neutral 
positive dmpfc R 16 3.37 0.001 21 42 36
fear > neutral 
Positive dmpfc* R 49 3.22 0.001 21 42 36
dmpfc* L 15 3.26 0.001 -6 48 36
sad > neutral 
Positive ifg L 23 3.69 <0.001 -27 42 3
Contrast Region Side Voxels Z values P values
      mni coordinates
x y z
angry > neutral 
mtg R 19 3.85 <.001 54 -42 6
mtg L 24 3.76 <.001 -54 -60 0
fear > neutral 
mtg R 10 3.8 <.001 51 -39 6
mtg L 14 3.75 <.001 -57 -60 0
sad > neutral 
Cerebellum L 125 4.81 <.001 -18 -57 -21
Post central 
gyrus R 81 4.6 <.001 48 -24 54
mtg R 25 3.73 <.001 57 -34 0
ifg R 15 3.66 <.001 54 30 3
Posterior 
cingulate gyrus R 10 3.54 <.001 60 -36 30
Table 2.1  Brain areas displaying a correlation between neuroticism scores and activity for angry, fearful and sad facial 
expressions. 
Note: A priori regions of interest are shown in bold. dmpfc: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Other activations at a threshold of 
p<0.001, and minimal 10 contiguous voxels are also reported. No negative correlations were found.
Table 2.2  Association between neuroticism and functional connectivity with the left amygdala for angry, fearful and sad facial 
expressions. 
Note: A priori regions of interest are shown in bold. *Small volume corrected, FWE p<.05 acc; Anterior Cingulate Cortex. Other 
activations at a threshold of p<.001, and minimal 10 contiguous voxels are also reported.
Table 2.3  Association between neuroticism and functional connectivity with the right amygdala for angry, fearful and sad facial 
expressions. 
Note: A priori regions of interest are shown in bold. *Small volume corrected, fwe p<.05 dmpfc: dorsomedial prefrontal cortex; ifg 
inferior frontal gyrus. Other activation at a threshold of p < 0.001, and minimal 10 contiguous voxels are also show
Table S2.1 Main effects of each negative emotional compared to neutral facial expressions 
Note: mtg: medial temporal gyrus, ifg: inferior frontal gyrus 
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stronger the coupling for fearful and angry compared to neutral faces between the right amygdala 
and the right dmpfc (see Figure 2.2). 
It is important to note that within each of the neuroticism related connectivity effects in the 
acc and dmpfc there were no significant main effects (irrespective of individual differences) of 
each contrast, even at a threshold of p<.05 uncorrected. Within our other regions of interest we 
only found significant effects of a positive ppi for the fear > neutral contrast in ventral lateral pre-
frontal cortex (-36/33/-8, Z=3.58), p<.05 fwe, small volume corrected. No other contrasts showed 
a positive or negative ppi effect in our rois 
2.5 Discussion 
Neuroticism modulates brain activity in the dmpfc during the processing of fearful faces
In this study, we investigated the modulatory role of neuroticism on brain activity and functional 
connectivity while processing negative compared to neutral facial expressions. Our results showed 
that activation in the dmpfc varied as a function of neuroticism scores in response to fearful facial 
expressions. This finding is broadly in line with studies in which dmpfc activity was found to be 
related to neuroticism (Haas, Constable, & Canli, 2008) and phobic proneness (Rubino et al., 2007) 
during the processing of sad, respectively fearful and angry facial expressions. Both studies discuss 
these findings within a framework of self-referential processing, a construct strongly associated 
with this brain region (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004). In accordance with 
these notions, neuroticism has been associated with an individual’s self-schema, i.e. a ‘[…] constel-
lation of self-referent information of one’s own unique traits […]’ which ‘[...] serves to guide the 
processing of personally relevant information’ (Winter & Kuiper, 1997). Trapnell and Campbell 
(1999) found that neuroticism related positively to ruminative self-consciousness (but not to re-
flective self-consciousness), which is associated with psychological distress (Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999). Hence, our results may imply that higher levels of neuroticism are associated with a higher 
degree of self-referential negative appraisal during the processing of fearful expressions
Neuroticism modulates amygdala–acc and amygdala–dmpfc connectivity
We did not observe an effect of neuroticism on activity in the amygdala during processing of 
negative emotional expressions. However, and crucial to our hypothesis, connectivity analysis 
showed that neuroticism distinctively modulated connectivity between the ‘left amygdala – 
right acc’ and ‘right amygdala – right dmpfc’. We found no significant main effect for these 
regions, which is broadly in line with previous research, applying the same functional connec-
tivity measure, that showed relatively small effects of functional coupling between the amyg-
dala and these prefrontal regions when processing fearful compared to neutral faces (Williams, 
2006). Our results suggest that it is worthwhile to account for individual differences in neuroti-
cism when studying functional connectivity related to the processing of negative emotional 
facial expressions. 
We found that connectivity of the left amygdala with the acc for angry and fearful, and dor-
sal acc for sad facial expressions, correlated negatively with neuroticism scores. This indicates 
that subjects high in neuroticism, while processing negative compared to neutral emotional 
expression, displayed relatively less amygdala and acc functional coupling. Numerous studies 
have shown the importance of amygdala–acc functional connectivity in the context of emotion 
processing. For example, Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch (2006), found that during high 
conflict trials in an emotional Stroop paradigm the amygdala and the rostral part of the acc 
were negatively functionally coupled, suggesting an inhibitory role of the acc over the amygdala. 
In line with our findings, a study on trait anxiety (Kienast et al., 2008) showed a negative correla-
tion of this trait with amygdala-acc connectivity when viewing negative compared to neutral 
scenes. Moreover, Pezawas et al. (2005) found that carriers of the short allele of the serotonin 
transporter gene (a polymorphism related to anxiety) showed relatively less functional coupling 
between the amygdala and acc when processing angry and fearful faces. These findings suggest 
that persons high in neuroticism (or other individual differences related to anxiety) display less 
acc related inhibitory control over the amygdala. It is of interest that the opposite pattern was 
found for a personality trait associated with positive affect and approach motivation; the behav-
ioral activation system (bas) (Passamonti et al., 2008). These authors found that bas positively 
predicted amygdala-acc connectivity for angry compared to neutral faces. The studies men-
tioned above demonstrate the relevance of amygdala–acc connectivity in emotion processing 
and emotion regulation. These reports suggest that individual differences in personality traits 
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modulate amygdala-acc functional connectivity, and that the direction of this correlation is dif-
ferent for traits related to negative or positive affect. 
In contrast to our results regarding left amygdala–acc connectivity, we found a positive re-
lation between neuroticism scores and right amygdala - right dmpfc connectivity. Participants 
with higher scores on neuroticism displayed relatively enhanced connectivity between the right 
amygdala and right dmpfc during the processing of angry and fearful compared to neutral faces. 
This finding relates to a study on functional connectivity in generalized social phobia (gsp) 
while processing self-referential praise and criticism (Blair et al., 2008). Their results showed 
that patients (compared to healthy control participants) displayed stronger functional connec-
tivity between amygdala and that the dmpfc for self-referential criticism. The authors argue that 
this finding may ‘[…] reflect a negative attitude toward the self, particularly in response to social 
stimuli [...]’, and mpfc may modulate amygdala engagement to initiate and maintain aspects of 
gsp (Blair et al., 2008). In keeping with our finding of neuroticism related differences in dmpfc 
activity, our amygdala – dmpfc connectivity results also suggest that persons high in neuroticism 
might demonstrate stronger self-referential processing in response to negative emotional faces. 
There is substantial evidence for the role of neuroticism in the development of, for example, 
anxiety disorders (Bienvenu et al., 2001; 2004). The pattern we found in the relation between 
functional connectivity and neuroticism might provide insight in the neural basis of neuroti-
cism-linked susceptibility to negative affect, and its associated vulnerability for the development 
of affective disorders. Taken together, our amygdala-acc connectivity results indicate that high 
levels of neuroticism are associated with relatively less inhibitory control over negative facial 
expressions. Based on dmpfc activity and amygdala – dmpfc connectivity, we suggest that those 
high in neuroticism demonstrate stronger self-reference to negative facial expressions. Further-
more, it is of interest to note the apparent dissociation between neuroticism and connectivity 
from the left and the right amygdala. A recent meta-analysis on amygdala function showed 
evidence for a dissociation between the left and right amygdala regarding temporal dynam-
ics (Sergerie et al., 2008), but did not find evidence for specific interactions between amygdala 
lateralization and valence or gender (Sergerie et al., 2008) in line with a previous meta-analysis 
(Baas et al., 2004). Less is known regarding lateralization of amygdala connectivity, and future 
research should therefore further explore possible lateralization in functional pathways from 
the amygdala. 
Limitations 
The interpretation of our connectivity analysis is restricted by the inherent limitations of functional 
connectivity measures. In our application of psycho-physiological interaction analysis, it is a measure 
of functional, but not effective connectivity (Friston et al., 1997). The main difference between these 
concepts is that the former is a correlation method and its results do not imply a causal relation 
between regions involved. ppi analysis in and of itself is therefore insufficient to assess the direction 
of effects (i.e., reciprocal or unidirectional) between the amygdala and the dmpfc and acc. This is 
an important limitation considering, for example, the argued regulatory role of the acc over the 
amygdala. Nonetheless, other studies, applying different methodologies, have provided more direct 
evidence for a top-down regulatory role of the acc over the amygdala. One tracing study, for exam-
ple, showed that the acc has more projections to the amygdala than vice versa (Ghashghaei, Hilgetag, 
& Barbas, 2007). Furthermore, deep brain stimulation experiments in depressed patients suggest that 
stimulating the acc -through its connectivity pathways- affects several subcortical regions, including 
the amygdala (Johansen-Berg et al., 2008; Mayberg, Lozano, Voon, & McNeely, 2005). 
In this experiment, we found differences in amygdala – prefrontal connectivity associated with 
neuroticism during an emotion processing task, with only very mild demands on cognitive control 
over emotional functions. It is therefore very well possible that when engaged in more cognitively 
demanding tasks, additional amygdala – pfc connectivity pathways strongly involved in inhibi-
tory control, would show associations related to individual differences in personality. For example, 
some studies have shown subcortical – prefrontal connectivity in relation to functions such as re-
appraisal (Banks et al., 2007; Wager et al., 2008), extinction learning (Quirk and Beer, 2006) and re-
sponse conflict (Etkin et al., 2006). Future research on negative affect should therefore incorporate 
individual differences in neuroticism in functional connectivity on such more challenging emo-
tion regulation tasks. We would argue that in such paradigms individual differences are likely to be 
associated with, for example, amygdala – ventromedial or ventral lateral prefrontal connectivity.
Conclusion
Our present study indicates that individual differences in neuroticism are of importance in modu-
lating functional connectivity of amygdala and prefrontal regions when processing negative emo-
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tional material. Neuroticism was negatively associated with amygdala-acc, and positively related 
to amygdala – dmpfc connectivity, when processing negative emotional facial expressions. These 
findings may provide insight into the neural mechanisms associated with susceptibility to negative 
emotional material, and may be relevant for to the development of affective disorders. 
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Extraversion is linked to 
volume of the orbitofrontal 
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3.1 Abstract
Objective: Neuroticism and extraversion are personality factors associated with the vulnerabil-
ity for developing depression and anxiety disorders, and are possibly differentially related to 
brain structures implicated in the processing of emotional information and the generation of 
mood states. To date, studies on brain morphology mainly focused on neuroticism, a dimen-
sion primarily related to negative affect, yielding conflicting findings concerning the association 
with personality, partially due to methodological issues and variable population samples under 
study. In the present study neuroticism but also, extraversion, a dimension primarily related 
to positive affect, are investigated in relation to brain volume using an optimized Voxel Based 
Morphometry (vbm) approach.
Methods: High resolution structural T1-weighted mr images of 65 healthy adults were processed 
using an optimized vbm approach. Multiple regression analyses were performed to test for as-
sociations of neuroticism and extraversion with prefrontal and subcortical volumes. 
Results: Orbitofrontal and right amygdala volume were both positively related to extraversion. Ex-
traversion was differentially related to volume of the anterior cingulate cortex in males (posi-
tive) and females (negative). Neuroticism scores did not significantly correlate with these brain 
regions. 
Conclusions: As extraversion is regarded a protective factor for developing anxiety disorders and 
depression, and has been related to the generation of positive affect, the present results indicate 
that the reduced likelihood of developing affective disorders in individuals high on extraver-
sion is related to modulation of emotion processing through the orbitofrontal cortex and the 
amygdala.
3.2 Introduction 
Neuroticism and extraversion are personality factors that have been directly linked to emotional 
states: neuroticism has been associated with susceptibility to negative emotional states, whereas 
extraversion has been linked to susceptibility to positive emotional states (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). 
Also, neuroticism correlates positively, whereas extraversion correlates negatively, with (subsyn-
dromal) symptoms of depression and anxiety in the general population (Jylhä & Isometsä, 2006). 
Other personality traits, such as agreeableness, openness to experiences, and conscientiousness, 
have been proposed to play a more indirect role in influencing affective states (Larsen & Ketelaar, 
1991). Consequently, neuroticism and extraversion may respectively put one at risk for (Bienvenu 
et al., 2004; Clark, Watson, & Mineka, 1994) or protect one against (Clark et al., 1994) development 
of affective disorders such as depression, panic disorder and social anxiety disorder.
More insight into the relation between personality and brain regions associated with emo-
tion processing and regulation may help to illuminate how personality is involved in the process-
ing of emotional information, and hence, in vulnerability to mood and anxiety disorders. On 
a functional level, it has previously been shown that neuroticism modulates neural activity in 
prefrontal and subcortical brain regions related to affective processing (Canli, 2004; Cremers et al., 
2010). Neuroticism has been related to more amygdala activation in response to distracting nega-
tive facial expressions during a cognitive task (Haas, Omura, Constable, & Canli, 2007), and to less 
anterior cingulate cortex (acc)–amygdala connectivity during processing of negative emotional 
facial expressions (Cremers et al., 2010). Extraversion on the other hand, was found to be positively 
associated with amygdala activation in response to happy faces (Canli, Sivers, Whitfield, Gotlib, & 
Gabrieli, 2002). Together, these findings indicate that core brain structures involved in emotion 
processing (e.g. the amygdala, the anterior cingulate gyrus, and the ventral part of the prefrontal 
cortex including the orbitofrontal cortex –ofc-) may play a role in the relation between personal-
ity, the processing of emotional information, and the production of mood states (Mobbs, Hagan, 
Azim, Menon, & Reiss, 2005). 
 Structural variation might underlie the relation between personality and activity in brain 
regions related to emotion perception and appraisal. In an adolescent sample, a positive associa-
tion between extraversion and (medial) prefrontal volume (Blankstein, Chen, Mincic, McGrath, 
& Davis, 2009) has been observed, which has also been demonstrated in adults (DeYoung et al., 
2010), although not consistently (Wright et al., 2006). Therefore, the relation between brain vol-
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ume and affect-related personality traits remains unclear. Inconsistencies in reported findings may 
be due to methodological and technical issues, such as the use of different segmentation and nor-
malization strategies (e.g. analyses based on modulated vs unmodulated images (Omura, Todd 
Constable, & Canli, 2005), not accounting for total brain volume (Jackson, Balota, & Head, 2009), 
or to sample characteristics and processes of brain maturation). For example, Jackson et al., 2009, 
and Wright, Feczko, Dickerson, & Williams (2007), studied the relation between neuroticism and 
regional brain volume in an elderly population, whereas Blankstein et al., 2009 included an adoles-
cent sample. As aging is an important predictor of regional brain volume, and because the process 
of aging (including brain maturation) has been shown to interact with personality (Jackson et al., 
2009), it is possible that the conflicting finding may depend on the age range of the sample. It is 
therefore necessary to further elucidate the complex relation between affect-related personality 
traits and regional brain volume in an adult sample, controlling for these important factors (i.e. 
age, total brain volume and modulation) but also testing for possible interaction effect with sex, as 
Blankstein et al., (2009) suggested that personality differentially affects regional brain volume in 
male and female adolescents. 
In the present study, we used an optimized vbm approach to investigate the relationship be-
tween neuroticism, extraversion, and regional brain volume in a large sample of healthy adults. We 
focused on brain regions involved in the initial processing of emotional information (amygdala) 
and on regions related to the appraisal and decision making influence of emotional information, 
acc and orbitofrontal cortex (Wright et al., 2006). As such, we aimed to identify neuro-anatomical 
substrates associated with affect-related personality traits. 
3.3 Methods
Ethics Statement
The study was carried out in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki. Also, the Ethical Review 
Boards of the Leiden University Medical Center (lumc), Academic Medical Center (amc), Uni-
versity of Amsterdam, and University Medical Center Groningen (umcg) approved this study. All 
participants provided written informed consent after complete description of the study. 
Participants
Sixty-five healthy participants were selected from the nesda (Netherlands Study of Depression 
and Anxiety) neuroimaging study (Penninx et al., 2008). The mri main sample is described in 
detail elsewhere (van Tol et al., 2010). Exclusion criteria for the current sample were: 1) a history of 
or current dsm iv axis i pathology, 2) taking any psychoactive drugs, 3) the presence or history of 
major internal or neurological disorder, 4) dependency or recent abuse (past year) of alcohol and/
or drugs, 5) hypertension 6) general mr-contraindications. 
Personality questionnaire 
To asses personality traits, all participants completed the neo Five Factor Inventory (Costa & Mc-
Crea, 1992).
Image acquisition
Imaging data were acquired using Philips 3T mr-systems (Best, The Netherlands) located at the Leiden 
University Medical Center (lumc), Academic Medical Center (amc), University of Amsterdam, and Uni-
versity Medical Center Groningen (umcg), equipped with sense-8 (lumc and umcg) and sense-6 (amc) 
channel head coils, respectively. For each subject, anatomical images were obtained using a sagittal 3D gra-
dient-echo T1-weighted sequence (tr=9 ms, te=3.5 ms; matrix 256x256; voxel size: 1 x 1 x 1 mm; 170 slices). 
Data analysis
vbm following the Diffeomorphic Anatomical Registration Through Exponentiated Lie (dartel) 
algebra software (Ashburner, 2007) implemented in Matlab 7.1.0 (The Matlab Inc, Natick, ma, 
http://www.mathworks.com/) was used. The preprocessing and masking procedure is described 
in detail elsewhere (van Tol et al., 2010). Briefly, after segmentation, data were registered, normal-
ized, and modulated using the dartel pipeline. Grey matter (gm) images were normalized to 
Montreal Neurological Institute (mni) space and smoothed at 8 mm full width at half maximum 
(fwhm). In the resulting images, each voxel represents an absolute amount of brain volume, 
equivalent to the brain volume per unit prior to normalization. 
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Next, we performed a multiple regression analysis with neuroticism and extraversion as independ-
ent variables and voxel-wise gm density maps as the dependent factor. In addition, sex x personality 
interaction terms were calculated by setting up a flexible factorial design. In each model, age, scan 
center, and gm total volumes were entered as nuisance variables. Based on the literature on emotion 
processing in affective disorders (Drevets, Price, & Furey, 2008), we set the following regions of interest 
(roi): amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex (ofc), anterior cingulate cortex (acc). A family wise error (fwe) 
at p<.05 correction for the spatial extent of the rois (small volume corrections) was applied. The rois 
were defined by the Automated Anatomical Labeling (aal) templates implemented in the Wake For-
est University School of Medicine (wfu) pickatlas (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette, 2003). For 
regions other than the rois, a voxel level threshold of p<.05 whole brain fwe corrected was set a priori. 
For completeness, explorative analysis are performed at an uncorrected threshold of p<.001, with a 
spatial cluster extent of 25 contiguous voxels. Demographic and clinical data were analyzed with spss 
16.0 (http://www-01.ibm.com/software/analytics/spss/) and significance was set at p<.05. 
3.4 Results
Sample characteristics and personality scores 
The age range of the 65 participants (42 females) was: 21-56, Mean (M)=40.5, standard deviation 
(sd)=9.7; years of education: M=14.3, sd=2.9. Neuroticism (range=13-36; M=24.2, sd=4.9) correlated 
negatively to extraversion (range 27-56; M=43.7, sd=6.2; r=-0.38, p=.002). Neuroticism correlated 
negatively with total gm, whereas Extraversion correlated positively with total gm (Neuroticism: 
r=0.29, p=.02; Extraversion: r=.29, p=.02). After partialling out variations in age and sex, only the 
correlation between Extraversion and gm total remained significant (Neuroticism: r
partial
=-.17, p=.18; 
Extraversion: r
partial
=.27, p=.03). Neither age nor years of education were significantly correlated with 
either neuroticism or extraversion (all p>.13), and no effect of sex was observed (F<1.74, p>.19).
Personality and regional brain volume
Volumes of both the right medial ofc -ba 11- (encompassing the rectal gyrus, the orbitofrontal re-
gion of Brodmann area 13 and the subgenual cingulate gyrus -ba 25-) and the right centro-medial 
amygdala were positively related with extraversion at the set threshold (p
fwe
<.05 corrected for ex-
tent of roi). At p<.001 uncorrected, the positive correlation of extraversion was also observed in 
the left ofc. Neuroticism did not show a significant relation with regional brain volume in any of 
Figure 3.1  Correlations of Extraversion and volume in the ofc and amygdala 
A) Positive correlation of extraversion and volume of the right orbital frontal gyrus scaled for total gray matter volume (r=.33; 
rpartial=.47 when neuroticism and age were partialled out) . B) Positive correlation of extraversion and right amygdala volume scaled 
for total gray matter volume (r=.31, rpartial=.39 when neuroticism and age were partialled out). Mean volume in ml of the significant 
voxels was extracted per subject and divided by total gm volume. In the correlation plots, mean volume of the significant amygdala 
and ofc region is depicted in scaled volume in ml * 10-3. 
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the rois. Adding the other three personality variables (openness, agreeableness, and conscientious-
ness) from the neo ffi did not significantly change the results (ofc: Z=3.28; amygdala, Z=3.50). 
Results are shown in figure 3.1 and table 3.1. No significant whole brain fwe p<.05 corrected effects 
outside these rois were found. For completeness, positive and negative correlations of neuroti-
cism and extraversion that were observed at p<.001, uncorrected with a spatial cluster extent of 25 
contiguous voxels are listed in table 3.1 (non-roi effects). However, these effects will not be further 
discussed, as these were not part of our a priori set regions of interest. 
Extraversion x sex interaction analysis showed an effect in the pregenual acc (mni coordinate: 
[x=3, y=48, Z=7] (p=.01 fwe corrected for the volume of the bilateral acc as defined by the aal 
templates). Post-hoc analysis showed that males displayed a significant positive association with 
extraversion (β=.40, p=.008, 95% C.I.(B)=[0.005 – 0. 26], zero-order correlation: r=.43), with gm 
totals, neuroticism, age, and scan center added to the model, whereas the association was in the op-
posite direction in female (β=-.28, p=.006, 95% C.I.(B)=[-0.24 – -0.004], zero-order correlation: 
r=.15). Sex by neuroticism interactions were not observed in any other region of interest. 
3.5 Discussion 
In the present report, we used an optimized vbm approach to test for personality related variations 
in regional brain volume in an adult sample. While controlling for age, sex and total gm we demon-
strated positive correlations between extraversion and regional brain volume in the medial ofc and 
centro-medial amygdala. This result confirms the role of the ofc in personality, a region that was 
already associated with personality changes in the case report of Phineas Gage (Damasio, Grabowski, 
Frank, Galaburda, & Damasio, 1994). We also found a positive correlation between extraversion and 
total gray matter volume. However, we did not find strong structural correlates of neuroticism.
 The observation that extraversion correlated positively with volume of both the medial ofc 
(extending into subgenual acc area 25) and the amygdala is of interest because of the role these 
regions play in affective processing (Rolls, 2004; Rolls & Grabenhorst, 2008). The medial ofc has 
often been associated with controlling reward and punishment related behavior, emotion regu-
lation, approach related behavior (Milad & Rauch, 2007) and decision making (Kringelbach & 
Rolls, 2004; Price, 2003), and has projections to visceral control structures, such as the ventral 
striatum, amygdala, hypothalamus, periaqueductal grey, and hippocampus: regions that are criti-
POSITIVE CORRELATIONS OF EXTRAVERSION
                MNI-coordinate
R/L region ba k x y z Z-score r
ofc        
R medial ofc, subgenual cingulate gyrus 11/25 329 13 16 -14 3.77 .47
 medial ofc, rectal gyrus 11  2 22 -18 3.54 .45
L medial ofc, subcallosal gyrus 34 68 -20 12 -14 3.33 .42
        
amygdala       
R amygdala, dorsal subdivision n.a. 31 21 -10 -21 3.34 .42
        
 NON-ROI EFFECTS       
R superior parietal lobule 7 60 34 -65 58 4.18 
L cerebellar declive, posterior lobe n.a. 65 -56 -65 -29 3.93 
L posterior cingulate gyrus 31 63 -7 -41 27 3.60 
        
NEGATIVE CORRELATIONS OF EXTRAVERSION       
                MNI-coordinate
R/L region ba k x y z Z-score
R  precentral gyrus 4 144 41 -20 47 3.75 
    34 -16 46 3.65 
L calcarine sulcus  30 -16 -69 13 3.55 
L inferior frontal gyrus 45 59 -49 20 14 3.46 
L superior parietal lobule 7 65 -21 -54 61 3.45 
        
POSITIVE CORRELATIONS OF NEUROTICISM       
                MNI-coordinate
R/L region ba k x y z Z-score
L middle temporal gyrus 21 278 -64 -43 -2 3.86 
        
NEGATIVE CORRELATIONS OF NEUROTICISM     
                MNI-coordinate
R/L region ba k x y z Z-score
R  supplemental motor area (sma) 6 45 13 -20 68 3.57 
Table 3.1   VBM effects 
r/l: Right vs. Left hemisphere; ba: Brodmann area; k=clustersize at p<.001, uncorrected; r=correlation coefficient at peak voxel.
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cal in modulating behavior and emotional expression (Milad & Rauch, 2007; Price, 2003; Price 
& Drevets, 2010). The amygdala has a well-documented role in emotion processing and has bi-
directional connections with the medial ofc (Price, 2003). Interestingly, a positive correlation of 
ofc thickness with extraversion and fear extinction has been previously described (Rauch et al., 
2005). In another study, humor-driven activation, reflecting hedonic capacity, was found to be 
positively correlated with extraversion in the right medial ofc (Mobbs et al., 2005). Moreover, in 
the amygdala, activation during happy face viewing was found to be positively related to extraver-
sion (Canli, 2004). Hence, the increased volumes of medial ofc and amygdala may play a role in 
the increased sensitivity to positive, pleasant information and (social) reward, and thus, the pro-
pensity to experience the positive affect which characterizes extraversion (Clark et al., 1994). The 
nature of this role, however, awaits further elucidation, as relations between volume and function 
are not straightforward: increased volumes of gm in brain areas may be reflective of a number of 
processes involving, among others, glial cells, inhibitory or excitatory neurons and interneurons. 
However, these processes cannot as yet be assessed in vivo in humans. 
Beside the overall positive correlation between ofc and amygdala volume and extraversion, 
we also found a sex x extraversion interaction in the acc. Males showed a positive correlation 
between acc volume and extraversion, while this correlation was negative in females. A similar 
effect in the medial prefrontal gyrus was previously shown in adolescents (Blankstein et al., 
2009). These findings could suggest that, in men, the acc is included in the same extraversion 
mediated regulatory network as the amygdala and ofc, while this is not the case in females. This 
could imply that extraversion has a stronger protective effect in men than in women, in line 
with the well known observation that men are less susceptible to affective disorders (Piccinelli 
& Wilkinson, 2000).
It is also interesting to note that our findings were mainly right-lateralized. In a study by Hast-
ings, Parsey, Oquendo, Arango, & Mann (2004), it was found that non-medicated depressed pa-
tients showed smaller right amygdala volume than controls (an effect which was driven by the 
female participants). Since we found that low extraversion is linked to smaller right amygdala 
volume, our results can be considered in line with this study. Moreover, a meta-analysis on later-
alization has found that the right amygdala is more involved in processing masked stimuli, where-
as the left amygdala is more involved in processing stimuli which contain language (Costafreda, 
Brammer, David, & Fu, 2008). Relating this finding to our data, it might suggest that extraversion 
is more strongly linked to the subconscious emotion-processing role of the amygdala. However, 
the lack of consensus regarding lateralization and amygdala function among functional mri meta-
analyses should be noted (Baas, Aleman, & Kahn, 2004; Sergerie, Chochol, & Armony, 2008; Wager, 
Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). Moreover a positive correlation between the left amygdala and 
extraversion was also observed at a more liberal threshold (p<.005 uncorrected), and no formal 
interaction of extraversion x lateralization was observed in a repeated measures anova. Therefore, 
no strong statements on lateralization can be made. Furthermore the positive correlation between 
extraversion and right amygdala volume was localized in the central-medial amygdala, which con-
tains (most of) the efferent connections from the amygdala to the brainstem and hypothalamus 
(Price, 2003). These connections are particularly important for fight/flight responses, and taken 
together, our findings might fit with the idea that extraversion is linked to moderating unconscious 
emotion processing and primary stress responses. 
The present result with respect to extraversion is in line with findings of Blankstein et al., 2009, 
who used a similar methodology (i.e. an optimized vbm approach) in an adolescent sample, and 
another study that showed a relation between extraversion and pfc volume in an adults sample 
(DeYoung et al., 2010). However, also neuroticism has been related to ofc volume (Wright et al., 
2006). Accordingly, in the present study, we expected neuroticism to account for a substantial por-
tion of the volumetric variation in regions associated with emotional perception and regulation. 
However, no such relation was observed. Instead, extraversion was found to be the main predic-
tor of regional brain volume in affective brain regions. This discrepancy in findings might be 
due to methodological issues such as those outlined before, most importantly, this study used an 
optimized vbm method in a relatively large adult subject sample. Future research has to elucidate 
whether this lack of neuroticism - brain volume relations is a stable finding. 
In the present study we examined structural correlates of extraversion and neuroticism in a 
cross-sectional design. Therefore, it is possible that the found correlates are not primary, but sec-
ondary to individual lifetime experiences. For instance, high extraversion is known to be asso-
ciated with different lifetime experiences than low extraversion. Findings from the same nesda 
study indicate that extraversion and negative life events mediate the course of depressive symp-
toms (Spinhoven et al., 2011), suggesting that extraversion, also defined as the tendency to engage 
in reward-enhancing behavior, could influence the likelihood of experiencing positive life events 
or how certain life events are perceived. In addition, extraversion is argued to be a protective factor 
for dysthemia and social anxiety rather than other anxiety disorders (Kotov, Gamez, Schmidt, & 
Watson, 2010). Interactions between extraversion, lifetime experiences (both positive and nega-
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tive) and brain structures should be investigated as this could shed light on the development of 
different psychiatric disorders. 
Given the augmenting evidence for a significant relation between extraversion and ofc and 
amygdala volumes, future research should address structural and functional connectivity of the 
ofc and the amygdala, and further investigate the role of the pregenual acc in this circuitry. This 
might provide more insight about the trajectory from health to psychopathology, and, in doing 
so, identify neuroanatomical markers which relates to one’s risk of developing affective disorders. 
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4.1 Abstract
Objective: An imbalance in the neural motivational system may underlie Social Anxiety Disorder 
(sad). Although cognitive theories conceptually link sad to social punishment sensitivity, cur-
rent neurobiological findings have not shown evidence thereof. This study examines social 
reward and punishment anticipation in sad, predicting increased striatal activation for pun-
ishment avoidance. 
Methods: Individuals with sad (n = 20) and age, gender and education case-matched controls 
(n=20) participated in a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fmri) study. During fmri 
scanning, participants performed a new Social Incentive Delay task to measure the anticipa-
tion of social reward and punishment. 
Results: As expected, healthy controls showed stronger striatal activity for reward than for punish-
ment trials. sad participants showed a reversed pattern of effects, indicating relative increased 
striatal punishment sensitivity. Furthermore, in the sad group, behavioral data showed evidence 
for reaction time difference between punishment and neutral trials, lower likeability ratings for 
punishment cues, and a correlation between anticipatory striatal activity and cue ratings.
Conclusions: sad participants’ striatal activation balance in social reward/punishment anticipa-
tion suggests an increased motivation to actively avoid social punishments. These results high-
light the impact of social incentives on the motivational system in the socially anxious brain, 
and point to altering the reward/punishment balance and increasing reward sensitivity when 
treating sad.
4.2 Introduction 
Avoidance motivation is a core aspect of social anxiety disorder -sad- (Holtforth, 2008; Neal & 
Edelmann, 2003). Research over the last decades has identified a dopaminergic mediated brain cir-
cuit involved in motivational processing (Haber & Knutson, 2010), largely encompassed by the ven-
tral parts of the striatum. Anticipatory striatal activity is thought to reflect motivational salience, and 
is linked to both appetitive -reward- and aversive motivation -punishment avoidance- (Salamone, 
1994). Although sad may be associated with an imbalance in the striatal system, it has never been 
studied in relation to social incentives, and it remains unknown whether the striatum is more active 
when avoiding social punishments or when obtaining social rewards. Insight into these core moti-
vational systems is critical in advancing the understanding of the neurobiological basis of sad, and 
in providing starting points for more focused treatment of this pervasive disorder. 
A recent model integrates Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory with sad development, and highlights 
the role of behavioral inhibition as a temperamental predisposition in the development of social anxiety 
(Kimbrel, 2008). The behavioral inhibition system is linked to punishment or threat sensitivity and the 
motivation to avoid potentially harmful situations -harm avoidance- (Carver & White, 1994). It is thus 
likely that in sad, the striatal motivational system shows differential preference for reward and punish-
ment avoidance, either reflecting the absence of a motivational drive to obtain a reward, heightened 
motivation to avoid punishments or both. Several lines of brain research have indeed linked alterations 
in the striatal dopaminergic systems to sad (see Freitas-Ferrari et al., 2010 for an overview). In addition, 
fmri studies in behaviorally inhibited children (Guyer et al., 2006) and adolescents with sad (Guyer et 
al., 2012) found overall increased activation in the ventral striatum for impending monetary rewards and 
punishments. This valence nonspecific increase in striatal activity was interpreted as reflecting a general 
motivation to avoid making mistakes. On the contrary, another study found that high shyness relates 
specifically to faster responses to monetary rewards but not to punishments (Hardin et al., 2006). 
None of the discussed empirical findings seem immediately compatible with the suggested 
motivational imbalance towards stronger punishment avoidance sensitivity. Surprisingly, how-
ever, brain responses to social incentives in sad have yet to be tested. To this end, we investigated 
brain activation in social anxiety disorder when social rewards or punishments could be actively 
obtained or avoided. We hypothesized that sad participants would show greater motivation to 
avoid social punishments than to obtain social rewards, reflected by stronger activation in striatal 
regions during punishment anticipation than during reward anticipation.
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4.3 Methods
Participants
This study included 20 participants with sad and 20 healthy control participants (selected from a 
pool of 24 subjects to match on age, gender, and years of education) see table 4.1. Participants com-
pleted several questionnaires: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (lsas) Social Phobia Anxiety Inventory 
(spai; Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989), Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation (bfne; Weeks et al., 
2005), Beck Depression Inventory (bdi; Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988), the five-factor model of person-
ality neo-ffi (Costa & McCrea, 1992), and the Behavioral Activation and Behavioral Inhibition Scale 
(bis/bas; Carver & White, 1994), see Table 4.1. sad participants were recruited through advertisement 
(n=7) and local participating treatment centers (n=8) and social anxiety websites (n=5). Inclusion 
criteria for social anxiety participants were an lsas score of 60 or higher, and to meet criteria for gen-
eral sad according to the dsm-iv (1994) criteria based on the Mini-International Neuropsychiatric 
Interview (mini) as a primary diagnosis. The mini is a well validated diagnostic instrument (Shee-
han et al., 1997) and took approximately 45 minutes to complete for the sad participants. Two sad 
participants had a secondary comorbid current depressive episode, while four others had a history 
of depressive episodes. Two of these sad participants were on stable Selective Serotonin Reuptake In-
hibitor (ssri) use. Healthy control participants had no history of psychiatric disease or psychotropic 
medication use. The study was approved by the Medical Ethical Committee of the Leiden University 
Medical Center and written informed consent was given by all participants.
Materials and Procedures
Participants performed the Social Incentive Delay task (sid; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009), a variation of 
the Monetary Incentive Delay task (mid; Knutson, Fong, Adams, Varner, & Hommer, 2001) which was 
designed to measure brain activity related to social rewards. In addition, we added a social punishment 
condition in order to directly compare the punishment and reward conditions. Participants are cued on 
the possible outcome when a target detection response (button press with right hand index finger) falls 
within the presentation time of that target. In the social reward condition, happy faces are the outcome 
of a fast response (hit) and morphed faces of a slow response (miss). In the social punishment condition, 
the morphed faces represent a hit, while angry faces represent a miss. In the control condition, a morphed 
face always follows the target, regardless of whether the response was fast enough (see Figure 4.1). 
The task consists of two runs, each of 72 trials. Each trial starts with a 500 ms cue: a circle for 
the reward condition (n=27), a triangle for the neutral condition (n=18), and a square for the pun-
ishment condition (n=27). A fixation cross is then presented for 2250-2750 ms. The combination 
of the two is referred to as the anticipation period. The target (filled white square) is presented and 
participants are instructed to respond as fast as possible when the target appears. To ensure that 
hit rate in the different conditions was similar across participants, the target duration was variable 
(160–500 ms) and shortened with 10 ms for the subsequent trial when the previous target was hit. 
The target duration was increased with 20 ms in the subsequent trial when the previous target was 
missed. This algorithm leads to an approximate hit rate of 66 percent. The target is followed by 
the outcome (1650 ms), after which a black screen is presented (2500 – 5000 ms). The different trial 
types were presented intermixed in an event-related design, with the presentation order of trial 
types optimized using a genetic algorithm toolbox (Wager & Nichols, 2003). 
Mean (sd)
Social Anxiety
(n=20)
Control Subjects
(n=20)
F value p-value
Age, y 29.1 (7.5) 27.7 (7.7) 0.33 0.57
Gender, male/female 11/09 11/09
Years of education 16 16.4 0.26 0.61
lsas 85.9 (13.9) 21.6 (13.1) 225.23 <.001
bfne 54.3 (5.6) 36.0 (9.2) 44.59 <.001
bdi 20.5 (11.6) 5.2 (4,.4) 40.52 <.001
neo-n 43.6 (9.8) 29.5 (6.7) 24.54 <.001
neo-e 30.8 (6.3) 42.7 (4.8) 39.51 <.001
bis 24.7 (3.4) 18.5 (4.2) 25.7 <.001
bas-Reward 14.9 16.6 (2.2) 5.8 0.021
Table 4.1  Participant Characteristics 
Note: lsas = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, bfne =Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation, bdi = Beck Depression Inventory. neo-n = neo-ffi 
neuroticism, neo-e = neo-ffi Extraversion. bis: Behavioral Inhibition System. bas: Behavioral Activation System.
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The faces used in this task were taken from a standardized and validated set of facial expressions, 
the nimstim database (Tottenham et al., 2009). Both happy and angry expression from 9 male 
and 9 female models were used. The morphed faces were generated using Adobe Photoshop 
(www.adobe.com/Photoshop). 
Before the actual task, participants completed practice trials until 10 hits were obtained (irre-
spective of condition). After the scan protocol, participants rated how much each cue was liked on 
a 11 point Likert scale ranging from 0 (extremely disliked) to 10 (extremely liked), 5 being neutral. 
fmri data acquisition and preprocessing
Imaging data were acquired on a Philips 3.0-T Achieva mri scanner using an eight-channel sense 
head coil for radiofrequency transmission and reception (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Neth-
erlands). Whole-brain fmri data were acquired using T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging 
(epi) with the following scan parameters: 298 volumes; 38 axial slices scanned in ascending order; 
repetition time (tr)= 2200 ms; echo time (te)= 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; fov = 220 × 220 mm; 2.75 
mm isotropic voxels with a .25 mm slice gap. A high-resolution anatomical image (T1-weighted 
ultra-fast gradient-echo acquisition; tr = 9.75 ms; te = 4.59 ms; flip angle = 8°; 140 axial slices; 
fov = 224 × 224 mm; in-plane resolution .875 × .875 mm; slice thickness = 1.2 mm), and a high-
resolution T2*- weighted gradient echo epi scan (tr = 2.2 s; te = 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; 84 axial 
slices; fov = 220 × 220 mm; in-plane resolution 1.96 × 1.96 mm, slice thickness = 2 mm) were 
acquired for registration to standard space. Data were analyzed using fsl Version 4.1.3 (fmrib’s 
Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). 
The following preprocessing steps were applied to the epi data sets: removal of non-brain tissue, 
spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full width at half maximum (fwhm), grand-
mean intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative factor, and a high 
pass temporal filter of 60 s (i.e., ≥.016 Hz). The dataset was registered to the high resolution epi 
image, the high resolution epi image to the T1-weighted image, and the T1-weighted image to 
the 2 mm isotropic mni-152 standard space image (T1-weighted standard brain averaged over 152 
subjects; Montreal Neurological Institute, Montreal, qc, Canada). The resulting transformation 
matrices were then combined to obtain a native to mni space transformation matrix and its inverse 
(mni to native space).
Reward
+
Neutral Punishment
Fast
Slow
Figure 4.1  Social Incentive Delay Task.  
Upper panel On each trial a cue -500ms- (corresponding to different conditions) is followed by a delay period (2250-2750 ms) 
after which a target is presented (150-500 ms). When the target is shown, participants are instructed to press a button as fast as 
possible. Depending on whether the reaction time is fast enough one of two possible feedback screens appear (1650 ms). Lower 
panel The different conditions with the associated feedback 
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Analysis
fmri data 
Time-series statistical analysis was carried out using film (fmrib’s Improved Linear Model) with 
local autocorrelation correction (Smith et al., 2004). Explanatory variables (ev’s) were included 
in the general linear model that modeled the anticipation of reward, anticipation of punishment 
and control conditions. For the outcome phase, four separate ev’s were entered for hits and misses 
in the reward and punishment conditions, and one ev for the outcome in the neutral condition. 
One ev was further added to model trials where no response was given at all, while another ev 
was modeled for all the button presses during the target presentation to explain variance due to 
motor responses. Each ev was convolved with a double gamma hemodynamic response function 
to account for the hemodynamic delay, and in addition, the temporal derivative for each ev was 
included. Contrasts were generated that compared the anticipation conditions against each other 
(e.g. reward>neutral, punishment>neutral) and against the “implicit baseline” (reward> baseline, 
punishment>baseline). 
The further statistical analyses were restricted to brain regions related to reward and punishment 
based on meta-analytic data, and a main effect of task condition (across participants). First the 
automated meta-analytic database Neurosynth (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Nichols, Van Essen, & Wager, 
2011) was used to create reverse inference statistical maps related to the terms “reward” and “pun-
ishment”, which were subsequently combined into one map. This statistical map was used as re-
gions of interest in a voxel-wise analysis of the two main effects of task (reward > baseline and 
punishment > baseline), cluster corrected with an initial cluster forming threshold of z>2.3, and 
a corrected p<0.05. The two cluster corrected maps subsequently were combined in an inclusion 
manner (regions showing significant clusters in both the reward and the punishment condition). 
This combined statistical map was thus a result of regions known to be involved in reward and or 
punishment processing a priori, and those which showed sensitivity to this version of the social 
incentive delay task. Subsequently, to test for a Group x Condition interaction, mean parameter 
estimates were extracted for each region, condition (compared to neutral) and participant, and per 
region entered in a repeated measure anova with group as between, and condition (reward and 
punishment) as within subjects factor. Grey matter values per cluster were entered as covariates. 
Behavioral data
Behavioral data was analyzed with pasw Statistics, Release Version 18 (spss, Inc., Chicago, il, www.
spss.com) using a 2 group (sad and controls) x 3 condition (social reward, punishment and neu-
tral) repeated measures anova on mean target reaction times. The same analysis was subsequently 
performed with subjective ratings of the cues as the dependent variable. In addition, correlational 
analyses were performed to test for a relation between behavioral variables (reaction time data, 
subjective ratings, social anxiety symptoms and bis/bas) and brain activity. A significance thresh-
old of p<0.05 uncorrected for multiple comparisons was applied. 
4.4 Results
Behavioral results
Reaction Time (rt)
Mean rt’s and standard errors per group and condition are presented in Table 4.2. A repeated 
measures anova with Group as a between-subjects and Condition as within-subjects factor showed 
a main effect of Condition on rt data (F(2,76)=7.35, p=.001), driven by both reward>neutral 
(t(38)=3.1, p=0.004) and punishment>neutral (t(38)=2.9, p=0.006) effects. There was a trend for 
a Group x Condition interaction (F(2,76)=2.96, p=.058). A post-hoc test revealed a significant dif-
ference between the punishment>neutral different scores in sad compared to the control group 
(t(38)=2.1, p=0.044). None of the other pair-wise comparisons or simple effects were significant 
between the two groups (all p>0.15). 
The adaptive reinforcement schedule resulted in the following hit rates: In the control group, the 
observed mean percentages of hits (± standard error) were 61.0% (±0.014 %) for reward, 61.0% 
(±0.014%) for punishment, and 57% (±0.019%) for the neutral condition. In the sad group, this 
was 61.0% (±0.012%) for reward, 61.0.% (±0.011%) for punishment, and 54% (±0.02%) for the 
neutral condition. There was no significant Group x Condition interaction, and none of the condi-
tions were significantly different between groups (all p>0.05). 
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Subjective Ratings of cues
Mean subjective ratings and standard errors are presented in Table 4.2. A mixed anova for the 
subjective (like-dislike) ratings of the symbols, signaling the condition at the start of each tri-
al, yielded a main effect of Condition (F(2,76)=33.56, p<.001). Both reward>neutral (t(38)=9.4, 
p<0.001) and punishment>neutral (t(38)=5.3, p<0.001) were significant. A Group x Condition 
interaction (F(2,76)=7.91, p=.001) was also found. Subsequently, the two groups were compared 
on the valence-specific contrasts. Group differences were significant both for the reward>neutral 
(t(38)=2.6, p=0.014) and for the punishment>neutral comparisons (t(38)=3.5, p=0.001). Com-
pared to sad participants, controls liked both the reward and the punishment cues more than the 
neutral cues. Furthermore, within sad participants, a trend was found for reward compared to 
punishment (t(38)=1.9, p=0.067) showing greater dislike for the punishment than for the reward 
symbols. 
fmri Results
The analytic procedure identified two clusters that showed a main effect of task (reward >baseline, and 
punishment>baseline) within reward and punishment related regions, one in the Putamen (x = -20, 
y =12 z = 4, k = 242) and another in the thalamus (x = 4 y = -24 z = 6, k = 409). Importantly there was 
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Figure 4.2  Brain activation during anticipation in the left Putamen region of interest. 
Parameter estimates per group and condition compared to neutral. Left side of the image is right side of the brain. Error bars are 
standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 4.3  Correlation between anticipatory striatal activation (reward>punishment) and likability rating of anticipation 
cues (reward>punishment) in the social anxiety group
Mean (se)
Reaction Time (ms) Subjective Rating 
Social Anxiety
(n=20) 
Control Subjects 
(n=20)
Social Anxiety 
(n=20)
Control
Subjects 
(n=20)
Reward 240.3 (6.5) 236.0 (6.5) 7.1 (0.4) 7.1 (0.3)
Neutral 253 (6.1) 239.9 (6.9) 5.4 (0.4) 4.1 (0.3)
Punishment 238.4 (6.7) 237.0 (6.7) 4.8 (0.4) 6.0 (0.4) 
a significant Group x Condition interaction (F(2,76)=4.26, p=0.046) in the left putamen cluster, were 
sad participants showed a relatively stronger activation for punishment than controls, who showed 
relatively stronger activation for reward (see figure 4.2). Post-hoc tests revealed that controls showed 
Table 4.2  Behavioral Data 
Note: Reaction times are in milliseconds. Subjective ratings are based on an 11-point likert scale on how much each cue, i.e. the 
start of a trial, was liked (0=extremely disliked, 10=extremely liked). 
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greater activity for reward than for punishment (t(19)=2.3, p=0.033), other pairwise comparisons 
within, or effects between groups were non-significant (all p>0.2). There was no significant Group x 
Condition interaction in the thalamus/brainstem cluster (F(38)=0.002, p= 0.96). In the social anxiety 
group, a positive correlation was observed between striatal difference scores (reward>punishment) and 
subjective liking ratings of the cues (also reward>punishment), pearson correlation: r=0.45, r2=0.20, 
p=0.047, 95% confidence Interval: .0087-.744, spearman correlation: r=0.52, p= 0.019), see figure 4.3. 
4.5 Discussion 
In this study, we tested whether participants with social anxiety disorder (sad) show differential 
neural activity during the anticipation of social reward or punishment. While controls demonstrated 
a stronger effect for reward than for punishment trials, sad participants showed an opposite pattern 
of results (relatively stronger punishment avoidance sensitivity). Behavioral data displayed a trend 
towards a significant group by condition interaction, and post-hoc test revealed a larger reaction 
time difference in the sad than in the control group when anticipating punishment compared to 
neutral feedback. This finding could be interpreted as a stronger motivation to avoid a punishment 
compared to neutral trials. However, the sad group have a higher reaction time for the neutral trials 
(albeit not significantly different from the control group), which could suggest a difficulty processing 
ambiguous stimuli (Moscovitch & Hofmann, 2007; Moser, Huppert, Foa, & Simons, 2012). Moreover, 
subjective ratings also revealed a trend toward lower likability ratings of the symbol indicating pun-
ishment than the one indicating reward in sad participants compared with controls. An additional 
correlational analysis indicated that increased striatal activity for reward compared to punishment 
anticipation also correlated with increased preference (ratings) of reward over punishment trials in 
the social anxiety group. Taken together, the neural and behavioral results could reflect a motivation-
al imbalance in sad, a state in which the usually increased motivation to obtain rewards rather than 
avoid punishments is shifted towards an increased relative motivation to avoid social punishments. 
This study extends findings from previous studies emphasizing the role of the striatum in in 
behaviorally inhibited adolescents (Guyer et al., 2006) or adolescents with sad (Guyer et al., 2012). 
However, in contrast to these studies we showed valence specific striatal effects, arguing for a relative 
lack of reward and increased punishment sensitivity in sad. Our results contradict findings of a be-
havioral study using the mid in shy and non-shy students, that indicated that the high shyness group 
was more reward driven (Hardin et al., 2006). The authors suggested this finding could have resulted 
from a conflict in the high shyness group between pressing a button (approach) and their motiva-
tion to avoid a punishment cue. Our data suggest that this hypothesized process might not occur 
when the outcomes are social in nature, and are thus more closely related to the pathophysiological 
mechanisms in sad. The discrepancy between the current and previous findings might therefore be 
related to the difference in the types of incentives (monetary in previous studies vs. social in our 
study). Along this line, another study on a symptom specific process in sad (self-referential process-
ing) reported increased mpfc and amygdala activity specially in response to negative self-focused 
comments (Blair et al., 2008). An additional explanation for the discrepancy between the current and 
some previous results is that the age of the study population (children compared with adults) might 
play a critical role in motivational preference, as sensitivity to punishment typically emerges at a later 
developmental stage (van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2008). More research on the current topic is needed, 
and it would be worth investigating whether the proposed motivational imbalance “shifts or normal-
izes” after a treatment which successfully increases reward sensitivity (e.g. Borgeat et al., 2009).
In line with predictions from a recent model of sad development (Kimbrel, 2008) and empiri-
cal findings (Kimbrel, Mitchell, & Nelson-Gray, 2010; Morgan et al., 2009), sad participants scored 
higher on the behavioral inhibition scale and lower on the behavioral activation scale. These findings 
in combination with striatal results are not only relevant for the understanding of the neurobiology 
of sad, but, on a theoretical note, also shed light on the valence specificity of the reward or motiva-
tional system in the brain, which may depend on the severity of anxiety (controls versus clinical anxi-
ety levels). Our finding relates to the ideas that dopamine reflects motivational salience, and that the 
(ventral) striatum codes “wanting” rather than “liking” (Berridge, 2004; 2006). It is important to note 
however, that the exact functional role of dopamine is still under debate. Different dopamine systems 
are thought to be related to motivational salience in general, while others are specific to reward only 
-motivational value- (Bromberg-Martin, Matsumoto, & Hikosaka, 2010; Matsumoto & Hikosaka, 
2009). In line with the anticipatory affect model (Knutson & Greer, 2008), striatal regions in control 
participants showed a preference for reward anticipation. This model further emphasizes the rela-
tionship between anticipatory striatal activation and subjective experience (Knutson & Greer, 2008), 
for which we found support in the social anxiety group. More generally, striatal (dopaminergic) 
anticipatory activity might depend on the individual relevance (either implicitly or explicitly deter-
mined) of the upcoming reinforcer. Along this view, a recent fmri study found support for a modula-
tory role of personal relevance (when valence is constant) in the ventral striatum (Carter, Macinnes, 
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Huettel, & Adcock, 2009). Another study found that harm avoidance scores correlated with ventral 
striatal activation during active avoidance of negative outcomes (Levita, Hoskin, & Champi, 2012). 
This study further underscores the link between striatal activation and active avoidance, which sup-
ports our interpretation that avoiding social punishments constitutes a stronger reinforcer (motiva-
tionally more salient) for sad participants than does obtaining social rewards. 
There are a few interpretational issues that need to be discussed. One point of concern is the 
specificity of the findings. In this version of the sid task, we opted for a large number of the same 
trial types to optimize our main contrast of interest (reward > punishment anticipation). This 
came, however, at the expense of including another control condition (for example a non-social 
control condition) or applying a fully balanced design, with not only congruent trials (happy faces 
signaling a fast response, angry faces a loss) as we have used here, but also with the incongruent 
trials (i.e., happy faces signaling a slow response, and angry faces signaling a fast response), as 
was used by Vrtička, Andersson, Grandjean, Sander, & Vuilleumier (2008). Future studies should 
apply these balanced designs to get a more specific view on valence differences in social incentive 
anticipation. In addition, a direct comparison with another anxiety patient group can increase 
the potential specificity of our findings. Moreover, in this study we used static faces that did not 
have direct personal relevance to the participants. Several studies have used dynamic facial expres-
sions (e.g., Trautmann, Fehr, & Herrmann, 2009) which arguably have more ecological validity. 
This same validity argument can be made for tasks designed to increase the personal relevance of 
stimuli. For example, in one study participants thought they would later engage in a computer chat 
session with peers, whose pictures were used as stimuli in the actual fmri experiment (Guyer et al., 
2008). Both adjustments could help increase the social nature of the task.
Conclusions
Whereas controls show relatively heightened striatal response to cues signaling reward rather then 
avoiding punishment, sad participants show the opposite pattern of results. This relative height-
ened sensitivity to cues signaling social punishment suggests that they are more motivated to avoid 
a potential punishment. This finding is in line with theoretical models of sad, and emphasizes that 
besides “passive” anxiety for social interactions, sad participants are also specifically motivated to 
actively avoid negative social feedback.
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Dysfunctional cortical-
amygdala coupling in social 
anxiety during the anticipation 
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5.1 Abstract
Objective: Severe stress in social situations is a core symptom of social anxiety disorder. Con-
nectivity between the amygdala and cortical regions is thought to be important for emotion 
regulation, a function that is compromised in sad. However, it has never been tested if and how 
this connectivity pattern changes under conditions of stress inducing social evaluative threat. 
Here we investigate changes in cortical-amygdala coupling in social anxiety disorder during 
the anticipation of a public speech. 
Methods: Individuals with sad (n = 20) and age, gender and education matched controls (n=20) 
underwent three “resting-state” fmri scans before, during and after the anticipation of a public 
speech. Connectivity between cortical emotion regulation regions and the amygdala was tested 
for group x condition interactions.
Results: sad participants, compared to controls, showed diminished connectivity (decoupling) 
between cortical emotion regulation regions and the amygdala during the anticipating speak-
ing in public. Moreover, cortical-amygdala decoupling mediated the relationship between so-
cial anxiety symptoms and increase in self-reported stress. 
Conclusions: The distinctive pattern of cortical-amygdala connectivity may suggest less effective 
cortical communication during social stress provoking situations in sad, which could be a core 
mechanism underlying perceived stress. 
5.2 Introduction 
Social anxiety disorder (sad) is characterized by persistent fear of social interactions. Dysfunc-
tional emotion regulation may be at the heart of its etiology and might involve ineffective cortical-
subcortical coupling. However, such coupling has not been investigated in relation to social evalu-
ative threat, a key component in social stress, which is difficult to study naturalistically in an fmri 
context on top of that. Insight into these cortical-subcortical mechanisms is critical to advancing 
knowledge on the neurocognitive background of sad, and improving therapeutic interventions in 
this frequent and persistent disorder. Here, we test whether and how cortical-subcortical (amyg-
dala) connectivity in sad alters during the anticipation of speaking in public. In addition, we 
test whether this pattern of connectivity mediates the relationship between symptom severity and 
acute stress responses. 
The amygdala is extensively connected to both cortical and subcortical regions (e.g. hypothala-
mus and brainstem nuclei, such as the periaqueductal grey and locus coeruleus (Arnsten, 2009; 
Ulrich-Lai & Herman, 2009). The subcortical connections are particularly important for both the 
autonomic nervous system (ans) and the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (hpa) axis reactions 
to stressors (Joëls & Baram, 2009; Ulrich-Lai & Herman, 2009); as such, the amygdala may play a 
coordinating role in the stress response (Arnsten, 2009; Joëls & Baram, 2009; Ulrich-Lai & Her-
man, 2009). The cortical-amygdala connections on the other hand, are important for regulatory 
processes aimed at altering (initial) stress or emotional responses (Arnsten, 2009; Feder, Nestler, & 
Charney, 2009). Previous pet studies in sad have demonstrated increased amygdala activity dur-
ing speech anticipation (Lorberbaum et al., 2004; Tillfors, Furmark, Marteinsdottir, & Fredrikson, 
2002). However, cortical-amygdala connectivity has not been addressed, and more generally, the 
role of the amygdala activity in prolonged stress states is unclear (Pruessner et al., 2008; Wager, 
Waugh, et al., 2009b). It is possible that social stress is reflected more by a change in the connectiv-
ity pattern (van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernández, 2010; Veer et al., 2011) of the amygdala than by 
a prolonged increase in activity. 
A recent fmri meta-analysis identified a broad set of cortical regions involved in cognitive emo-
tion regulation, including medial and lateral prefrontal and parietal regions (Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, 
& Gruber, 2011). A limited capacity to adequately (voluntarily) regulate emotion responses is thought 
to underlie several anxiety disorders (Amstadter, 2008). Some studies have started to investigate sad 
in paradigms with an explicit instruction to the participants to regulate their emotional responses 
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(Goldin, Manber, Hakimi, Canli, & Gross, 2009a; Goldin, Manber-Ball, Werner, Heimberg, & Gross, 
2009b). However, these emotion regulation processes are clearly also important when situational 
demands are high, without following explicit emotion regulation instructions (Gross, 2010). For sad, 
reduced (spontaneous) regulatory processes could be particularly pronounced during public speech 
anticipation and may relate to an increased stress or anxiety response. 
Here we investigate connectivity between the set of cortical emotion regulation regions and the 
amygdala in sad participants before, during and after the anticipation of giving a public speech. 
We hypothesize that, compared to the control group, sad participants are characterized by less 
effective cortical emotion regulation of the amygdala, reflected by diminished connectivity under 
social stress. In addition, we approximate the activity in the cortical regions and the amygdala by 
rank ordering the intensity levels across the whole brain. Finally and most critically, we investigate 
whether cortical-amygdala connectivity mediates the relation between anxiety symptoms and in-
creased perceived stress levels. 
5.3 Methods
Participants
This study included 20 participants with sad and 20 healthy control participants -hc-, (selected 
from a pool of 24 subjects to match on age, gender, and years of education) -Table 5.1-. sad par-
ticipants were recruited through an advertisement (n = 7), local participating treatment centers (n 
= 8) and sad participants’ web forums (n = 5). sad participants had to meet criteria for general 
sad according to the dsm-iv as a primary diagnosis (1994) based on the Mini-International Neu-
ropsychiatric Interview (mini; Sheehan et al., 1997). Two sad participants had a secondary co-
morbid current depressive episode, while four others had a history of depressive episodes. Two of 
these sad participants were on stable Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor (ssri) use. Exclusion 
criteria were other comorbid anxiety, psychotic or substance abuse disorders. Healthy controls 
participants had no history of psychiatric diseases or psychotropic medication use. Participants 
completed several questionnaires: Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (lsas; Fresco et al., 2001) and 
Beck Depression Inventory (bdi; Beck, Steer, & Carbin, 1988) for initial screening, and after inclu-
sion, the Social Phobia Anxiety Inventory (spai; Turner, Beidel, Dancu, & Stanley, 1989), Brief Fear 
of Negative Evaluation (bfne; Weeks et al., 2005), the five-factor model of personality (neo-ffi; 
Costa & McCrea, 1992) and the Behavioral Activation and Behavioral Inhibition Scale (bis/bas; 
Carver & White, 1994) -see Table 5.1-. The study was approved by the Medical Ethical Committee of 
the Leiden University Medical Center and written informed consent was given by all participants.
Materials and Procedures
Procedure
Participants were scanned during three 7.5-minute “resting-state” (rs)–fmri runs, in which they 
did not have to perform any particular task, but were instructed to just lie still, eyes closed, without 
falling asleep. After a first baseline run (R1, baseline), participants were instructed that a public 
Mean (sd)
Social Anxiety
(n=20)
Control Subjects
(n=20)
F value p-value
Age, y 29.1 (7.5) 27.7 (7.7) 0.33 0.57
Gender, male/female 11/09 11/09
Years of education 16 16.4 0.26 0.61
lsas 85.9 (13.9) 21.6 (13.1) 225.23 <.001
bfne 54.3 (5.6) 36.0 (9.2) 44.59 <.001
bdi 20.5 (11.6) 5.2 (4,.4) 40.52 <.001
neo-n 43.6 (9.8) 29.5 (6.7) 24.54 <.001
neo-e 30.8 (6.3) 42.7 (4.8) 39.51 <.001
bis 24.7 (3.4) 18.5 (4.2) 25.7 <.001
bas-Reward 14.9 16.6 (2.2) 5.8 0.021
Table 5.1  Participant Characteristics 
Note: lsas = Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale, bfne =Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation, bdi = Beck Depression Inventory. neo-n = neo-ffi 
neuroticism, neo-e = neo-ffi Extraversion. bis: Behavioral Inhibition System. bas: Behavioral Activation System.
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speech had to be given after the scanning session was completed, that the researchers would be the 
committee that would judge them on their performance, and that their speech would be video-
taped for later analysis. Importantly, a topic of the speech was not yet given. This instruction was 
immediately followed by a second rs run (R2, speech anticipation). Subsequently, the instruction 
was given that participants did not have to give the public speech after all, that it was just meant 
to measure their initial reaction to having to give a public speech, and that after a last scan, the 
experiment would be finished. This instruction was followed by a third and last run (R3, recovery). 
Before each instruction, participants rated their stress levels on an 11-point Likert scale (See Figure 
5.1 for an outline of the procedure). This three-scan stress procedure was preceded by a social in-
centive delay task (Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009) and structural scans.
Analysis
Behavioral and physiological analysis 
The stress ratings at the end of each scan, before each instruction, were analyzed in a repeated 
measures anova with Group as between and Run as within-subjects factor. During the three scans, 
heart rate was continuously measured using four mri compatible ecg electrodes sampling at 500 
Hz. Automatic peak detection was performed (using customized matlab code) on the resulting 
electrocardiogram (ecg) data. Two control participants were excluded from hr analysis due to ex-
cessive noise in the ecg signal. The remaining ecg data were inspected for errors in peak detection, 
and 0.24% of the peaks had to be manually corrected. The peak detections were used to calculate 
the inter-beat-intervals (ibi), which were transformed (60/ibi) to beats per minute. The resulting 
hr values were averaged per run, and analyzed in a repeated-measures anova with group as be-
tween and run as within-subjects factor. 
fmri data 
Acquisition 
Imaging data were acquired on a Philips 3.0-T Achieva mri scanner using an eight-channel sense 
head coil for radiofrequency reception (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands). Whole-
brain fmri data were acquired using T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging (epi) with the 
following scan parameters: 200 volumes; 38 axial slices scanned in ascending order; repetition 
time (tr)= 2200 ms; echo time (te)= 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; fov = 220 × 220 mm; 2.75 mm iso-
tropic voxels with a .25 mm slice gap. A high-resolution anatomical image (T1-weighted ultra-fast 
gradient-echo acquisition; tr = 9.75 ms; te = 4.59 ms; flip angle = 8°; 140 axial slices; fov = 224 
× 224 mm; in-plane resolution .875 × .875 mm; slice thickness = 1.2 mm), and a high-resolution 
T2*- weighted gradient echo epi scan (tr = 2.2 s; te = 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; 84 axial slices; fov 
= 220 × 220 mm; in-plane resolution 1.96 × 1.96 mm, slice thickness = 2 mm) were acquired for 
registration to standard space. 
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Figure 5.1  Experimental Design and Self-Report Stress and Heart Rate results.  
(a) The procedure consisted of three subsequent resting-state fmri scans. After the first scan (R1, baseline), an instruction was 
given that a public speech would have to be performed after the scanning sequence was finished. The instruction was followed by 
another scan (R2, speech anticipation) after which the instruction followed that no public speech had to be given, again followed 
by an fmri run (R3, recovery). After each scan, and before each instruction a self-report level of stress was obtained on a 11point 
likert-scale. Heart rate was measured continuously during each scan. (b) Self-reported stress levels per scan and group. (c) 
Average heart rate per scan and group. All Error bars represent within subject standard error (Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
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Preprocessing
Data were analyzed using fsl Version 4.1.3 (fmrib’s Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). 
The following preprocessing steps were applied to the epi data sets: motion correction, removal of 
non-brain tissue, spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full width at half maximum 
(fwhm), grand-mean intensity normalization of the entire 4D dataset by a single multiplicative 
factor, and a high pass temporal filter of 100 s (i.e., ≥.01 Hz). The rs datasets were registered to the 
high resolution epi image, the high resolution epi image to the T1-weighted image, and the T1-
weighted image to the 2 mm isotropic mni-152 standard space image (T1-weighted standard brain 
averaged over 152 subjects; Montreal Neurological Institute, Montreal, qc, Canada). 
Connectivity Analysis 
For the connectivity analysis, white matter, cerebral spinal fluid (csf) and global (whole brain) sig-
nal where extracted, and entered in a regression analysis together with the six rigid-body motion 
parameters. The resulting residual time-series data were used for further analysis. To investigate 
amygdala connectivity with cortical regions involved in emotion regulation, a representative time 
series (first eigenvariate) was extracted from the residual data from the left and right amygdala 
(based on 50% probability mask from the Harvard-Oxford subcortical probability atlas, provided 
in fsl), and the combined set of cortical regions involved in cognitive emotion regulation (cer), 
based on a meta-analysis on emotion regulation (Diekhof et al., 2011). To quantify the connectivity, 
the two time-series for each participant and rs run were correlated, and the correlation coefficient 
transformed to Fisher’s Z-score. These Z-values were entered in a repeated measures mixed effects 
anova with Group as between-subjects and Run and Side (left and right amygdala) as within-sub-
jects factors. Additionally, whole brain voxel-wise regression analyses were performed to support 
the initial approach. The representative cer time-series were used as regressors in a general linear 
model (glm) voxel-wise analysis using feat version 5.98, part of fsl (Smith et al., 2004). At the 
subject level, contrasts were generated that tested the overall effect (across scans), the differences 
between the second and first scans, the second and third scans, and the quadratic effect. The result-
ing individual parameter estimate (pe) maps were fed into a higher-level between-groups random 
effects analysis (two-sample t-test). Subsequently, correction for multiple comparisons was carried 
out for only those voxels present in the roi masks (left and right amygdala) using familywise error 
correction (fwe). In a similar fashion, voxel-wise analyses were performed with the left and right 
amygdala as regressor and with the cer regions as targets for small volume corrections. Effects 
outside our regions of interest were whole brain fwe corrected p<0.05.
Link between behavioral variables and changes in connectivity due to speech anticipation 
Correlational analyses were performed to test the relation between the social anxiety symptoms 
(spai-sp), speech preparation related changes in brain connectivity, and self-reported stress. 
In order to examine whether changes in brain connectivity might drive the relation between 
social anxiety symptoms (spai-sp) (predictor) and change in self-reported stress (outcome), 
a mediation analysis was performed (Baron & Kenny, 1986). The predictor-outcome relation 
is referred to as effect c, and the direct effect controlling for the mediator as c’. Effect a is the 
relation between predictor and mediator, effect b the relation between mediator and outcome, 
and a*b refers to the mediation effect (the a*b effect tests the significance of c – c’, for which a 
bootstrapping procedure is applied (Wager, Davidson, Hughes, Lindquist, & Ochsner, 2008). 
The mediation analyses were applied to both the connectivity results from the initial analysis 
(cer-amy z values), and the connectivity z-values restricted to the significant amygdala voxels 
from the voxel-wise regression analysis with the cer time-series as regressor. From these signifi-
cant voxels in the Group x Run interaction, the times-series was extracted, correlated with the 
cer time-series and Fisher Z transformed. 
5.4 Results
Stress Ratings and Physiological Responsiveness 
The stress manipulation showed a significant Run x Group interaction on the reported stress lev-
els (F(2,76)= 7.2, p<0.001). sad participants reported higher stress after R2 (speech anticipation) 
than R1 (baseline) compared to controls (t(38)=2.9, p=0.006), see figure 5.1. The average heart rate 
data showed a trend towards a similar Run x Group interaction (F(2,72)=3.07, p=0.052), including 
a trend towards a higher score for the differences from R2 to R1 (t(36)= 1.9, p=0.06) in the sad 
compared to the control group. 
C
H
A
P
TE
R
 5
74
C
H
A
P
TER
 5
75
fmri: amygdala connectivity 
There was a significant Run x Group interaction in cer-Amygdala connectivity (quadratic contrast; 
F(1,38)=4.68, p=0.037), see figure 5.2. This interaction can be explained by the following pattern 
of effects: in controls, cer activity at baseline (R1 and R3) was correlated with reduced amygdala 
activity (negative connectivity) and during speech anticipation (R2), this negative connectivity 
was strengthened. sad participants showed comparable negative cer-amygdala connectivity at 
baseline. However, in contrast to the controls, the negative coupling diminished significantly in the 
sad participants during speech anticipation. No interaction of this effect with side (left or right 
amygdala) was observed (p=.88). In addition, none of the main effects were significant (all p>0.25). 
Secondly, we performed a whole-brain regression analysis, to confirm the above-mentioned find-
ings in a voxel-wise approach. Using the cer time series as a regressor, we found an effect in the 
right amygdala x = 30 / y = 0 / z = -20,  Z=3.14, small volume fwe corrected p<0.05) for the quad-
ratic contrast (comparing the baseline and recovery measurement to the speech anticipation). The 
analysis with the amygdala as source region did not yield any significant effect in our roi for any 
of the Group x Condition interaction effects. For both analyses, no whole-brain corrected interac-
tion effects outside of our regions of interest were found. To explore and visualize the temporal 
dynamics of the connectivity patterns, we used a sliding window connectivity analysis for the left 
and right amygdala (with the cer time-series) separately (see supplementary material). 
Link between Anxiety Symptoms, Stress Ratings and Connectivity Changes due to 
speech anticipation
Results showed a significant correlation between social anxiety symptoms (measured with the 
spai-sp) and increases in reported stress in the social anxiety group (r=0.48, p=0.048). Using me-
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Figure 5.2  Cortical-Amygdala Connectivity 
(a) Regions used for connectivity analysis, amygdala (top) and cortical emotion regulation regions (bottom). (b) Group by condition 
interaction on cortical-amygdala connectivity. All Error bars represent within subject standard error (Loftus & Masson, 1994)
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Figure 5.3  Mediation Results. 
Path diagram showing the relation between social anxiety symptoms (spai-sp), changes in brain connectivity (run2 – run1) and 
changes in self-reported stress (run2 – run1). Path a is the connection between anxiety symptoms and brain connectivity, path b 
the connection between brain connectivity and perceived stress. Path c’ is the direct connection between anxiety symptoms and 
perceived stress controlling for the mediator. The indirect, mediation, path (a*b) is shown as an arc connecting anxiety symptoms 
and perceived stress. Values for each path represent beta values with standard error in parentheses, significant paths are bold. 
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diation analyses with bootstrapping, we subsequently tested the indirect effect of this correlation 
through changes in brain connectivity. Brain connectivity (difference R2 – R1 from the voxel-wise 
analysis results) mediated the relationship between social anxiety symptoms and increased stress 
responses (a*b=0.016, Z=1.99, p=0.047, see figure 5.3). Path c (spai-sp – self-reported stress) was 
trend significant (c=0.035, Z=1.86, p=0.065), path a was significant (social anxiety symptoms to 
connectivity, a=0.0047, Z=3.079, p=0.0021) but path b (brain connectivity to change in reported 
stress, b=3.63, Z=1.51, p=0.13) was not. The significant positive mediation effect, and the positive 
values of path a and b suggest that higher social anxiety symptoms were related to “decoupling” of 
brain connectivity (moving from “negative” connectivity to zero or positive connectivity values), 
and the greater this change in brain connectivity, the greater the increase in reported stress. 
5.5 Discussion 
The present investigation revealed a distinct pattern of cortical-amygdala connectivity in social 
anxiety disorder (sad) compared to controls when anticipating giving a public speech. The control 
group displayed an increase in negative connectivity under social stress. The social anxiety group 
however showed “decoupling” (moving from negative connectivity to no, or positive connectiv-
ity) during speech anticipation. This pattern in connectivity change may reflect failure to recruit 
adaptive control processes in the face of social stress. This finding shows similarities with studies 
that found a link between cortical-amygdala coupling and subjective or physiological responses 
during the instructed reappraisal of negative emotions (Lee, Heller, van Reekum, Nelson, & Da-
vidson, 2012; Urry et al., 2006; Wager et al., 2008) and research that showed some indication of less 
cortical-amygdala connectivity during cognitive reappraisal in sad patients (Goldin et al., 2009b). 
The results of self-reported stress and heart rate suggest that the applied speech anticipation 
procedure can indeed be considered stress-inducing, and is potent in differentiating the controls 
from the social anxiety group. Our findings are broadly in line with various studies that have 
shown increases in physiological and self-reported responses to (the anticipation of) public speech 
in social anxiety (Blöte, Kint, Miers, & Westenberg, 2009; Davidson, Marshall, Tomarken, & Hen-
riques, 2000; Gramer & Saria, 2007). It is of great interest that the changes in cortical-amygdala 
connectivity (as obtained from the voxel-wise analysis) in the sad group mediated the relation-
ship between social anxiety symptoms and increases in self-reported stress. Although speculative, 
the changes in brain connectivity may underlie the relationship between social anxiety symptoms 
and perceived stress. Separate cortical-subcortical pathways might be involved in the regulation 
or initiation of other stress reactions. For example, it has been shown that mpfc-pag connectivity 
mediates hr increase during speech anticipation (Wager, van Ast, et al., 2009a) and other work has 
linked endogenous cortisol levels (Veer et al., 2012) and corticosteroid administration (Henckens, 
van Wingen, Joëls, & Fernández, 2011) to amygdala-mpfc connectivity. 
Amygdala connectivity has been linked to anxiety disorders (Kim et al., 2011) and our data em-
phasizes the importance of amygdala connectivity for sad. However, the results of the rank-ordered 
activity levels (see Supplementary Methods 1) of the amygdala do not indicate stress-related dif-
ferences between the control and sad groups (see Supplementary Results 1). The cortical emotion 
regulation regions showed a trend towards relatively stronger activation in the control group during 
speech anticipation perhaps this also points at increased cortical regulation. Our findings suggest 
that the connectivity specifically differentiates the controls from the sad patients. While the role of 
the amygdala is well established in ambiguity detection of unpredictable or salient stimuli (Davis & 
Whalen, 2001; Whalen, 2007), the role of the amygdala in prolonged social stress states is currently 
debated, as decreases have also been reported (Pruessner et al., 2008; Wager, van Ast, et al., 2009a). 
Amygdala activity and connectivity may have partially different functions under certain circum-
stances. It is conceivable that amygdala activity (in its role of vigilance or ambiguity detector) is 
most strongly increased during for example face processing, and stress might increase reactivity to 
subsequent facial stimuli (Oei et al., 2012; van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & Fernández, 2009). However, 
in its link to prolonged states of social stress itself, the role of the amygdala may be better under-
stood as integrating cortical responses on the one hand, and subcortical responses (related to ans 
and hpa activation) on the other, without necessary becoming more “active or inactive”. 
Based on the finding that cortical-amygdala connectivity mediates the link between anxiety 
symptoms and increases in perceived stress, one might argue that the stress-related connectivity 
change is a state rather than a trait marker for sad. Subsequently, it might be expected that after 
successful treatment of sad, cortical-amygdala coupling would “normalize”; connectivity under 
social stress would strengthen, perhaps reflective of treatment-induced increases in successful com-
munication between cortical emotion regulation regions and the amygdala. Previous studies have 
already shown that the amygdala activity during speech anticipation decreases after successful treat-
ment (Faria et al., 2012; Furmark et al., 2005), which is thought to indicate less anxiety sensitivity. 
Furthermore, a recent eeg study found evidence for changes in beta-delta frequency band coupling 
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(thought to indicate cortical-subcortical connectivity) after behavioral treatment (Miskovic et al., 
2011). It would be of great interest to test whether cortical-amygdala connectivity, as measured in 
our current approach, indeed normalizes after treatment, and at which rate this might occur. 
Several (recent) studies have addressed resting-state connectivity in social anxiety and the re-
sults suggested diminished cortical regulation (Ding et al., 2011; Hahn et al., 2011; Liao et al., 2010; 
Qiu et al., 2011). However, these studies used a variety of analytic strategies, which hinders direct 
comparison. Although each of these findings is of interest, our study shows that “resting-state” 
connectivity differentially changes in sad and control participants as a function of anticipatory 
stress. Several researchers have pointed at the importance of state-related changes in “resting-state” 
connectivity in understanding the link between (resting-state) connectivity networks and cog-
nition (Bressler & Menon, 2010; Cole, Smith, & Beckmann, 2010). Our data-analytic approach 
is comparable to resting-state studies that extract representative time-series from spatial maps 
(based on either independent component analysis in a previous step, or on predefined masks) 
and then use these time-series in a regression analysis, to estimate the contribution of a network 
to other brain regions (Cole et al., 2010; Margulies et al., 2010). In our current study however, we 
departed from a set of regions not grouped by their temporal profile, but by their involvement in a 
certain function (cognitive emotion regulation) as identified in a meta-analysis. Our approach as-
sumes that no cortical region in particular (necessarily) drives our findings, but rather, each node 
contributes to the signal of a set of cortical regions. Complex functions like emotion regulation 
are also most likely not to emerge from a single region, or a single connection, and the large set 
of regions identified by the meta-analysis on emotion regulation adds to this notion (Diekhof et 
al., 2011). Future research on stress responses in social anxiety could further focus for example on 
changes in network properties of cortical emotion regulation regions due to social stress. 
Much remains unknown about the cortical-subcortical connectivity effects with respect to 
emotion and stress regulation; especially the timing of the stress processing is probably another 
crucial factor in investigating brain connectivity. For example, increases in amygdala-salience net-
work connectivity have been observed directly after stress (van Marle et al., 2010), increased amyg-
dala-precuneus/pcc an hour after social stress (Veer et al., 2011) and another study showed differ-
ential effects of slow genomic or fast non-genomic corticosteroid activity on amygdala response 
to emotional faces (Henckens, van Wingen, Joëls, & Fernández, 2010). There is also an increasing 
interest in dynamic changes in connectivity within a measurement period (Chang & Glover, 2009; 
Cribben, Haraldsdottir, Atlas, Wager, & Lindquist, 2012). The time-varying changes of cortical-
amygdala connectivity during speech anticipation hint at the possibility of stronger earlier differ-
ences between sad and controls for the right amygdala (see Supplementary Figure 5.2). It has to 
be noted however, that these interpretations are speculative, and no formal statistical significance 
between the two groups was observed (see Supplementary Results 2). It is of interest that a recent 
paper, applying a paradigm similar to that applied in the current study, found time-varying effects 
in the occipital regions during early phase, and insula during recovery phase of social evaluative 
threat processing in sad (Waugh, Hamilton, Chen, Joormann, & Gotlib, 2012). 
Limitations 
Although the mediation analysis results show an interesting link between social anxiety symptoms 
and current stress levels during speech anticipation, it does have to be noted that only the media-
tion results from the time-series connectivity extracted from the voxel-wise analysis (amygdala 
voxels) were significant. The connectivity results from the initial analysis (whole amygdala) were 
not significant, although the coefficients of each of the paths were in the same direction. It is pos-
sible that this is simply a result of a lack of statistical power (i.e. with a larger subject sample the 
results would have been significant for the whole amygdala time-series). Another possibility is that 
only part of the amygdala (here, maybe the basolateral nuclei) is important for the mediation ef-
fect. We do note however, that our current method of extracting one time-series over a broad set 
of cortical regions, in combination with the inherent problem in fmri to accurately differentiate 
between activities in small adjacent structures, makes inference about the subnuclei functioning of 
the amygdala extremely difficult. 
Another important issue in the interpretation of the data is the direction (“positive or nega-
tive”) of the connectivity effect. As mentioned, eeg studies have shown some evidence for increases 
in beta-delta frequency band coupling in sad under social stress (Miskovic et al., 2010). Since we 
have shown a “decoupling” between cortical-amygdala connectivity in social anxiety, these findings 
seem to be at odds with each other. It is important to note that the differences in techniques and an-
alytic approaches are large, which hampers comparing these findings in any detail. In addition, one 
preprocessing step in our analysis, which is important to point out, is the removal (by regression) of 
global signal fluctuations. This procedure increases the range of correlations that can be observed 
between regions or networks, but it is argued that this procedure can “induce” anti-correlations, 
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or at least make the sign of the correlations uninterpretable (Cole et al., 2010). At the very least, we 
agree that our findings should be interpreted in light of the global signal regression step, and “nega-
tive connectivity” is therefore necessarily a relative value with respect to global signal fluctuations. 
Conclusion 
In this study, we have shown that cortical emotion regulation–amygdala connectivity changes in 
sad participants in the opposite direction of that of controls, when anticipating speaking in pub-
lic. The alteration in brain connectivity mediated the relation between social anxiety symptoms 
and increases in perceived stress. These findings suggest that social anxiety disorder participants 
show a diminished cortical regulation of the amygdala when anticipating speaking in public. More 
research is needed to test whether this potentially maladaptive change in cortical-amygdala con-
nectivity normalizes after treatment. 
5.6 Supplementary Material 
S1. Rank Percentage of activity level
S1 Methods 
Assessing brain activity in resting state fmri scans is difficult because of a lack of a baseline condi-
tion within each scan to compare the activity to. Yet, In order to approximate activity within each 
scan, the following procedure was applied: for each participant and scan, the pre-processed data 
was averaged over the entire time-series per voxel. These mean values per voxel were subsequently 
rank-ordered across the whole brain, and transformed to a percentage (rank order/total voxels 
*100). As such, a value per voxel is obtained that describes the relative strength (as a percentage) of 
activity compared to the rest of the brain. These values were subsequently averaged per region (left 
and right amygdala and cortical regions) and entered in a repeated-measures anova, with group 
as between and run as within factor. For the analysis of the amygdala, side (left or right) was ad-
ditionally entered as within-subjects factor. 
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Figure S5.1  Rank percentage of activity level. 
Normalized levels of activity for each group and run. (a) Cortical emotion regulation regions (b) left amygdala (c) right amygdala. 
Error bars represent within subject standard error. 
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S1 Results
For the rank-ordered percentage of the cer, a repeated measures anova with group as between 
and run as within factor, showed a main effect of run (F(2,76)=3,77, p=0.027). The group x run 
interaction showed a trend towards a significant effect on the quadratic contrast (F(1,38)=3.1, 
p=0.087), see figure S5.1. Group showed no significant main effect (F(1,38)=1.98, p=0.16). For the 
analysis of the amygdala, a repeated measures anova with group as between, and run and side 
(left or right) as within factors. Side showed a main effect (F(1,38)=52.24, p<0.001), there was 
no significant effect of run or a run x group interaction (both p>0.32). There was no significant 
main effect of group (F(1,38)=1.01, p=0.32
S2. Time-varying changes in heart rate and cortical-amygdala 
connectivity 
S2 Methods
To test the possibility that connectivity between the amygdala and the cortical emotion regula-
tion regions would vary during the course of the stress measurement (R2), and to visualize this 
response, we estimated dynamic changes in connectivity. This analysis was done by applying a 
Gaussian sliding window of 60 tr over the time-series to calculate the Pearson correlation coef-
ficient, and employing a Fisher Z transform (see Chang & Glover, 2009, for a similar approach). 
The analyses were performed on the cer with the left and right amygdala separately. To subse-
quently test if the two groups differed in onset and duration of this connectivity or heart rate 
responses during the speech anticipation run, change-point estimation was applied, using hi-
erarchical exponentially weighted moving average (hewma; Lindquist, Waugh, & Wager, 2007). 
A change point here was defined as a difference between the two groups after the baseline (the 
last 100 data points of the first run). To correct for multiple comparisons the hewma method 
incorporates a monte-carlo procedure, and test observed differences between the two groups to 
a distribution of maximum t values from randomly generated time-series of equal length. 
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Figure S5.2  Time-Varying Estimates of Hear Rate and Connectivity
Time-varying estimates per measurement period (baseline, speech anticipation, and recovery). All values are baseline (R1) corrected. (a) 
Heart rate (b) Left amygdala – cer connectivity (C) Right amygdala – cer connectivity. Shaded area is standard error of the mean per group. 
S2 Results
Figure S5.2 display the time-varying responses per measurement period. However, no significant 
change-points between the groups were observed for any of the three measurements (Heart rate, 
cer-lAmygdala connectivity, cer-rAmygdala connectivity, all p>0.39). 
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Chapter 6
Neuroticism and extraversion 
differentially modulate cortical-
amygdala coupling before, 
during and after stress.
Henk Cremers   |  Ilya Veer   |  Philip Spinhoven   |  Serge A.R.B Rombouts   |  Karin Roelofs
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6.1 Abstract
Objective: Extraversion and neuroticism are personality traits related to experiencing positive and 
negative affect, respectively. In addition, they are regarded as vulnerability and protective fac-
tors for the development of affective disorders. The amygdala plays an important role in stress 
and emotion processing, and cortical-amygdala connections are thought to reflect emotion 
regulatory processes. However, we know little about the relationship between personality traits 
and such regulatory brain mechanisms during social stress. Here, we investigated connectivity 
between meta-analytic based cortical emotion regulatory regions and the amygdala during 
resting-state state fmri baseline measurements and anticipation of public speaking.
Methods: Participants underwent three “resting-state” fmri scans before, during and after the an-
ticipation of a public speech. Brain connectivity between cortical emotion regulation regions 
and the amygdala, heart rate and subjective stress were investigated in relation to neuroticism 
and extraversion. 
Results: During the anticipation of public speaking, heart rate and subjective stress levels were 
significantly increased. Cortical-amygdala connectivity was negative overall (across measure-
ments) and showed a trend toward stronger negative connectivity during stress. However, per-
sonality factors modulated the connectivity patterns. Neuroticism showed a positive correla-
tion (ranging from stronger negative values towards no, or slightly positive connectivity) with 
cortical-amygdala connectivity irrespective of the stress phase. Extraversion, however, showed 
a negative correlation with stress-induced changes in connectivity (stronger negative connec-
tivity during stress). 
Conclusions: Stronger connectivity (positive or negative) might reflect cortical regulation by the 
amygdala, and neuroticism may relate to tonic cortical dysregulation, while extraversion may 
relate to phasic cortical control during social stress. Although this interpretation is tentative, 
the present results offer valuable clues to the mechanisms by which personality and cortical-
amygdala connectivity interact in different emotional states. 
6.2 Introduction 
Neuroticism and extraversion are personality traits related to experiencing negative and positive 
affect, respectively (Larsen & Ketelaar, 1991). These traits are also associated with the development 
of anxiety and mood disorders, where neuroticism is considered to be a vulnerability factor, and 
extraversion is thought to serve as a protective factor against the development of anxiety and de-
pression (Bienvenu, Hettema, Neale, Prescott, & Kendler, 2007; Bienvenu et al., 2004). Yet, much 
remains unknown about the neurobiological mechanism of important processes of anxiety, which 
could link to these personality traits. Particularly, insight into the link of neuroticism and extraver-
sion with neurobiological mechanisms of stress-inducing social evaluative threat may be critical to 
the advance of knowledge on the development of pathological anxiety. 
The amygdala is involved in a wide variety of affective functions, including a coordinating role 
in the stress response (Arnsten, 2009) and emotion processing (Kober et al., 2008; van Marle, Her-
mans, Qin, & Fernández, 2010). Several cortical -medial and lateral prefrontal, as well as parietal- 
regions (Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 2011) are associated with emotion regulation and are 
thought to influence amygdala response to emotional or stressful situations. Connectivity between 
the amygdala and cortical regions involved in emotion regulation can be indicative of adequate 
neural communication. In addition, cortical-amygdala connectivity is linked to individual differ-
ences in personality (Cremers et al., 2010) and to anxiety disorders (Kim et al., 2011). Personality 
traits are also linked to individual differences in stress reactivity (Tyrka et al., 2006; 2007) and emo-
tion regulation (Tamir, 2005; 2009). Cortical-amygdala connectivity might represent a crucial neu-
ral correlate of stress coping under social threat. However, the relation between cortical-amygdala 
connectivity and personality traits under social evaluative threat has not been addressed. 
Speaking in public is stress provoking for almost anyone to some extent, but the anxiety is 
typically very high in patients with social anxiety disorder. In chapter 5, we have reported on the 
differences in brain connectivity in sad patients compared to matched controls. Given the link 
between personality factors and the development of, among others, social anxiety (Kimbrel, 2008), 
here, we investigate whether common variation in neuroticism and extraversion is linked to dif-
ferences in cortical-amygdala connectivity during the anticipation of speaking in public in healthy 
controls. We expect that higher neuroticism scores are related to less regulatory capacity, and that 
higher extraversion scores are related to greater regulatory capacity, reflected by differential corti-
cal-amygdala connectivity at rest compared to the anticipation of speaking in public.
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6.3 Methods
Participants
This study initially included 24 healthy control participants (hc), and is part of a larger research 
project on social anxiety disorder, the results of which were presented in chapter 4. Participants in 
the current study had no history of psychiatric diseases or psychotropic medication use. Participants 
completed several questionnaires, of which the five-factor model of personality neo-ffi (Costa & 
McCrea, 1992) was used for the current analysis, see table 6.1. One participant did not complete the 
neo-ffi and has been excluded from further analysis. The study was approved by the Medical Ethical 
Committee of the Leiden University Medical Center and written informed consent was given by all 
participants.
Materials and Procedures
Procedure
Participants were scanned during three 7.5-minute “resting-state” (rs)–fmri runs, in which they 
did not have to perform any particular task, but were instructed to just lie still, eyes closed, without 
falling asleep. After a first baseline run (R1, baseline), participants were instructed that a public 
speech had to be given after the scanning session was completed, that the researchers would be the 
committee that would judge them on their performance, and that their speech would be video-
taped for later analysis. Importantly, a topic of the speech was not yet given. This instruction was 
immediately followed by a second rs run (R2, speech anticipation). Subsequently, the instruction 
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Figure 6.1  Experimental Design and Stress responsivity
(a) The procedure consisted of three subsequent resting-state state fmri scans. After the first scan (R1), an instruction was given 
that a public speech would have to be performed after the scanning sequence would be finished. The instruction was followed 
by another scan (R2), after which the instruction followed that no public speech had to be given, again followed by an fmri run 
(R3). After each scan, and before each instruction, a self-report level of stress was obtained on an 11-point Likert-scale. Heart 
rate was measured continuously during each scan. (b) Self-reported stress levels (c) Average heart rate (d) Cortical – Amygdala 
connectivity. Error bars represent within-subject error (Loftus & Masson, 1994)
 Mean Standard Error Minimun Maximum
Neuroticism  28.52 1.44 16 44
Extraversion 43.22 0.98 35 55
Age 28.57 1.67 19 46
Gender 10 M / 13 F
Table 6.1  Demographic Data
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was given that participants did not have to give the public speech after all, that it was just meant 
to measure their initial reaction to having to give a public speech, and that after a last scan, the 
experiment would be finished. This instruction was followed by a third and last run (R3, recovery). 
Before each instruction, participants rated their stress levels on an 11-point Likert scale (See Figure 
6.1 for an outline of the procedure). This three-scan stress procedure was preceded by a social in-
centive delay task (Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009) and structural scans.
Analysis
Behavioral and physiological analysis 
The stress ratings at the end of each scan, before each instruction, were analyzed in a repeated 
measures anova with the different scans as within-subject factor. During the three scans, heart 
rate was continuously measured at 500 Hz using four mri compatible ecg electrodes. Automatic 
peak detection was performed (using customized matlab code) on the resulting electrocardio-
gram (ecg) data. 0.24 percent of the peaks had to be manually corrected. The peak detections 
were used to calculate the inter-beat-intervals (ibi), which were transformed to beats per minute 
(60/ibi). 
fmri data 
Acquisition 
Imaging data were acquired on a Philips 3.0-T Achieva mri scanner using an eight-channel sense head 
coil for radiofrequency reception (Philips Medical Systems, Best, The Netherlands). Whole-brain fmri 
data were acquired using T2*-weighted gradient echo-planar imaging (epi) with the following scan pa-
rameters: 200 volumes; 38 axial slices scanned in ascending order; repetition time (tr)= 2200 ms; echo 
time (te)= 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; fov = 220 × 220 mm; 2.75 mm isotropic voxels with a .25 mm slice 
gap. A high-resolution anatomical image (T1-weighted ultra-fast gradient-echo acquisition; tr = 9.75 
ms; te = 4.59 ms; flip angle = 8°; 140 axial slices; fov = 224 × 224 mm; in-plane resolution .875 × .875 
mm; slice thickness = 1.2 mm), and a high-resolution T2*- weighted gradient echo epi scan (tr = 2.2 s; 
te = 30 ms; flip angle = 80°; 84 axial slices; fov = 220 × 220 mm; in-plane resolution 1.96 × 1.96 mm, 
slice thickness = 2 mm) were acquired for registration of the epi scans to standard space. 
Preprocessing
Data were analyzed using fsl Version 4.1.3 (fmrib’s Software Library, www.fmrib.ox.ac.uk/fsl). 
The following preprocessing steps were applied to the epi data sets: motion correction, removal of 
non-brain tissue, spatial smoothing using a Gaussian kernel of 6 mm full width at half maximum 
(fwhm), grand-mean intensity normalization of the entire 4D data set by a single multiplicative 
factor, and a high pass temporal filter of 100 s (i.e., ≥.01 Hz). The rs data sets were registered to 
the high resolution epi image, the high resolution epi image to the T1-weighted image, and the T1-
weighted image to the 2 mm isotropic mni-152 standard space image (T1-weighted standard brain 
averaged over 152 subjects; Montreal Neurological Institute, Montreal, qc, Canada). White matter, 
csf and Global (whole brain) signals were extracted, and were entered in a regression analysis 
together with the motion parameters. The resulting residual data was used for further analysis. 
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Figure 6.2  Cortical-Amygdala Connectivity and Personality 
(a) Brain regions used in the analysis; amygdala (based on the Harvard-Oxford atlas) and the meta-analytic derived map of the cortical 
emotion regulation regions (based on Diekhof et al., 2011). (b) Correlation between neuroticism and averaged connectivity (across all 
conditions) (c) Correlation between extraversion and changes in brain connectivity (quadratic effect of the stress conditions). 
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Connectivity Analysis 
To investigate connectivity between the amygdala and relevant cortical brain regions, a representa-
tive time series (first eigenvariate) was extracted from the preprocessed data from the amygdala 
(based on a 50% mask from the Harvard-Oxford anatomical probability atlas) and from corti-
cal regions involved in cognitive emotion regulation (cer), based on a meta-analysis of emotion 
regulation (Diekhof et al., 2011) which included several lateral and medial prefrontal as well as 
parietal regions (see figure 6.2 for an overview). To quantify cortical-amygdala connectivity, the 
two time-series for each participant and rs run were correlated, and the correlation coefficient was 
transformed to Fisher’s Z-score. The connectivity measures per run were analyzed in a repeated 
measure anova with scan as within-subject factor. 
Analyses with Personality
Each of the measures of stress reactivity (subjective stress ratings, heart rate, cortical-amygdala connec-
tivity) were analyzed in a repeated measure anova, with run as within-subject factor. The focus was on 
both linear and quadratic within-subject effects. The quadratic contrast effects were of specific interest 
because they reflect changes in the outcome variables due to the stress manipulation (comparing the ef-
fect during speech anticipation with the baseline and recovery measurements). Subsequently, to test the 
influence of personality on these measures, each analysis was repeated with neuroticism and extraversion 
as variables of interest, and age and gender as control covariates. For each significant effect, partial cor-
relation and corresponding confidence intervals are also reported as an index of standardized effect size. 
6.4 Results
Results
Stress Ratings and Physiological Responsiveness 
The repeated measures anova showed a significant effect of run on the reported stress levels 
(F(2,36)=5.3, p=0.007), see figure 6.1. A post-hoc t-test revealed a significant increase from speech 
anticipation (R2) compared to baseline (R1) (t(22)=2.24, p=0.036), and a significant decrease from 
R2-R3 (t(22)=2.7, p=0.013). Heart rate data also showed a significant effect of run (F(2,40)=0.04, 
p<0.001), and post-hoc t-test revealed a significant increase from R2 to R1 (t(20)=3.81, p=0.001), 
and a trend significance difference between speech anticipation (R2) and recovery (R3) (t(20)=1.8, 
p=0.081). The effects of reported stress levels and heart rates were not significant when the co-
variates neuroticism, extraversion, age and gender were entered (all p>.4), although no significant 
interaction or main effect of any covariate of interest was observed either (all p> .4 ). 
fmri: amygdala connectivity 
There was no significant main effect of run on the cer-amygdala connectivity values (F(2,44)=0.68, 
p=0.51, quadratic contrast, F(1,22)=1.2, p=0.28). However, the model that included personality showed 
a significant effect of neuroticism (F(1,18)=20.53, p<0.001, partial correlation r=0.66, p=0.001, 95% 
C.I: 0.34 – 0.84) and a significant run x extraversion interaction (F(2,44)=3.35, p=0.046, quadratic 
effect F(1,18)=5.09, p=0.037, partial r=-0.45, p=0.03, 95% C.I: -0.73 - -0.041), see figure 6.2. Although 
included as a control variable, gender showed an interaction effect with scan (F(2,36)=3.68, p<0.035). 
6.5 Discussion 
The present study investigated the effects of the personality traits of neuroticism and extraversion on 
cortical-amygdala connectivity before, during, and after social stress. The results show that cortical-
amygdala connectivity is differentially modulated by neuroticism and extraversion: the higher the 
score on neuroticism, the higher (less negative) the cortical-amygdala connectivity. Extraversion on 
the other hand showed an opposite and stress-specific pattern of modulation of cortical-amygdala 
connectivity. The higher the extraversion score was, the lower (more negative) the connectivity during 
the speech anticipation period was. These findings suggest that neuroticism relates to cortical-amyg-
dala connectivity, but does not depend on the contextual demands (baseline or speech anticipation). 
The relation between extraversion and connectivity, however, does depend on social stress conditions. 
Below, we will discuss the link with current literature and possible theoretical implications. 
The present investigation builds on task fmri work that has addressed the association between 
neuroticism and other personality traits related to negative affect, such as harm avoidance and 
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trait anxiety. For example, one study showed a relation between trait anxiety and cognitive biases 
(Bishop, 2007), related to impoverished cortical control (Bishop, 2008). Especially interesting is 
the observation that the impoverished cortical control-anxiety correlation was specifically pro-
nounced under low task-demands (Bishop, 2008). This observation is in line with our finding 
of less negative connectivity in participants scoring high on neuroticism, already at baseline and 
irrespective of stress condition. In addition, other work reported a negative correlation between 
anxiety-related traits and amygdala-anterior cingulate cortex (acc) connectivity in response to 
negative facial expressions (Cremers et al., 2010; Kienast et al., 2008), suggesting less regulatory 
capacity when viewing negative faces without high task demands however. Resting-state state fmri 
studies have also addressed personality and brain connectivity. For example, one study showed 
distinct correlations of neuroticism and extraversion with regions involved in self-evaluation and 
reward processing respectively (Adelstein et al., 2011). However, contrary to our observations, an-
other rs-fmri study found a negative correlation between harm avoidance and negative amygdala-
vmpfc connectivity, which could point at more regulation at baseline associated with harm avoid-
ance (Li, Qin, Jiang, Zhang, & Yu, 2012). It is important therefore that the current findings are 
independently replicated. 
Based on the current findings, one may speculate on the theoretical interpretations of the as-
sociation of personality with stress processing. Neuroticism showed a positive correlation with 
cortical-amygdala connectivity (less negative connectivity), irrespective of stress-condition, which 
might indicate less cortical regulation overall. Extraversion showed a negative correlation with the 
quadratic effect of cortical-amygdala connectivity: connectivity became a stronger negative dur-
ing the anticipation of public speaking. This may suggest that extraversion relates to spontaneous 
cortical regulatory processes, triggered during social stressful situations, normalizing thereafter. 
Arguably, neuroticism is associated with high tonic stress levels, while extraversion is linked to 
phasic adaptions during stress. The current literature provides some evidence in this direction. 
Neuroticism (part of the higher-order trait of stability) is linked to high levels of baseline cortisol, 
yet lower cortisol response to stress (Deyoung, 2010). Extraversion, on the other hand, is thought 
to be part of a higher-level trait of plasticity (Deyoung, 2010) and extraversion is positively re-
lated to stress resilience (Campbell-Sills, Cohan, & Stein, 2006; Waugh, Wager, Fredrickson, Noll, 
& Taylor, 2008). In terms of stress coping, extraversion might be related to challenge appraisals of 
stressful events (perhaps a greater sense of controllability), while neuroticism is related to threat 
appraisals (Olff, Langeland, & Gersons, 2005). This could also form the link between extraver-
sion as a protective factor for the development of social anxiety, which is thought to relate to less 
controllability (Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). However, this proposal is tentative, and how personality 
traits link to the development of anxiety within individuals is unknown. Ideally, each of these fac-
tors: stress reactivity, brain-connectivity, and personality would be investigated in a longitudinal 
study on the development of anxiety disorders. 
Heart rate measurements and stress ratings showed a significant effect of run. These findings sug-
gest that the procedure was successful in inducing a mild form of stress across participants. However, 
for these two outcome measures, personality factors did not correlate with baseline or quadratic 
effect. A broad relation between personality and stress (coping) is well established (Sapolsky, 1996), 
yet the relation between different personality traits and physiological measurements of stress reac-
tivity has produced diffuse findings. For example, one study found a correlation between openness 
and cortisol response while speaking in public, while neuroticism and extraversion showed interac-
tion effects with gender on cortisol response (Oswald et al., 2006). Another study showed that there 
was a relation between neuroticism and stress, but this was mediated by threat appraisal (Schneider, 
2004). Earlier reports did not show any relation between personality and stress response on a single 
task (Schommer, Kudielka, Hellhammer, & Kirschbaum, 1999), but did when data was aggregated 
across several measurements (Pruessner et al., 1997). Much remains unknown about the relation 
between personality traits and stress responses. Although speculative, the broad personality dimen-
sions of neuroticism and extraversion might be stronger related to the neurobiological basis than to 
autonomic or subjective outcomes, at least in the current paradigm where a mild stressor was used. 
It has also been suggested that lower-level personality characteristics might be more strongly related 
to stress responses than higher-order traits like neuroticism and extraversion (Oswald et al., 2006). 
Clearly, more research is needed to further establish the relation between higher-order and lower-
order personality traits and stress responsiveness and regulation.
 
  
Limitations 
The relation between amygdala connectivity and personality might vary for different cortical re-
gions (Cremers et al., 2010). In our current approach, this “fine grained” information is lost, since 
the signal from several cortical regions was summarized as one representative time-series. How-
ever, the current approach greatly reduces the number of tests, and hence increases the statisti-
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cal power, which is very poor for between-subject studies, especially when voxel-wise regression 
analyses are performed and multiple comparison correction need to be applied (Braver, Cole, & 
Yarkoni, 2010; Yarkoni, 2009). Future research on personality and its brain correlates needs much 
larger study samples to elucidate the specific relation of amygdala connectivity with the differ-
ent cortical regions that subserve different functions. The investigation of potential higher-order 
interactions, such as gender x personality interactions with brain functions, would also greatly 
benefit from larger study samples. 
On a technical note, it is important to point out that the interpretation of the connectivity find-
ings (“positive and negative” connectivity) heavily depends on a preprocessing step in the data analy-
sis: the removal (by regression) of global signal fluctuations. This procedure increase the range of 
correlations that can be observed between regions or networks (Cole, Smith, & Beckmann, 2010), 
but it is argued that this procedure can “induce” anti-correlations, or at least make the sign of the 
correlations uninterpretable (Cole et al., 2010). At the very least, we agree that our findings should be 
interpreted in light of the global signal regression step, and “negative connectivity” is therefore neces-
sarily a relative value with respect to global signal fluctuations. In addition, the interpretation that 
negative connectivity would reflect cognitive regulation of the amygdala supposes a directional effect, 
which the current analytic strategy cannot provide. In other words, the current connectivity analyses 
are instances of functional rather than effective connectivity (Friston, 2011). 
Our findings can be regarded as broadly in line with previous task and resting-state state fmri 
work on individual differences in personality, although the current paradigm and analytic ap-
proach also substantially differ on several grounds, which makes direct comparison with other lit-
erature difficult. The speech anticipation paradigm is clearly distinct from task-related approaches 
because the focus is on sustained differences in brain connectivity (over the course of minutes) 
instead of on shorter connectivity changes (task-related, i.e. over the course of seconds). Secondly, 
our data-analytic approach is distinct from many task-related connectivity studies, in that we ob-
tained a representative signal from a whole set of cortical regions grouped by their involvement 
in cognitive emotion regulation (Diekhof et al., 2011). In a way, the current analysis bears similar-
ity to eeg approaches in linking approach-avoidance personality traits to prefrontal lateralization 
(left prefrontal cortex related to behavioral approach, and right prefrontal cortex to behavioral 
inhibition; Davidson, 2002; Sutton & Davidson, 1997). Although the techniques and measures are 
certainly very different, the overlap stems from the use of a broad index of “brain functioning” in 
relation to higher-order personality traits. However, instead of giving evidence for a lateralization 
effect, our findings rather highlight the differences between extraversion and neuroticism in their 
relation to stress-dependent and stress-independent cortical-amygdala coupling.
Conclusion
The current study showed a distinct pattern between extraversion and neuroticism and their link 
to cortical-amygdala connectivity at baseline and during the anticipation of public speaking. 
While neuroticism positively correlated to connectivity (irrespective of stress state), extraversion 
correlated negatively to stress-related changes in the connectivity pattern. Since the negative con-
nectivity found here might reflect cortical regulation, it is possible that neuroticism is linked to 
tonic cortical dysregulation, while extraversion is related to phasic cortical regulation. Although 
this interpretation is tentative, these results offer valuable clues on the mechanisms by which per-
sonality and brain mechanism interact under different cognitive and emotional states. 
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The power of fmri: 
considerations for 
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7.1 Abstract
The progress in fmri methods has been impressive during the last two decades, yet commonly 
raised concerns about research practices in social and medical sciences certainly apply to different 
fields of fmri research also. This paper focuses on problematic issues in between-subjects fmri 
studies, such as typical group x condition interactions in clinical fmri research. It is argued that 
specifically, the combination of extremely low statistical power and great flexibility in data analy-
ses hinders the interpretation of the majority of published findings. These issues will be illus-
trated by examples in the literature, and a simulation is presented to exemplify the consequences 
of underpowered sampling from different population effects. Due to the lack of statistical power, 
results that survive a statistical threshold can appear strong and selective, while this is an unlikely 
representation of the underlying population effect. In underpowered studies, stringent multiple 
comparison correction has the ironic consequence of making this mismatch even worse. On the 
other hand, due to the many options of analysis, most papers can still report “significant” results, 
but these may well be false positives. Within a certain research field, published results may seem 
misleadingly consistent (due to the flexibility in data analyses), “unnecessarily” confusing (because 
of sampling error in underpowered studies) or represent a complex combination of both. In addi-
tion, since most studies lack exact and quantitative replication, therefore, the value of most clinical 
fmri results is at best unclear. Despite practical and financial difficulties, adequately powered stud-
ies are warranted, ideally, combined with independent, exact and quantitative replication studies.
7.2 Introduction 
“No one ever seemed to know exactly what 
hypothesis testing could tell you that was at 
all interesting or important […]. Somewhere 
along the line, however, we all internalized 
one lesson that is entirely correct: the more 
you reject the null hypothesis, the more likely 
it is that you’ll get tenure.“
– Geoffrey R. Loftus, (1991)1
fmri is a unique neuroimaging tool because of its ability to non-invasively obtain measurements 
of brain activity. Impressive progress has been made in analyses options and tools over the last 20 
years (Bandettini, 2012). On the other hand, for example, the progress made in so-called biomarker 
research is extremely slow (Kapur, Phillips, & Insel, 2012). This was to be expected since it is a very 
complex and time-consuming endeavor, but the cumulative insight into the biological basis of 
psychiatric diseases may also simply be hindered by statistical and publication practices that have 
obscured true understanding of the underlying population effects. 
Recent years have seen a large amount of papers that address various kinds of concerns in com-
mon fmri data-analysis practices. Examples include the issues of non-independence in data analy-
ses (Kriegeskorte, Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009; Vul, Harris, Winkielman, & Pashler, 2009), 
of spurious brain-behavior correlation (Rousselet, 2012), of adequate testing of interaction effects 
(Nieuwenhuis, Forstmann, & Wagenmakers, 2011), and of multiple comparison correction (Ben-
1    Loftus, G. R. (1991). On the Tyranny of Hypothesis Testing in the Social Sciences. Contemporary psychology,
      36(2), 102–105.
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nett, Wolford, & Miller, 2009; Nichols, 2012). While these are all very relevant topics, some broader 
concerns are more worrisome, such as the “undisclosed” flexibility in data analysis (Carp, 2012; 
Ioannidis, 2008; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011), the effect of bias and low prior probability 
of hypotheses on the possibility of the results being true (Ioannidis, 2005) or inflated (Ioannidis, 
2008), and the prevalence of underpowered studies (Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989).
Here, the issues of low statistical power (small sample sizes, where results are substantially sub-
ject to sampling error) and flexibility in data analyses (many analyses options, subject to research-
ers’ bias) will be addressed. Specifically, the focus will be on between-subjects fmri studies such 
as clinical fmri that compare different groups (e.g. patients vs. controls). Firstly, between-subjects 
effects are statistically less powerful than within-subjects effects. Secondly, between-subjects stud-
ies such as clinical fmri research often contain very small sample sizes. Thirdly, while some within-
subjects effects are strong and robust (e.g., amygdala activation in response to emotional faces), 
this is not at all clear for many of the more complex interaction and between-subjects effects. A 
broader discussion on the limitations of inferences made from “standard” null-hypothesis testing, 
and the especially relevant topic of prior probability (or pre-study odds) of hypotheses, is beyond 
the scope of this paper and my competence. Many excellent contributions have been made how-
ever (for examples, see: Cohen, 1994; Falk & Greenbaum, 1995; Gigerenzer, 2004; Loftus, 1996; 1991; 
Meehl, 1967; Nickerson, 2000).
Several examples from the literature will be discussed to illustrate the issue of low statistical 
power and bias. fmri studies on social anxiety (Freitas-Ferrari et al., 2010) will serve as an example 
for clinical fmri research, but the issues are generalizable to most (or all) other fmri research on 
psychiatric diseases. Another typical between subjects-effect, brain-behavior correlations, will be 
used as an example for simulating the consequences of underpowered studies on the mismatch 
with the underlying population effects. It will be argued that because of the extremely low statisti-
cal power, the flexibility in data analyses, and the absence of quantitative replication studies, the 
value of the majority of the published clinical fmri results is at best unclear. 
7.3 Statistical Power
“… less is more. 
Except of course for sample size.”
– Jacob Cohen (1990)2 
From the recent papers expressing criticism of fmri data analysis practices, the topic of non-in-
dependent inferences (“double dipping” or “voodoo correlations”; Kriegeskorte et al., 2009; Vul 
et al., 2009) has perhaps received the most attention. The main argument of these papers was 
that if a subset of the dependent variables is selected (voxels) based on a threshold (i.e. “where is 
a non-zero effect”), one cannot make unbiased inferences on the size of the effect (“how strong is 
an effect”). Therefore, many brain-behavior correlations reported in fmri studies seem large, but 
it has been argued that this is due to the flawed two-stage analytic procedure. In a commentary 
on this issue, Yarkoni (2009) pointed out that the underlying reason for the seemingly high strong 
values of correlation is not so much the “two-staged inference” procedure as it is the low statistical 
power (statistical power can be defined as the chance of rejecting a false null hypothesis; Cohen, 
1992) typical for most fmri studies (Yarkoni, 2009; Yarkoni, Poldrack, Van Essen, & Wager, 2010). 
Concerns about the prevalence of underpowered studies are widespread in psychology and 
have been raised for decades (Cohen, 1962; Maxwell, 2004; Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 1989). An im-
portant consequence of low statistical power in combination with many independent variables is 
the excessive overestimation (due to sampling error) of the population effect when a result reaches 
statistical significance (Cohen, 1994; Gelman & Weakliem, 2009; Ioannidis, 2008; Maxwell, 2004). 
Research on correlations between personality traits and brain activity have been highlighted as an 
example of such misinterpretation of fmri results (Yarkoni, 2009). While you may expect a broad 
personality trait to be moderately correlated with many brain regions, an underpowered study that 
applies some form of statistical threshold (multiple comparison correction) will necessarily result 
2    Cohen, J. (1990). Things i have learned (so far). American Psychologist, 45(12), 1304–1312. 
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in seemingly strong and localized effects. The same principle applies to fmri studies on group dif-
ferences. In the appendix of this paper, this issue is illustrated with a simulation study.
Clearly, population effects are not known, and the estimation of statistical power of fmri stud-
ies is difficult because of the number of alternative hypotheses and the focus on (complex) inter-
action effects, which makes it difficult to make assumptions about the expected effect size. Yet it 
seems unlikely that many of these complex cognitive phenomena studied in fmri and the typical 
group x condition effects in clinical fmri would have a particularly strong effect in any specific 
brain region. It can therefore be argued that as least a rough idea of statistical power and the neces-
sary sample size can be formed. For example, consider a between-groups fmri study with patients 
and controls. Suppose you expect a moderate effect size (e.g. Cohen’s d = 0.5), and use an uncor-
rected alpha level of p<0.001 (which is therefore still very lenient, see discussion below), then 127 
participants are needed in each group to obtain an adequate power of 80% (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007). This is, of course, a lot more than the commonly used sample sizes in for exam-
ple sad research, where sample sizes range from n = 7 - 27 (Freitas-Ferrari et al., 2010). 
Studies on statistical power in fmri that recommended approximate sample sizes of n = 15-25 
as being sufficient, must have done so because they assumed much higher effect sizes (Desmond 
& Glover, 2002). This may be realistic for some very robust within-subjects effects, but seems very 
unlikely for comparisons between two or more heterogeneous groups. Also, when exact power 
calculations are not possible, post-hoc reporting of confidence intervals gives a good indication of 
the “state of affairs” (Liu, 2011; Loftus, 1996). If fmri studies would present the confidence intervals 
that correspond to the statistical threshold, the low precision (large confidence intervals) of the es-
timates from underpowered studies would immediately become apparent. Note that by presenting 
effect sizes and confidence intervals, it would also become obvious that when adequately powered 
studies (with a large sample) obtain effects that are barely statistically significant, the effect sizes 
are small (but measured with high precision), and the relevance (“biological significance”) may 
be questioned. 
At least two solutions to increase statistical power are theoretically straightforward: apply less 
stringent thresholding (Lieberman & Cunningham, 2009) or test more participants (Yarkoni, 
2009). In the long run, only the latter option is of course a real solution. The problem is clearly that 
in practice, this is not easy at all, because of the high costs of fmri scanning on the one hand, and 
for clinical neuroscience, the difficulty of recruiting sufficient participants on the other. Nonethe-
less, you may wonder whether these practical and financial limitations offer sufficient justification 
for running underpowered studies (Yarkoni, 2009). A main cause of the low statistical power in 
fmri of course stems from the many tests that are performed in the common mass-univariate ap-
proaches, and the need to apply statistical correction for multiple comparisons. Hence, any meth-
od that sensibly reduces the dimensionality of the data (e.g. multivariate approaches) will, given 
similar effect sizes, also greatly increase power. 
7.4 Flexibility in data analyses, multiple comparisons 
 and false positive control
“... there is the irony that the “sophisticates” 
who use procedures to adjust [their alpha 
error] for multiple tests […] are adjusting for 
a nonexistent alpha error, thus reduce their 
power, and, if lucky enough to get a significant 
result, only end up grossly overestimating the 
population effect size!”
– Jacob Cohen (1994)3 
As noted, in the common mass-univariate approach of fmri data analysis, many dependent vari-
ables are separately tested, which requires a correction for multiple comparisons (mcc) to control 
the false positive rate (fpr). It has been shown that a commonly applied uncorrected threshold 
of p<0.001 produces fwe-rates of 0.15-0.4 (Wager, Lindquist, Nichols, Kober, & Van Snellenberg, 
2009). On the one hand, more stringent corrections are therefore warranted, for which various 
methods are available (Nichols, 2012; Nichols & Hayasaka, 2003). On the other, however, it is also 
3     Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p < .05). American Psychologist, 49(12), 997–1003.
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clear that stringent mcc has negative consequences, a further reduction of statistical power being 
the most obvious one. The emphasis on mcc is usually restricted to tests within a statistical map 
(single image mcc). Evidently, the fpr also depends on the number of tests (i.e. different con-
trast) and different analyses that are performed (more stringent mcc would not be recommended 
however, since it would lower already dramatically low statistical power even further). The many 
factors determine the fpr besides single-image mcc, therefore highlight the difficulty of true fpr 
control within a single study (Yarkoni, Poldrack, Van Essen, & Wager, 2010). 
The great emphasis on the need for multiple comparison correction, combined with the “pres-
sure” to obtain significant and hence, publishable results, can introduce a substantial amount of re-
search bias. Ioannidis defined bias as “the combination of various design, data, analysis, and presen-
tation factors that tend to produce research findings when they should not be produced” (Ioannidis, 
2005). In this broad definition, bias can be anything from manipulations in the analysis to selective 
or distorted reporting (Ioannidis, 2005). This latter notion especially constitutes what is perhaps the 
most common source of bias: the many analytic options (high flexibility in analyses) and selective 
reporting of analyses results that are “significant” (Simmons et al., 2011). A typical example in fmri 
is the use of so-called region-of-interest (roi) analyses, i.e. restricting the statistical correction to “a 
priori defined” brain regions. Consider the 23 fmri studies on social anxiety (Freitas-Ferrari et al., 
2010): none applied a true whole brain statistical correction for these effects, and they either relied on 
small-volume corrections or on cluster correction with unrealistic assumptions about the smooth-
ness of the noise (Bennett et al., 2009). Although when accurately applied, roi analyses are certainly a 
valid method (Poldrack, 2006), it is often unclear why certain rois are selected (and not others), and 
importantly, whether this was really done before the data-analysis process started (Poldrack, 2011). 
For some studies, the choice for an roi is relatively straightforward (for example, the choice for the 
amygdala when studying face processing) but it easily becomes a lot less clear when studying amyg-
dala connectivity for example, where many target rois are possible. 
roi analyses are certainly not the only statistical practice that is potentially subject to bias. As 
mentioned, maybe the most likely source is simply the number of different analyses that can be 
performed (different preprocessing options, different task contrasts, many different types of con-
nectivity analyses, etc.). The flexibility in fmri analyses (Carp, 2012), and many other fields (Ioan-
nidis, 2005), is extremely large and due to continuous development of new analytic methods, it is 
still increasing. While this development of analysis techniques and exploratory data analysis is es-
sential for insight into brain function, it does mean that most (clinical fmri) studies often produce 
false positive results (Ioannidis, 2005). Therefore, even whole-brain mcc gives some, but still only 
vague information on the actual fpr. The reason for the probability of a high fpr in clinical fmri 
has to do with the (”undisclosed”) flexibility in data analyses at least as much as with the lack of 
“correct” use of single-image mcc. It can be argued that for a more accurate fpr estimation in con-
firmatory studies, some form of a pre-trial register is needed in which the analyses that will be per-
formed are described. Such a practice is already common in clinical trials (De Angelis et al., 2004). 
Without any form of pre-registration of the analyses, the term “corrected” results (especially, but 
not exclusively, small volume corrections) should be treated with much caution. 
A discussion on correcting for multiple comparisons only really makes sense in conjunction with 
the topics of statistical power and flexibility in data analyses. An emphasis on stringent mcc will 
therefore ultimately only be beneficial if it leads to true improvement in statistical practices and, ide-
ally, to adequately powered studies. However, if a one-sided focus on single-image mcr encourages 
fuzzy roi corrections or (massive) additional data exploration only aimed at obtaining a “corrected” 
and hence “publishable” result, it brings more harm than good to insight into brain functioning.
7.5 Replication and Meta-Analyses
“...we must finally rely, as have the 
older sciences, on replication” 
– Jacob Cohen (1994)4  
Since results from many clinical (between-subjects) fmri studies have an unclear status (due to the 
unknown fpr, and low statistical power), the need for independent replications rises. Direct repli-
cations do not seem to have high priority, however, since most journal publications in psychology 
and neuroscience appear to be entirely directed at novel findings. 
4  Cohen, J. (1994). The earth is round (p < .05). American Psychologist, 49(12), 997–1003. 
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Although it may be tempting to assume that a finding with a very low p-value will probably rep-
licate, the p-value from a statistical test is not formally indicative of the replication rate, and by 
simulations it is also shown to be a very vague predictor of whether an effect will be replicated 
(Cumming, 2008). Note that this is not necessarily specific to p-values, but a general principle of 
point estimations in underpowered studies, because these are extremely sensitive to sampling error 
(Miller, 2009). When fmri studies do report that a finding has been replicated, most often, this refers 
to approximate replications, and the success of replication is determined in a very broad and quali-
tative way (e.g. “study A found activation in the mpfc, and so did study B”). However, this descrip-
tion is not very informative, and there might actually be a substantial difference between the results 
of the two studies. Hence, such notions offer only an imprecise reference to the overlap of effects, 
and so, to whether the actual effect is replicated. Therefore, it is important that replications of fmri 
results should be quantifiable, for example, by using statistics similar to those applied in test-retest 
reliability studies, assessing the overlap between statistical maps (Caceres, Hall, Zelaya, Williams, & 
Mehta, 2009; Plichta et al., 2012; Rombouts, Barkhof, Hoogenraad, Sprenger, & Scheltens, 1998) of 
the initial and the replication studies. However, the opposite observation is also very likely: effects 
do not seem to replicate across studies on a similar topic, but this may be due to sampling error of 
underpowered studies. The results of the simulation presented in the appendix, show that each rep-
lication (which in this case is even a highly unlikely exact replication without measurement error) 
of an underpowered study (n=20, case a) will produce different results, every time the experiment 
is run. So even without considering measurement error or bias, several underpowered studies on a 
similar topic can therefore combine to a highly confusing body of literature. 
A recent critical analysis of gene x environment (GxE) interactions found that only 27% percent of 
replication studies were significant, compared to 97% of the initial results (Duncan & Keller, 2011). The 
authors mentioned publication bias, low power, and low prior probability of an effect being true as likely 
causes of this discrepancy, and concluded that most of the initial GxE interactions should be regarded as 
false positives (Duncan & Keller, 2011). Ioannidis has pointed to similar problems in brain morphology 
studies in psychiatric patient groups, where there is an “excess significance” (Ioannidis, 2011) as well as in 
general, research fields that are susceptible to research bias (Ioannidis, 2005). One can only speculate what 
the replication rate would be for clinical or other between-subjects fmri studies, but it seems there is little 
reason to be very optimistic, since each of these issues (low power, bias) most certainly apply.
While direct replication studies are uncommon, meta-analyses do offer ways to detect robust 
patterns of activity across different studies. In addition, meta-analyses can point at consistency in 
small but robust effects that single studies may overlook. For example, Kober et al. (2008) showed 
that the pag and hypothalamus are robustly active during emotion processing. This finding was 
to be expected from the animal literature, but unobserved in most individual fmri studies, per-
haps since it is a notoriously difficult for fmri to detect activity in the brainstem (Duzel et al., 
2009). Therefore, any single study might show only small effects in these regions, which can yet 
be consistent enough to be detected over a large number of studies. It is clear that meta-analyses 
aggregate (slightly) different types of studies, and you necessarily loose spatial and cognitive do-
main specificity. However, it could also be argued that most cognitive processes rely on activity in 
a distributed set of regions, which would further advocate the focus on brain networks rather than 
single brain regions (Bressler & Menon, 2010; Poldrack, 2011) in mass univariate statistical tests. 
While meta-analyses are very useful in separating spurious from consistent findings, the results 
depend on the quality and potential bias of the input (Carp, 2012). The ideal input for meta-analyses 
would be unthresholded statistical images, since they contain the largest amount of information and 
are least susceptible to research bias. Moreover, different analytic techniques are still being developed 
for meta-analyses also (Wager et al., 2009; Wager, Lindquist, & Kaplan, 2007), and results from dif-
ferent types of meta-analyses, perhaps with different inclusion criteria, may vary. For instance, it has 
been observed that different meta-analyses on the serotonin transporter gene and life-event interac-
tions lead to very different conclusions, presumably because of different study inclusion criteria (al-
lowing approximate replication studies, or not; Duncan & Keller, 2011). There are not many topics in 
fmri research for which a lot of meta-analyses are available, but the lateralization of amygdala func-
tioning in emotion processing is perhaps a notable exception. Some initial meta-analyses found that 
a larger number of studies reported peaks in the left compared to the right amygdala (Baas, Aleman 
& Kahn, 2004; Wager, Phan, Liberzon, & Taylor, 2003). This was confirmed in another meta-analyses, 
but when focusing on effect size, there was no difference between the left and right amygdala (Ser-
gerie, Chochol, & Armony, 2008). The authors did find evidence for an interaction of laterality and 
temporal dynamics (block -for the left amygdala- or event related designs).  Another study found evi-
dence for an interaction between amygdala laterality and stimulus type -stimuli containing language 
are related to the left amygdala, while masked stimuli relate to a higher probability of activation in 
the right amygdala- (Costafreda, Brammer, David, & Fu, 2008). Other recent meta-analyses seem to 
suggest a consistent co-activation between the left and right amygdala (Kober et al., 2008; Lindquist, 
Wager, Kober, Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, 2012).  Despite the many available meta-analyses, confusion 
about the “true” population effects remains.
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7.6 Conclusion
The discussed issues of low statistical power, high flexibility in data analyses and lack of quantita-
tive replication studies are particularly troublesome for the field of clinical neuroscience, where 
often, small heterogeneous groups of patients are compared to a control group, and where small/
medium and distributed population effects are most likely to exist. Many of the current published 
clinical fmri findings should be regarded as exploratory studies, which without adequately pow-
ered replication give at best a very limited insight into the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms 
of a psychiatric disorder. While there are many practical and financial obstacles, much larger sam-
ples are needed to adequately represent the population effects. Ideally, adequately powered studies 
should be followed up by independent and quantitative replication studies. 
7.7 Appendix: simulation of underpowered sampling 
To exemplify the consequences underpowered studies have on the results, a simulation study 
was performed. Consider a brain consisting of 400 (20 x 20) brain regions, each of which can be 
described as a between-subjects correlation between its activity and another behavioral variable 
(e.g. a personality trait, or a dichotomous group variable); see figure 7.1. Two different population 
(n=10000) effects are considered, a “medium and distributed effect” (20% of the brain correlates 
with the behavioral variable at a medium effect size, r = ±0.3) and a “strong and localized effect” 
(8% of the brain correlates with the behavioral variable, with a strong effect size, r=±0.6). From 
these two population effects, 5 samples (of n = 20 or n = 100) are drawn. These samples can be 
thought of as independent replications of the same experiment, see figure 7.1. To illustrate the 
consequence of different multiple comparisons thresholds, each of the replications is presented at 
three different statistical thresholds: unthresholded, uncorrected (p<0.01), and Family Wise Error 
(fwe) corrected (p<0.05 fwe corrected). In this simulation, measurement error is not modeled, 
and any variation between replications is due to sampling error. 
A population effect where activity in many regions is moderately correlated to the behavioral vari-
able is considered a more likely scenario than localized and very strong effects. When a study of 
n=20 is performed (i.e. a sample of 20 participants from the population is drawn), a few observa-
tions can be made. Firstly, an effect that survives Family Wise Error correction is a gross overesti-
mation of the population effect. Secondly, if an effect survives fwe correction, the results appear 
to be similar (local and strong) to the results obtained from a population effect that actually is 
a localized and strong correlation. So the (corrected) results give a very poor representation of 
the underlying population effects. Thirdly, each replication (5 are presented here) is very likely to 
give a result different from the previous replication. The statistical power for each of the present 
population effects, at a whole brain Family Wise Error (fwe) corrected threshold is extremely low 
(about 0.3%). However, in this example, there are many different regions correlated with a behav-
ioral variable, and the power to detect any effect (the sum of the power of all effects) is still 25%. 
Fourthly, although the situation is much better for a study of n=100, still, here also the power to 
detect each effect at an fwe corrected threshold is only 19% (yet the power to detect any effect will 
be up to 100%). Fifthly, consider that these where not independent replications, but independent 
tests (for example an fmri data set correlated to different behavioral variables). In this case, some 
of these independent tests (brain-behavior correlates) may survive (“single image”) fwe correc-
tion but the true overall false positive rate (across all behavioral variables) becomes unclear, and 
the number of false negatives is extremely large.
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8.1 Overview of findings
The aim of the current thesis was to investigate neurobiological mechanisms in social anxiety disor-
der (sad). In this thesis, i focused on two broad sets of interconnected regions, the neural motiva-
tion and emotion circuitries that have been implicated in state and trait aspects of sad. i studied the 
involvement of these circuits both in relation to stress-inducing social evaluative threat (speaking in 
public and social punishment anticipation) and in relation to the personality traits of neuroticism 
and extraversion, which are important in the development of sad. This discussion section will first 
summarize the main findings of each of the different studies. Secondly, the results of the studies 
on neuroticism and extraversion will be discussed together (chapters 2, 3 and 6). Thirdly, the neu-
ral emotion and motivation circuitries in sad will be considered in conjunction. In addition to the 
results presented in the individual chapters, here i will also explore the link between the reward/
punishment processing balance (chapter 4) and social stress anticipation (chapter 5). Lastly, clinical 
considerations, limitations and recommendations for future research will be discussed. 
Chapter 2 investigated whether neuroticism modulates connectivity of the amygdala with pre-
frontal regions during the processing of negative emotional facial expression. The hypothesis 
was tested that this relationship may depend on the specific pfc functions. The results showed 
that right amygdala–dmpfc connectivity for angry and fearful faces, compared to neutral ones, 
was positively correlated with neuroticism scores, which suggests that neuroticism is related to 
increased self-referential processing of negative facial expressions. In contrast, left amygdala 
– anterior cingulate cortex (acc) connectivity for angry, fearful and sad compared to neutral 
faces was negatively related to neuroticism levels, which may argue for neuroticism-dependent 
decreased regulation of the amygdala. 
Chapter 3 described the structural brain correlates of neuroticism and extraversion in the emotion and 
motivation circuits. The results indicated that extraversion was positively correlated with the vol-
umes of the amygdala and ofc, regions important for emotion processing and regulation. Surpris-
ingly, neuroticism scores did not significantly correlate with volume in these brain regions. 
Chapter 4 focused on altered motivational processes that may be key features of sad. Based on cogni-
tive theories linking sad to punishment sensitivity, we predicted increased striatal activation for 
punishment avoidance compared to obtaining a reward. As expected, healthy controls showed 
relatively stronger striatal activity for reward than for punishment trials, and sad participants 
showed a reversed pattern of effects. sad participants’ striatal activation balance in social reward/
punishment anticipation suggests an increased motivation to actively avoid social punishments. 
Chapter 5 addressed functioning of the emotion circuit in sad, before, during and after stress-
inducing social evaluative threat. Here the focus was on the interregional connectivity of the 
amygdala with a set of cortical emotion regulation regions. Compared to controls, sad par-
ticipants showed diminished connectivity (decoupling) between cortical emotion regulation 
regions and the amygdala during anticipation of speaking in public. Moreover, cortical-amyg-
dala decoupling mediated the correlation between social anxiety symptoms and increases in 
self-reported stress. The distinctive pattern of cortical-amygdala connectivity may suggest less 
effective cortical communication during social stress-provoking situations in sad, which could 
be a core mechanism underlying perceived stress. 
Chapter 6 built on the work presented in chapters 2 and 3, and investigated extraversion and neu-
roticism as modulatory factors in social stress processing, using the same data as presented in 
chapter 5. Results showed that personality modulated the connectivity patterns in the healthy 
control group. Neuroticism showed a positive correlation with cortical-amygdala connectiv-
ity irrespective of task phase (baseline, speech anticipation, recovery), whereas extraversion 
showed a negative correlation with stress-induced changes in connectivity. Neuroticism might 
be related to tonic dysregulation, while extraversion is characterized more by phasic increases 
in regulation during social stress. 
Chapter 7 focused on the limitations of research findings, especially in the clinical fmri literature. 
Specifically the combination of low statistical power, flexibility in data analyses, and lack of 
direct and quantitative replication studies hinders the interpretation of many results in the 
clinical fmri literature.
8.2 Neuroticism and extraversion: correlations with neural emotion  
 and motivation regions 
Chapters 2, 3 and 6 all suggested that normal variation in the personality traits extraversion and 
neuroticism relates to various determinants of the neural emotion and motivation circuitries. 
Chapters 2 and 6 point at correlations between neuroticism and connectivity patterns linked to 
emotion regulation: the coupling of the amygdala with cortical regulatory regions. These connec-
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tivity patterns were found in relation to the processing of negative facial expressions (chapter 2) 
and the resting-state condition (chapter 6). For the latter results, presented in chapter 6, the cor-
relation between cortical-amygdala connectivity and neuroticism was observed in all conditions, 
both at baseline and during speech anticipation. This neuroticism-connectivity correlation was 
not different for the speech anticipation compared to the baseline conditions. The neuroticism 
and amygdala-acc connectivity results presented in chapter 2 were observed for passive processing 
of negative emotional facial expression. Both the relationships between neuroticism and cortical-
amygdala connectivity were therefore found either without high demands on regulatory capacity 
(passive face processing) or irrespective of stress conditions. 
Neuroticism is linked to excessive worry (Robinson, Ode, Wilkowski, & Amodio, 2007) and is 
negatively correlated to stress resilience (Campbell-Sills, Cohan, & Stein, 2006). Moreover, it has 
been found that neuroticism is related to threat appraisal, the idea that coping resources are inad-
equate in proportion to stressor demands (Schneider, 2004). Interestingly, it has been shown that 
neuroticism is correlated to high baseline cortisol, but not to cortisol reactivity during stressful 
events (Deyoung, 2010). Although tentative, the latter findings suggest that those with high neu-
roticism appraise mildly demanding situations as threatening and show less emotion regulatory 
capacity. On top of that, neuroticism is unrelated to cognitive tendencies to recognize threats as 
they occur, and to subsequently down-regulate them (Robinson et al., 2007). Another study added 
that neuroticism interacted with heart rate variability (said to indicate flexibility) in predicting 
daily levels of stress and negative affect (Ode, Hilmert, Zielke, & Robinson, 2010). In other words, 
not neuroticism by itself but its interaction with “flexibility” predicted daily stress levels. Neu-
roticism may therefore be more strongly related to passive worry than to a lack of active (flexible) 
coping. Along those notions, the amygdala connectivity results presented in chapters 3 and 6 could 
argue that neuroticism relates to “tonic” emotion dysregulation: sustained lower emotion regula-
tory capacity under low-threatening situations. 
Chapter 3 showed that extraversion is related to larger amygdala and ofc volumes. The finding 
that extraversion positively correlates with amygdala volume may seem counterintuitive consider-
ing the role of the amygdala in processes such as threat detection. However, amygdala processing 
has also been linked to positive emotion, and amygdala volume is associated with social network 
size (Bickart, Wright, Dautoff, Dickerson, & Barrett, 2011). This observation is of particular inter-
est, because extraversion is also positively correlated with social network size (Pollet, Roberts, & 
Dunbar, 2011). In addition, sad has, interestingly, been linked to smaller amygdala volume (Irle, 
2010). Contrarily, the amygdala is also suggested to increase in size due to chronic stress (Davidson 
& McEwen, 2012), which seems at odds with the positive extraversion-amygdala correlation. It is 
possible however, that the mechanisms driving the between-subjects and within-subjects effects 
are different. The link between larger amygdala volume and social network size or extraversion 
might be explained by the suggestion that a larger amygdala enables effective processing of social 
cues in conspecifics (Bickart et al., 2011). The within-subject mechanisms of stress-induced in-
crease in amygdala volume, are linked to intracellular and extracellular processes increasing den-
dritic spine density, although much remains unknown about the exact details of these processes 
(see for a discussion: Mitra, Jadhav, McEwen, Vyas, & Chattarji, 2005).
 The ofc/vmpfc is associated with both reward processing and emotion regulation (Kringel-
bach & Rolls, 2004; Milad & Rauch, 2007; Rolls, 2004). The positive correlation between extra-
version and ofc volume (chapter 3) may relate to enhanced reward processing and/or increased 
emotion regulatory functions. With respect to the interpretation of stronger reward processing 
and extraversion, it is surprising however that the striatal reward/punishment effects presented in 
chapter 4 did not correlate significantly with extraversion. The correlation between extraversion 
and increased negative cortical-amygdala connectivity during stress-inducing social evaluative 
threat (chapter 6) fits with the notion of enhanced emotion regulatory capacity for people high in 
extraversion. Moreover, extraversion is linked to stronger resilience and coping (Carver & Connor-
Smith, 2010) and a sense of control after adverse events (Affleck & Tennen, 1996). Greater emotion 
regulatory capacity and greater reward sensitivity might buffer (raise the threshold) against the 
negative consequence of stress or adverse events, and extraversion is related to both. Contrary to 
neuroticism, extraversion is related to challenge appraisal and the belief that coping skills are suf-
ficient for stressful demands (Schneider, 2004). Since extraversion was related to the increase in 
negative connectivity during speech anticipation, it may suggest a more phasic regulatory role, ac-
tive in high but unrelated to low-threatening situations. The correlation between extraversion and 
greater volume within emotion and motivation circuitry regions perhaps indicate an increased 
“readiness” for high demanding or threatening situations.
In sum, our data suggest that broadly, neuroticism and extraversion are differently related 
to the neural emotion and motivation circuitries. Whereas neuroticism may be more linked to 
tonic (dys)regulation, extraversion might be associated to greater reward sensitivity and phasic 
increase in emotion regulatory functioning during high-demanding situations. A combination of 
low extraversion and high neuroticism is found to be a vulnerability factor for the development 
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of sad and other anxiety disorders as well as for depression (Bienvenu, Hettema, Neale, Prescott, 
& Kendler, 2007; Bienvenu et al., 2004). The proposed differing relation between neuroticism and 
extraversion with the motivation and emotion circuitries might shed light on the underlying neu-
robiological mechanism related to this vulnerability. 
8.3 sad and the neural emotion and motivation circuitries
Correlation between striatal reward/punishment balance and social stress processing
As was mentioned in the introduction, the motivation and emotion circuitries are linked in sev-
eral ways. For example, it is has been found that acute stress leads to increased dopamine levels 
(Arnsten, 2009; Kienast et al., 2008; Mizrahi, 2010; Pruessner, Champagne, Meaney, & Dagher, 
2004), and that stress is linked to addiction (Koob, 2008; Ulrich-Lai & Herman, 2009). On the 
other hand, a motivational balance towards higher reward sensitivity may buffer against stressful 
events, and could be regarded as an indication of stress resilience (Degnan & Fox, 2007; Masten, 
2001). For example, a recent study showed that reward sensitivity, measured by striatal responses 
to monetary incentives, is in turn associated with less susceptibility to stress (Nikolova, Bogdan, 
Brigidi, & Hariri, 2012). In addition, psychiatric disorders such as depression and posttraumatic 
stress disorder are characterized by reduced reward sensitivity (Feder, Nestler, & Charney, 2009). 
Here, we investigated whether the striatal reward/punishment balance (presented in chapter 4) 
was predictive of various determinants of the stress response (presented in chapter 5): heart rate 
increase, subjective ratings and cortical-amygdala connectivity. This was done by simple correla-
tions between the striatal activity balance (reward vs. punishment) and stress procedure related 
effects (i.e. the quadratic effect: speech anticipation condition simultaneously compared to both 
baseline and recovery). Figure 8.1 presents the overall results across participants, (black line) and 
separately, for the control group (orange) and social anxiety group (grey). Most notable is that the 
striatal reward/punishment balance negatively correlated overall with subjective stress responses 
(r=0.308, p=0.036) and heart rate increases (r=0.351, p=0.027). Both these effects were trend sig-
nificant in the social anxiety group (p=0.057 and p=0.063), but not in the controls (p>0.6). The 
relation with cortical-amygdala connectivity showed a similar pattern but was non-significant 
(overall: r=-0.244, p=0.129, sad: r=-0.356, p=-0.124, controls p=0.82). These negative correlations 
between striatal reward/punishment balance and stress outcome suggest that, especially in the so-
cial anxiety group, the more an individual is punishment avoidant rather than reward motivated, 
the more stress reactive he or she is to the speech anticipation procedure. 
The analyses could possibly be extended to test for example if the same cortical regions that 
regulate reward anticipation (pfc-vs connectivity) during the reward task are predictive of emo-
tion regulation during speech anticipation (pfc-amygdala connectivity) on a between subject level 
(Mennes et al., 2010) or perhaps even on a within subject level (Mennes et al., 2011). Moreover, the 
function of both networks within the task paradigms could be further explored. For instance, there 
may be links between anticipatory striatal activity and subsequent amygdala activity (during face 
processing) in the social incentive delay task. These current results give some indication of a link 
between the motivational balance and stress sensitivity, and fit with idea that the two circuitries 
are interrelated, and that both are potential important neural mechanisms of vulnerability and 
resilience to social anxiety.
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Figure 8.1  Correlations between Striatal Activity and Stress responses. 
Striatal reward/punishment balance (chapter 4) is correlated with stress outcome (quadratic effects: speech anticipation condition 
simultaneously compared to both baseline and recovery) presented in chapter 5: (a) stress ratings (b) heart rate and (c) cortical-
amygdala connectivity. 
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Data-analytic considerations
The analytic approaches in chapters 4-6 were mainly chosen to reduce the number of statisti-
cal comparisons to one critical outcome variable. This was done by (weighted) averaging over 
voxels in one broad region (chapter 4) or even several ones (chapters 5 and 6), both with the goal 
to increase statistical power (see chapter 7). These procedures inevitably come at the expense 
of potentially obscuring functional differences among various brain regions and other com-
plexities within these neural circuitries. This is perhaps most apparent for the cortical regions 
involved in emotion regulation of which a single time series was extracted (chapters 5 and 6). 
Here, i will consider in more detail some cortical and subcortical regions and pathways that are 
important for sad. 
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmpfc) is perhaps the core region for emotion regula-
tion. A recent emotion regulation meta-analysis did indeed find the vmpfc to be involved across 
different forms of emotion regulation (placebo, fear conditioning and cognitive emotion regula-
tion; Diekhof, Geier, Falkai, & Gruber, 2011). In a broader perspective, its function has recently 
been described as reflecting affective meaning (Roy, Shohamy, & Wager, 2012). The authors ar-
gued that the vmpfc is not so much involved in the affective responses per se, but critical when af-
fective responses are shaped by conceptual information about specific outcomes (Roy et al., 2012). 
In animal research, the vmpfc is often divided into the infralimbic (il) and prelimbic (pl) 
subregions, which contain differential connectivity patterns, and are differentially related to initi-
ating and regulation of stress or fear responses (Maier & Watkins, 2010; Sierra-Mercado, Padilla-
Coreano, & Quirk, 2011; Ulrich-Lai & Herman, 2009), although the exact link is not as clear as is 
sometimes suggested (Vertes, 2006). The subdivision of the ventral and dorsal mpfc is thought to 
be the human homologue of the il/pl (Wager, van Ast, et al., 2009a; Wager, Waugh, et al., 2009b). 
The vmpfc and dmpfc were respectively found to be negatively and positively correlated to heart 
rate responses under social evaluative threat, which was mediated by several subcortical regions 
(Wager, van Ast, et al., 2009a; Wager, Waugh, et al., 2009b). We investigated the possibility that 
sad could be characterized by dysfunctional responses in one, or both of these pathways, but no 
clear-cut evidence was found (results not presented). However, despite the many challenges of 
integrating autonomic physiological and bold fmri responses (Iacovella & Hasson, 2011), neural 
pathways involved in the regulation of autonomic and hpa axis responses are a very relevant topic 
in neurobiological research on anxiety disorders. 
The subcortical regions of the neural emotion and motivation circuitries can also be divided into 
anatomical and functional discrete subunits. The amygdala, for example, contains the basolateral 
and centromedial subnuclei which have very separate patterns of connections (Price, 2003), and 
play distinct roles in fear expression and fear conditioning (Sierra-Mercado et al., 2011; Sotres-
Bayon & Quirk, 2010) and anxiety behavior (Tye et al., 2011). For example, a recent optogenetics 
study showed that stimulation of the bla terminal in the cea reduced anxiety-like behavior (Tye 
et al., 2011). In fmri studies, functional connectivity differences of these main amygdala subnuclei 
have also been investigated (Roy et al., 2009), even in relation to anxiety disorders (Etkin, Prater, 
Schatzberg, Menon, & Greicius, 2009). However, distinguishing connectivity patterns from neigh-
boring time-series (e.g. for amygdala subnuclei) can still be regarded as challenging. With respect 
to the motivation circuit, the striatal effects presented in chapter 4 also encompassed different 
striatal regions (nucleus accumbens, putamen and caudate nucleus), which also perform partly 
distinctive functions within the processing of incentives (Haber & Knutson, 2010).
 The amygdala also has important connectivity pathways to other subcortical structures which 
are relevant for stress responses. It is perhaps of interest to note that in chapter 5, amygdala-pag 
and amygdala-hypothalamus connectivity differences between the sad and control groups were 
observed at a more lenient threshold (p<0.005 uncorrected). These effects were in the opposite 
direction of the cortical-amygdala results: the sad group showed enhanced positive connectivity 
between these subcortical regions during social stress, compared to the baseline measure. This 
pattern of effect seems of great interest because these regions have been linked to threat (freeze 
responses) and hormonal stress response (hpa axis). Therefore, future research could be directed 
at considering the possibility that social stress “shifts” amygdala connectivity in sad to less cortical 
and stronger subcortical connectivity. 
Lastly, a dichotomy between cortical and subcortical regions as reflecting emotion regulation 
and reactivity might need some reconsideration. It has been argued that, for example, processing 
in the cortex is not slower than in the amygdala, and salient visual information does not ‘bypass’ 
the prefrontal cortex (Pessoa & Adolphs, 2010). Furthermore, the cortex plays a role in emotion 
generation, and at the same time the amygdala has its role in cognition (Pessoa, 2008). From a 
theoretical standpoint it has also been argued that the distinction between emotion generation 
and regulation is not clear-cut, and varies widely for different emotion theories (Gross & Barrett, 
2011). Furthermore, it has been shown that it is technically difficult to prove a causal relation be-
tween different brain regions with bold-fmri (Smith et al., 2010), and consequently, it is therefore 
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fundamentally problematic to show whether for example the amygdala influences the cortex, the 
cortex the amygdala, or both. In combination with the finding that a wide range of (interacting) 
regions is involved in emotion (Kober et al., 2008) and emotion regulation (Diekhof et al., 2011), 
each of these issues may call for different analytic strategies, such as network approaches that bet-
ter capture the many complex interactions between cortical and subcortical regions (Bressler & 
Menon, 2010; Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; Menon, 2011). 
Clinical considerations 
In line with the findings on personality differences, we also found evidence for altered functioning 
of the neural motivation and emotion circuitries in social anxiety disorder. The results of the two 
studies presented in chapters 4 and 5 suggest that sad participants show both a striatal activity 
balance towards avoiding punishment as well as less effective cortical-amygdala neural communi-
cation under social stress. As discussed above, there is some initial evidence that these effects are 
related, or at least that the striatal findings are correlated with determinants of the stress response. 
The results demonstrate that under mild threat (the possibility of negative feedback), sad 
participants are still more motivated to avoid, especially when this is an explicit part of the task 
procedure. However, in a perhaps more threatening situation (speech anticipation), where active 
avoidance was not an explicit part of any task, cognitive regulatory mechanisms may not function 
adequately. Along the proposed notion of a relation between threat appraisal and neuroticism, 
sad patients might (either consciously or unconsciously) evaluate both the upcoming negative 
feedback and speaking in public speech as threatening. In the “milder threatening” social incentive 
delay task, sad participants are characterized by sufficient motivation to avoid a punishment (al-
though it has been proposed that social anxiety is related to approach-avoidance conflicts in such 
active punishment avoidance situations; Hardin et al., 2006). During speech anticipation, however, 
the threat appraisal and the lack of control may result from insufficient regulatory functioning. 
Contrary, controls may not appraise the social punishment anticipation as threatening and hence 
are not necessarily motivated to avoid it, or, they are motivated but this is because of challenge ap-
praisal. During the speech anticipations, controls may either not appraise the situation as threaten-
ing, or perhaps even appraise it as challenging.
Our current findings of relative striatal punishment sensitivity and diminished cortical-amyg-
dala connectivity in sad can complement theoretical models of the development of anxiety dis-
orders. For example, the low perception of control in social situations has been highlighted as an 
important feature of sad (Hofmann, 2005; Mineka & Zinbarg, 2006). In addition, higher pun-
ishment avoidance compared to reward motivation may reflect another crucial determinant in 
susceptibility for sad (Degnan & Fox, 2007). It is important to emphasize that active avoidance of 
punishment may clearly be adaptive in many situations, whereas an exaggerated tendency to avoid, 
such as in the case of social anxiety, can be detrimental (Holtforth, 2008). For example, the active 
avoidance of social interactions may prevent natural social stress habituation processes. Also, we 
found preliminary evidence that punishment sensitivity and stress reactivity are correlated, which 
may further underscore the integrated role of both the neural emotion and motivation circuitries 
in resilience (Feder et al., 2009) as well as the relevance of both emotion (reactivity and regulation) 
and motivational functions for sad (Degnan & Fox, 2007).
Another potential avenue for future research is to consider whether the functioning of the 
motivation and emotion circuitries in sad normalizes after treatment. Several studies have started 
to address the effects of pharmacological and psychological treatment, and hint at this possibility. 
For instance, a recent study showed increased dopamine transporter binding after ssri treatment 
in sad (Warwick et al., 2012). Other findings suggest that the amygdala response in stressful public 
speech situations normalizes after ssri treatment (Faria et al., 2012; Furmark et al., 2005). Lastly, 
recent studies have shown that mindfulness training increases activity in several parietal and corti-
cal regions, and improves emotion regulation functions in sad (Goldin & Gross, 2010; Goldin, Ziv, 
Jazaieri, Hahn, & Gross, 2012). 
The observation that variations in neuroticism and extraversion which are related to sad cor-
relate with several determinants of the neural emotion and motivation circuitries, underscores 
the importance of a dimensional view of anxiety disorders (Goldberg, 2000). In a dimension-
al view, psychiatric disorders are regarded as the tail of a continuum rather than as a distinct 
category. Current dsm classifications do not capture such dimensionality well, and in addition, 
the diagnostic criteria for social anxiety disorder are still a matter of debate (Bögels et al., 2010). 
Moreover, an interesting novel network approach has further highlighted the co-occurrence of 
psychiatric symptoms, and emphasizes both the complex interrelated structure of these symptoms 
and the fuzzy nature (large symptom overlap) of many of dsm classifications (Borsboom, Cramer, 
Schmittmann, Epskamp, & Waldorp, 2011; Cramer, Waldorp, van der Maas, & Borsboom, 2010). 
Although some categorical distinction may be relatively clear (Haslam, 2003; Meehl, 2006), most 
dsm classifications in this network perspective were considered arbitrary (Cramer et al., 2010). 
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Tension seems to exist between the goals of using the dsm as an instrument to guide treatment 
and using it as a classification system for (brain) research into psychopathology (Goldberg, 2000). 
For instance, when determining a treatment plan, it may be helpful to consider whether a patient 
is primarily anxious or depressive. Yet comorbidity is the rule rather than the exception for most 
psychiatric disorders (Kessler, Chiu, Demler, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005), and for example ex-
cluding comorbidity in a (neurobiological) study of a certain disorder seems to result in an un-
representative subsample of the wider clinical population. For instance, sad is strongly related to 
major depression symptoms, and you may wonder whether it is possible or even sensible to aim at 
distinguishing symptoms of social anxiety and depression when they are both closely interrelated 
with social anxiety severity. With respect to the results obtained in the current research, it is also 
difficult therefore to assess how specific our findings are to sad. Both the emotion and motiva-
tional neural circuitries, and neuroticism and extraversion are implicated in many other anxiety 
disorders and depression. However, we also have to consider that some diagnostic criteria may 
have a clear biological basis. One may for example speculate that while sad and depression are 
both characterized by altered striatal functioning, to some extent, depression is stronger related to 
a lack of reward sensitivity while sad relates to a stronger motivation to avoid punishment (at least 
for social punishments).
While a dimensional approach to psychiatric disorders may be beneficial for neurobiological 
studies, it is also important to emphasize that just a few basic (trait) dimensions are clearly insuf-
ficient to describe the many differences between individuals in psychopathology. For example, the 
same levels of social anxiety across individuals can have very different impact on the impairment 
of daily functioning (Rapee & Spence, 2004; Stein & Stein, 2008). Considering additional relevant 
dimensions rather than a categorical view may better capture these individual differences. For 
example, the discussed network approach to psychiatric symptoms would, as the authors them-
selves noted (Cramer et al., 2010), benefit from including resilience factors that buffer individuals 
from the occurrence of symptoms and a causal spread to other symptoms. In line with Degnan & 
Fox (2007), we would argue that the reward/punishment motivational balance and stress reactiv-
ity and/or controllability (with the proposed respective neural underpinnings) might form good 
candidates for resilience factors in models on social anxiety. 
8.4 Limitations and consideration for future studies
Longitudinal Research
The results presented in the current thesis are all based on cross-sectional data. We have thus observed 
cross-sectional evidence for the relation between sad, personality traits and the neural emotion and 
motivational circuitries. However, these neurobiological systems and the functions they underlie, also 
interact within individuals over time. Crucial questions about such intra-individual (causal) mecha-
nisms cannot be answered from our data. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the mechanisms that 
drive between-subjects effects, can be very different from the mechanism that cause between-subjects 
mechanisms (e.g. Hamaker, Nesselroade, & Molenaar, 2007). An ideal study would take both between 
and within subjects effects into account, and obtain fmri measurements over several time points. In 
that case, it would also be of interest to consider whether and how the functioning of the emotion and 
motivation neural systems relates to symptom severity, for instance, as a result of treatment. It is of note 
that the nesda project does have longitudinal data that lend itself for some of such analyses.
Task design and analyses
The tasks used in chapters 4-6 to investigate the emotion and motivation circuitries were spe-
cifically developed to probe processes relevant for social anxiety: the anticipation of a potential 
social punishment and a public speech. However, the paradigms are also relatively novel, and need 
further investigation. Chapter 4 already discussed some possible adjustments in the social incen-
tive delay task to increase the social nature of the task. Another possibility to consider is that the 
differences in reward/punishment sensitivity may be clearer as so-called adaptation effects (Etkin, 
Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006), where behavior and neural activity in the current trial is 
modeled as a function of the previous trial. One may for example expect that social anxiety pa-
tients are more affected (e.g. show more motivation to avoid a punishment) by the current trial 
when the previous one resulted in a loss (for example, an angry face in the punishment condition). 
Although such an analysis was considered, the task would need a lot more trials per condition to 
adequately model these more complex interaction effects. 
Another consideration in the speech anticipation paradigm (chapter 5) relates to the temporal 
differences in emotional reactivity and regulation responses between individuals. For example, the 
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difference in stress responses between controls and sad may perhaps be clearer as “recovery speed” 
after the onset of a stressor than the “average” response during a stressor. These potential recov-
ery differences could be captured by time-varying estimates of brain connectivity and physiology. 
Initial exploratory analyses showed no significant differences between the sad and control groups 
(supplementary material chapter 5), nonetheless, time-varying responses remain a very relevant 
research topic for the investigation of differences between controls and anxiety patients in their 
stress responses. 
For many fmri tasks paradigms, little is known nor consistently found, on test-retest reliability. 
A recent study showed that test-retest reliability is reasonable for a monetary reward task (Plichta 
et al., 2012), yet a previous study found low test-retest reliability for a similar task (Fliessbach et 
al., 2010). Information on the reliability of the social incentive delay task has not yet been estab-
lished, whereas this would be essential for longitudinal studies. With respect to stress processing 
in sad, an unusual, but highly relevant recent study investigated test-retest reliability of eeg and 
physiological measures during public speech in sad (Schmidt et al., 2012). The results showed 
medium to large correlation between two subsequent time points of various cardiovascular and 
eeg measurements. Ideally, similar reliability metrics would be obtained for fmri connectivity 
measurements in sad. 
Larger samples and data reduction 
The problem of the prevalence of underpowered studies in clinical fmri research was discussed in 
chapter 7. For mass-univariate statistical approaches, much larger samples are needed to obtain 
adequate statistical power. Multi-center studies, such as the nesda project (chapters 2-3) seem 
ideally suited for this. However, it is also important to consider that such larger studies do tend to 
use very general experimental paradigms (e.g. passive emotional facial expression task), aimed to 
be relevant for many psychiatric conditions. These paradigms are clearly not best suited to investi-
gate specific symptoms, and may not elicit particularly large between-groups effects, which would 
theoretically counteract the goal of increasing statistical power by including more participants. 
Moreover, large multicenter studies tend to coincide with an extremely large number of statisti-
cal tests, which means that the false positive rate becomes largely uncontrollable. Therefore, not-
withstanding such more adequately powered multicenter studies, replication studies (or split-half 
analyses, statistical power allowing) remain imperative. 
In many clinical fmri studies, obtaining much larger subject samples (e.g. n>40) is perhaps unre-
alistic. For such cases, it seems relevant to massively reduce the number of statistical tests. We have 
attempted to do so in chapters 4-6. Several much more sophisticated methods have also been de-
veloped, such as multivariate pattern recognition (Haynes & Rees, 2006), independent component 
analysis (Brown, Yamada, & Sejnowski, 2001), graph theory approaches (Bullmore & Sporns, 2009; 
Rubinov & Sporns, 2010) and cross-validated regression techniques (Wager, Atlas, Leotti, & Rill-
ing, 2011). These methods are promising, since they reduce the number of statistical comparisons, 
and are generally better able to capture brain functioning (large-scale interconnections between 
regions) than the “standard” localized approaches. However, with the ever-increasing amount of 
novel analytic approaches, it is crucial that research results are independently replicated. For main 
effects of for example brain network properties, this has certainly been done (Zuo, Di Martino, et 
al., 2010a; Zuo, Kelly, et al., 2010b), but it is much less clear for interaction and between-subjects ef-
fects such as the typical group differences effects in clinical fmri studies, as was argued in chapter 7.
Conclusion
Social anxiety and related personality traits are linked to alterations in structure and functioning 
of the neural emotion and motivation circuitries. Imbalances in these circuitries, towards more 
striatal punishment sensitivity and less cortical-subcortical communication, may form core neu-
ral-cognitive mechanisms in sad. In addition, reward/punishment balance and emotion reactivity 
and regulation should be further integrated into models of social anxiety. The personality traits of 
neuroticism and extraversion may be differentially related to the regulation of the neural emotion 
and motivation circuitries. While neuroticism is linked to worry and sustained emotional dys-
regulation, extraversion is characterized by phasic increases in regulatory capacity and challenge 
appraisal of high demanding (stressful) situations. The combination of high neuroticism and low 
extraversion is therefore a predisposing factor for the development of sad. Longitudinal research 
is needed to investigate individual trajectories, taking into account personality traits, the neural 
emotion and motivation circuitries, and the role each of these factors play in the vulnerability and 
resilience for developing, or recovery from, sad. However, a representative insight into these and 
other neurobiological mechanisms related to psychiatric disorders cannot be obtained, as long as 
issues of statistical power and research bias are ignored. While the studies presented here may form 
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essential steps towards an understanding of the neurobiology of social anxiety, the importance of 
these results has to be evaluated by replication studies. 
Chapter 9
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Nederlandse Samenvatting
Mensen verschillen in de mate waarin zij sociale situaties waarnemen en verdragen. Sociale-angst-
stoornis (sa) is de extreme angst voor de beoordeling door anderen. De stoornis wordt sinds 40 
jaar onderscheiden van andere specifieke angsten of agorafobie. Dit proefschrift onderzoekt de 
neurobiologie van sa en persoonlijkheidsfactoren die geassocieerd zijn met de ontwikkeling ervan. 
 
Hoofdstuk 1 behandelt de algemene achtergrond van het onderzoek in dit proefschrift. sa wordt 
gekenmerkt door een aanhoudende angst voor situaties waarin men kan worden beoordeeld door 
anderen. Iemand met sa is bang dat hij of zij zal handelen op een manier die vernederend of 
beschamend zal zijn. De blootstelling aan de gevreesde sociale situaties gaat bijna altijd gepaard 
met extreme angst en mogelijk met paniekaanvallen. Sociale situaties worden daarom vaak verme-
den of slechts  met grote angst of stress doorstaan. Als deze angst in belangrijke mate de normale 
dagelijkse routine verstoord wordt de diagnose van sa gesteld. sa komt bij ongeveer vijf tot twaalf 
procent van de mensen voor. Alhoewel er behoorlijk succesvolle behandelingen bestaan, in de 
vorm van gedragstherapie en van farmacologische interventies, reageert ongeveer 40 procent van 
de mensen niet op deze therapieën. Fundamenteel onderzoek naar de neurobiologie van sa heeft 
als doel de onderliggende mechanismen van sa te begrijpen. Dit kan tevens leiden tot verbetering 
van behandelingen van sa. 
Persoonlijkheidstheorieën beschrijven vaak persoonlijkheidskenmerken die geassocieerd worden 
met de beleving van bepaalde emoties. Vaak wordt onderscheid gemaakt tussen persoonlijkheidsken-
merken die gerelateerd zijn aan een frequenter/intensievere beleving van positieve of negatieve emo-
ties. Extraversie en neuroticisme zijn de bekendste voorbeelden van dergelijke persoonlijkheidsken-
merken. Deze persoonlijkheidskenmerken zijn ook zeer relevant voor de ontwikkeling van sociale 
angst. Extraversie wordt gezien als een beschermende factor in de ontwikkeling van sa: hoe extra-
verter mensen zijn, hoe kleiner de kans op de ontwikkeling van sa. Het omgekeerde geldt voor neu-
roticisme: hoe hoger iemand scoort op neuroticisme - wat vaak gepaard gaat met verhoogde angst 
en piekeren - hoe groter de kans op de ontwikkeling van sociale angst. Naast deze factoren zijn de 
sociale omgeving waarin iemand is opgegroeid (waaronder de rol van de ouders) en het meemaken 
van traumatische gebeurtenissen zeer belangrijk voor de vatbaarheid voor het ontwikkelen van sa. 
Er zijn veel verschillende hersengebieden betrokken bij sociale angst en de persoonlijkheidsken-
merken neuroticisme en extraversie. Wij richten ons hier op centrale neurale circuits: gekoppelde 
hersenstructuren die samen een bepaalde cognitieve of emotionele functie vervullen. Een breed 
onderscheid wordt hier gemaakt tussen het emotiecircuit (dit circuit centreert zich rond de amygdala, 
de hersenstamnuclei en prefrontale schors) en het motivatiecircuit (gecentreerd rond het striatum, het 
ventraal tegmentale gebied, en ook de prefrontale schors). Het emotiecircuit is essentieel voor de de-
tectie van belangrijke, nieuw stimuli in de omgeving, om daar vervolgens snel op te kunnen reageren. 
Het motivatiecircuit is cruciaal voor het detecteren van mogelijk belonende situaties, en om gedrag 
voor te bereiden om de beloning te behalen. Aan de andere kant is dit circuit ook belangrijk bij het 
vermijden van straf. De emotie- en motivatiecircuits vormen de basis voor vele belangrijke cognitief-
emotionele functies, en de verstoring van hun functie is gekoppeld aan de ontwikkeling van onder 
andere angststoornissen. Bij het in kaart brengen van hersenfuncties wordt in dit onderzoek gebruik 
gemaakt van de beeldvormende techniek functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fmri). Hiermee kan 
op (een indirecte manier) het functioneren van de hersenen worden gemeten wanneer deelnemers in 
een mri-scanner een taak uitvoeren. Het functioneren van de hersenen kan op verschillende manieren 
worden benaderd. Het kan gaan om de lokale activatie van een bepaald hersengebied, het volume van 
een hersenstructuur, en de communicatie tussen verschillende hersenstructuren. Het centrale idee bij 
veel psychiatrische aandoeningen is dat met name de communicatie tussen zogenaamde regulerende 
prefrontale/corticale gebieden en subcorticale gebieden (zoals de amygdala) is verstoord.
Het doel van het huidige onderzoek is om deze neurale circuits te bestuderen in relatie tot 
sociale angst en persoonlijkheidskenmerken die belangrijk zijn voor de ontwikkeling van sociale 
angst. De deelnemers aan dit onderzoek hebben taken uitgevoerd die het functioneren van de 
twee neurale circuits beogen te testen. De verwachting is dat patiënten met sociale angst een an-
der activatiepatroon vertonen in het emotiecircuit dan de controlegroep. Dit zal een combinatie 
zijn van een sterker reactieve amygdala en verminderde prefrontale controle op sociale stimuli. 
Wat betreft het motivatiecircuit verwachten wij dat de activatiebalans bij sa is verstoord, en sa 
deelnemers sterker reageren op het vermijden van een negatieve beoordeling dan op het behalen 
van een positieve beoordeling. Wat betreft neuroticisme en extraversie is de verwachting dat deze 
persoonlijkheidsfactoren samenhangen (correleren) met het functioneren van de twee neurale cir-
cuits. Neuroticisme zal voornamelijk gepaard gaan met verhoogde reactiviteit van het emotie cir-
cuit en verminderde prefrontale regulatie, en sterkere vermijdingsdrang. Extraversie is gekoppeld 
aan sterkere prefrontale controle en beloningsgevoeligheid. De verwachting is daarom dat binnen 
de controlegroep bij deelnemers die hoog op neuroticisme en/of laag op extraversie scoren, deze 
circuits functioneren zoals bij de deelnemers met sociale angst.
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De data uit Hoofdstuk 2 en 3 zijn onderdeel van een groot longitudinaal onderzoeksproject: de 
Nederlandse studie naar depressie en angst (nesda). in hoofdstuk 2 wordt de link met neuroti-
cisme en amygdala-prefrontale connectiviteit onderzocht. Dit zijn twee belangrijke structuren in 
het emotiecircuit. De amygdala is belangrijk voor het verwerken van emotionele stimuli in de 
omgeving. De prefrontale schors is belangrijk voor het reguleren, en interpreteren van deze reac-
ties. De deelnemers aan het onderzoek kregen emotionele gezichtsuitdrukkingen te zien, terwijl zij 
in de mri scanner lagen. Op deze manier kon worden onderzocht hoe mensen reageren op nega-
tieve (bijvoorbeeld boze) gezichtsuitdrukkingen, in vergelijking met hun reactie op neutrale ge-
zichtsuitdrukkingen. De belangrijkste bevinding was dat de connectiviteit tussen de amygdala en 
een regulerend deel van de prefrontale schors (de rostrale anteriore cingulate cortex) verminderde 
naarmate de deelnemers hoger scoorden op neuroticisme. Daarnaast was de connectiviteit tussen 
de amygdala en het “evaluerende deel” van de prefrontale schors (de dorsomediale schors) juist 
positief gecorreleerd met neuroticisme. Dat zou kunnen betekenen dat mensen die hoger scoren 
op neuroticisme, zowel meer moeite hebben negatieve gezichtsuitdrukkingen in hun omgeving te 
verwerken of te controleren, als ook deze sneller te interpreteren als een negatieve beoordeling op 
het eigen handelen. De combinatie van deze twee resultaten geeft inzicht in de kwetsbaarheid voor 
negatieve stimuli geassocieerd met neuroticisme. 
 
Hoofdstuk 3 richt zich op het volume van hersengebieden in het emotie- en motivatiecircuit. Het 
volume van hersengebieden kan informatie geven over de onderliggende processen die belangrijk 
zijn voor hersenactivatie. Naast neuroticisme is in dit onderzoek vooral ook de rol van extraversie 
benadrukt. De belangrijkste bevindingen waren dat zowel de amygdala als de orbitofrontale cor-
tex een positieve correlatie met extraversie lieten zien. In tegenstelling tot de verwachtingen was 
er geen significante correlatie tussen hersenvolume en neuroticisme. De amygdala en de orbito-
frontale cortex zijn beide belangrijk voor het verwerken van emotionele informatie. Dit kan er op 
wijzen dat hoe extraverter iemand is, hoe meer (regulerend) vermogen hij heeft om emotionele 
stimuli te verwerken. 
 
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft een onderzoek naar het motivatiecircuit van patiënten met sociale angst. De 
hypothese was dat mensen met sociale angst een sterkere motivatie hebben om straf te vermijden 
dan om een beloning te behalen. Dit effect zou tot uitdrukking moeten komen in onbalans van de 
activatie in het neurale motivatie systeem. Zowel deelnemers met sociale angst als deelnemers van 
de controlegroep voerden een taak uit waarin zij ofwel “beloond” werden met de vertoning van 
een blij gezicht als zij een detectietaak zo snel mogelijk hadden uitgevoerd, ofwel “gestraft” werden 
met de vertoning van een boos gezicht als de detectietaak niet snel genoeg werd uitgevoerd. De 
resultaten lieten zien dat de sa-groep inderdaad een relatief sterker actief striatum (een belangrijk 
onderdeel van het motivatiecircuit) hebben als straf kan worden ontlopen. Dit wijst op het sterke 
vermijdingsgedrag dat zo kenmerkend is voor sa. 
 
In Hoofdstuk 5 wordt ook een onderzoek beschreven waar de anticipatie van sociale situaties in so-
ciale angst is gemeten, maar nu in een meer direct stressvolle context. In dit onderzoek voerden de 
deelnemers geen taakje uit, maar lagen zij voor een aantal minuten stil in de mri scanner (resting-
state fmri). Na een zogenaamde baseline-meting kregen de deelnemers te horen dat zij na het fmri 
onderzoek, geacht werden een korte presentatie te geven, waar de onderzoekers als beoordelaars 
zouden optreden. Na deze mededeling volgde een nieuwe fmri-meting, waarin dus geen specifieke 
taak werd uitgevoerd maar waarin deelnemers wel verhoogde angst en spanning rapporteerden. 
Deze meting werd gevolgd door de mededeling dat de korte presentatie toch niet doorging en het 
onderzoek na de laatste fmri-scan, klaar zou zijn. Op deze manier werden twee “rustmetingen” en 
een stressmeting gedaan. Tijdens de stressmeting vertoonde de sa-groep een verhoogde hartslag 
en stressbeleving. Dat ging gepaard met minder sterke connectiviteit tussen corticale emotie reg-
ulerende gebieden en de amygdala. Deze bevindingen kunnen een neurobiologische verklaring 
vormen voor de grote angst die sa patiënten ervaren als zij in het openbaar moeten spreken. 
In Hoofdstuk 6 zijn de data van het onderzoek van hoofdstuk 5 opnieuw geanalyseerd maar nu met 
nadruk op de persoonlijkheidsfactoren neuroticisme en extraversie. Evenals in hoofdstuk 2 en 3 heb-
ben wij ons hier nadrukkelijk op de controledeelnemers gericht en individuele verschillen binnen 
deze groep onderzocht. Uit de resultaten bleek dat hoe hoger mensen op neuroticisme scoren, hoe 
zwakker de connectiviteit tussen de corticale emotie-regulatiegebieden en de amygdala werd. Deze 
relatie was echter niet afhankelijk van het al dan niet in afwachting zijn van spreken in het openbaar. 
Daarentegen vertoonde extraversie juist wel een effect met corticale-amygdala-connectiviteit die af-
hankelijk was van de stressanticipatie. Gedurende de stressperiode lieten sterker extraverte mensen 
meer prefrontale controle over de amygdala zien. De combinatie van de extraversie- en neuroticisme-
bevindingen verschaffen inzicht in de neurobiologie van persoonlijkheidsfactoren die mensen meer 
of minder vatbaar kunnen maken voor de ontwikkeling van onder andere sociale angst. 
154 155
Hoofdstuk 7 behandelt statistische problemen die een grote rol spelen bij veel fmri-onderzoek 
naar het functioneren van de hersenen van mensen met psychische aandoeningen, en meer in het 
algemeen bij fmri-onderzoek naar verschillen tussen individuen. Het meest problematisch zijn de 
combinatie van lage statistische power en de grote flexibiliteit in data-analyse opties. Daarnaast 
wordt in wetenschappelijke publicaties van fmri-gegevens weinig nadruk gelegd op onafhankeli-
jke kwantitatieve replicatie van bevindingen. De combinatie van deze factoren leidt ertoe dat het 
bijna onmogelijk is om de waarde van gepubliceerde resultaten te beoordelen. Dit heeft te maken 
met ten minste twee consequenties van de statistische problemen. Ten eerste kan door de grote 
flexibiliteit in data-analyse-onderzoek de misleidende suggestie worden gewekt dat er bevindingen 
zijn gedaan die in overeenstemming zijn met eerder onderzoek. Aan de andere kant kan door het 
gebrek aan statistische power en de gerelateerde grote invloed van steekproeffouten een onnodig 
verwarrend beeld ontstaan als verschillende onderzoeken naar hetzelfde onderwerp activatie in 
andere hersengebieden laten zien. Theoretisch kunnen deze verschillen in hun geheel toe te schri-
jven zijn aan de toevallige samenstelling van de steekproef. Het is waarschijnlijk dat de huidige ge-
publiceerde literatuur een moeilijk te doorgronden combinatie is van deze twee uitwerkingen. Het 
is daarom aan te bevelen in dat toekomstig onderzoek zal bestaan uit grote steekproeven (hogere 
statistische power) en idealiter wordt gecombineerd met onafhankelijk replicatie onderzoek. 
Hoofdstuk 8 geeft een samenvatting van de belangrijkste bevindingen uit hoofdstuk 2 tot en met 
7. De hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 6 tonen consistent aan dat individuele verschillen in de persoonlijk-
heidskenmerken neuroticisme en extraversie gepaard gaan met verschillen in het functioneren van 
de emotie- en motivatiecircuits. Met met name de communicatie tussen prefrontale en subcorti-
cale gebieden zoals de amygdala lijkt hier van belang. Neuroticisme correleert met verminderde, en 
extraversie met verhoogde prefrontale regulatie van de amygdala. Dit zijn belangrijke bevindingen 
omdat deze persoonlijkheidskenmerken ook geassocieerd zijn met de ontwikkeling van onder an-
dere sociale angst en dit kan duiden op een neurobiologische kwetsbaarheid voor de ontwikkeling 
van sociale angst.
De hoofdstukken 4 en 5 demonstreren dat zich bij patiënten met sociale angst veranderingen 
manifesteren in het emotie- en motivatiecircuit. sa-patiënten zijn, vergeleken met de controlegroep, 
meer gemotiveerd om een straf te ontlopen als daartoe de kans bestaat (hoofdstuk 4). In een situ-
atie die een sterkere mate van stress opwekt, (hoofdstuk 5) zien we een verminderde regulatie van de 
amygdala door corticale gebieden. Een cruciale vraag die zich opdringt, is of vermijdingsgeneigdheid 
in de experimentele taak samenhangt met verhoogde stressgevoeligheid. Nadere analyse toonde dat 
deze effecten inderdaad in zekere mate samenhangen: hoe sterker de striatale reactiviteit om een straf 
te vermijden (Hoofdstuk 4), hoe sterker de stressreactie (hartslagverhoging, en stressbeleving) tijdens 
het in afwachting zijn in de aanloop naar het spreken in het openbaar (hoofdstuk 5). 
Het is belangrijk om te vermelden dat het onderzoek in dit proefschrift, evenals het meeste 
onderzoek naar klinische populaties in de literatuur, eenmalige metingen betreft. Dit is een belan-
grijke tekortkoming, omdat de conclusies die kunnen worden getrokken, hierdoor zeer worden be-
perkt. Met name wat betreft de relatie tussen persoonlijkheidskenmerken en de ontwikkeling van 
sociale angst, en mogelijke andere stoornissen, is zogenaamd longitudinaal onderzoek essentieel. 
Zo’n onderzoek vereist waarschijnlijk een grote steekproef. Het nesda-project beschikt over een 
grote hoeveelheid gegevens en herhaalde metingen, en daar liggen mogelijkheden om vragen rond 
de ontwikkeling (verandering) van aandoeningen en/of symptomen te onderzoeken. 
Het onderhavige onderzoek probeert inzicht te verschaffen in de neurale mechanismen be-
trokken bij sociale angst en relevante persoonlijkheidskenmerken. De bevindingen duiden op 
structurele en functionele verschillen in het emotie- en motivatiecircuit. Patiënten met sa ver-
toonden een combinatie van verhoogde vermijdingsgevoeligheid en verminderde corticale-sub-
corticale regulatie tijdens stress. Neuroticisme leek voornamelijk gekoppeld aan verminderde neu-
rale regulatie tijdens niet-stressvolle situaties terwijl extraversie juist meer specifiek betrokken was 
bij verhoogde regulatie tijdens stress. Het functioneren van deze circuits lijkt dus zeer belangrijk 
voor sa en de ontwikkeling daarvan. Voor de resultaten van dit onderzoek geldt - evenals voor al 
het bestaande gepubliceerde onderzoek - dat onafhankelijke replicaties nodig zijn om te bepalen 
of effecten vals dan wel echt positief zijn.
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